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FOREWORD
This volume contains the impressive record of the pro-
ceedings of the Second Annual Natural Law Institute
held at the University of Notre Dame on December 10th
and 1 lth, 1948. This year's two-day Institute was spon-
sored by Mr. Alvin A. Gould, of Cincinnati, Ohio. It
was attended by more than six hundred jurists, judges,
lawyers, legislators, philosophers, and others interested in
searching appraisal and reaffirmance of the proposition
that all American constitutional guaranties of liberty and
freedom must rest ultimately in the immutable principles
of a universal, unchanging moral philosophy.
This second Institute emphasizes the historical roots
of natural law theory in five distinct eras of world history.
Five accomplished and scholarly lectures graced the pro-
ceedings. Professor Maurice Lebel, of Laval University,
Quebec, gave the introductory lecture on Natural Law in
the Greek Period. Professor Ernst Levy, distinguished
teacher of legal history at the University of Washington
Law School, presented a profound and scholarly disserta-
tion on Natural Law in the Roman Period. Dr. Gordon
H. Gerould of Princeton University followed with a sketch
of natural law theory at the height of its early glory in
the mediaeval period, and the famous legal and philos-
ophical writer Heinrich Rommen concluded the journey
into the past with his presentation of Natural Law in the
Renaissance Period. The Institute was climaxed by a
stirring address by Federal District Judge Robert N.
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Wilkin, of Cleveland, Ohio, on the present status of nat-
ural law in American jurisprudence. Dean Clarence E.
Manion of the College of Law, University of Notre Dame,
served as active chairman of the proceedings, which also
included a short talk by Mr. Ben Palmer, of the Minne-
apolis bar, noted author and a lecturer at the first Natural
Law Institute, held in 1947.
The consensus of those who attended the second Insti-
tute was that, unless one agrees with Hegel that we "learn
nothing from history save, the fact that we learn nothing
from history," the proceedings were most stimulating and
successful. The similarities and dissimilarities in the
theories of natural law among many civilizations served
to provoke fresh reflection among those who are appre-
hensively aware of the stage in civilization which we have
reached. Attaining the scientific "know-how" by means
of which he can destroy himself, Man seems to lack the
moral force and law to prevent his own suicide. Notre
Dame believes that these annual Institutes may help to
correct, in some measure, that very grave deficiency.
ALFRED LONG SCANLAN,
Editor
INVOCATION
There are less than a half dozen references to lawyers
in the New Testament and on the occasions that are men-
tioned the Doctors of the Law are usually pictured in
the unenviable role of hecklers, trying to tempt or en-
snare Our Divine Savior in His speech. Let us examine
one of these refer,!nces which I believe will furnish us
with a thought suitable to the occasion that has brought
us together this morning.
We read in the Holy Gospel according to St. Matthew,
XXII 35-40 "And one of them, a doctor of the law, asked
Him tempting Him; Master which is the great com-
mandment in the law? Jesus said to him: Thou shalt
love the Lord Thy God with thy whole heart and with
thy whole soul and with thy whole mind. This is the
greatest and the first commandment, and the second is
like unto this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
On these two commandments dependeth the whole law
and the Prophets." A lawyer had asked Our Divine
Savior which was the first, the greatest law of all. It
was a question which the scribes had frequently pon-
dered, because it was not easy to choose one from among
the six hundred and fourteen precepts with which they
were familiar, and even though they had compiled a list
of the principal laws and prohibitions, they had not suc-
ceeded in coming to any agreement concerning the order
of importance in which they should be listed; in fact, they
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had come to believe that this impossibility of agreeing
upon the primacy of any one law was a sign that God
willed that all the precepts of the law should be observed
in the same order. Jesus settled the matter once for all
by the simple declaration that the first and greatest law
was to love God above all else, and the second was to
love our neighbor as ourselves.
These were not new laws. They were written in the
Old Testament though not in these precise words. When
Our Lord picked them out and placed them at the head
of the list it was easy to see their preeminence. And for
anyone who admits the existence of God, it is easy to see
the basis for the first and greatest law. If God is our
Creator upon whom alone we depend for our existence
and continuance in life, it is but logical that we belong
to Him and owe Him everything that we are and have
including a love that is above that for all else, The basis
for the law that our Divine Savior places second is not
so evident, especially since in the word neighbor He in-
ludes all men even our enemies, as He made so clear
in the parable of the Good Samaritan.
What is there in this "man" that God commands that
he be loved even as we love ourselves. As we rub shoul-
ders with him in our daily life he does not seem to be so
lovable. As Father Scott puts it: "Of all creatures man
alone is an enigma. At times he seems to be an angel,
again a devil. Proud of himself today, tomorrow he will
despise himself. His thoughts sometimes are as high as
heaven, at others as low as hell. A part of him delights
in what is good, another part drags him down to what he
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despises. A battle is continually waging within him. He
approves of the sublime but too often follows the debased.
"It is possible by observing the ways of other crea-
tures to forecast to a certain extent what they will do.
Of man ordinarily you can foretell nothing. Often a man
cannot himself foretell what he will do. He may plan and
purpose, only to be thwarted by himself. At times capable
of the heroic, he as frequently acts the craven. He often
wonders at his own courage and as often despises himself
for his cowardice.
"He disappoints himself and his friends by his con-
duct under certain circumstances, while under others he
wins admiration. He is a puzzle to himself. While men
are praising him, he may be harboring thoughts and pur-
poses that reek of infamy. While they are condemning
him he may be wrapped in spirit to the highest realms.
He wonders at his own vileness and at his own virtues.
He is a living contradiction. That is man." That is him
whom you must love even as you love yourself, no matter
where you find him and no matter what the color of skin
that clothes him; so says the second great law of God.
Man just doesn't seem worthy of love. In fact, he
seems to be the one great discordant note in nature. Man
is the only living thing that experiences rebellion within.
His passions are continually at war with his ideals, con-
stantly a trap for his downfall. Not so with other living
things. With them passion directs them to their welfare.
In indulging their instincts they follow the law of their
preservation. The contrary with man. Witness the
drunkard. The passions of other living things do not lead
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astray. Man's do. Look at the victims of vice. Animals
left to themselves do not go to excess. Man does. His
passions uncontrolled run away with him. The world is
strewn with wrecks of unbridled passion. Why is man
the one tragic contradiction in nature? We must go to
the first chapter of Genesis for the story. Man rebelled
against his Creator. He sinned and brought upon him-
self this tragic conflict within his own nature. There is no
other explanation. But we are not concerned with the
fall of man here, the fact remains that man with all his
tragic contradictions is still the Creator's Masterpiece.
"Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels." He
is still beloved by God. And not because of his sins and
imperfections, but, in spite of them, because he bears the
image and likeness of his Creator in his soul God com-
mands that he be loved by us even as we love ourselves.
The relations which form the basis for these two great
commandments also form the subject of a study that is of
special interest to students of law. In the first instance
the fact that God is the Creator and ruler of all things
including man not only places Him as the object of our
highest love but also as the supreme lawgiver. In truth,
all authority rests in God and no other lawgiver has one
iota of authority unless in one way or another it comes to
him from God.
Today we are not only concerned with the supreme
lawgiver but with the subject of law as well. We can,
therefore, pause a moment with profit to consider the
basis of God's second great commandment of love as the
basis of man's accountability to law. We have been com-
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manded by God to love our fellowman as ourselves, as
we have seen, not necessarily because of the good we
outwardly see in him but because he is the favored crea-
ture of God, made to the image and likeness of his
Creator and endowed with an immortal soul with intelli-
gence and free will. For exactly the same reason man
becomes a subject of law, he has a soul with the faculty
to reason and a will to choose. We do not here speak of
the law in nature about us, we speak of moral law, the
natural law, the positive law of God or of those who have
a right to direct us. All the world about us, the trees, the
flowers, the birds and the beasts is subject to the inexor-
able laws of nature which determine and direct their
way through time. They have not, however, been given
laws for the keeping of which they will be held account-
able by their Creator. It is true that man also, like the
trees, the flowers, the birds and the beasts is subject to the
immutable laws of nature in many things, but at the same
time precisely because God has made him higher than all
nature about him and has given him an immortal soul en-
dowed with faculties to reason and to choose He has
made him accountable and a subject of laws some placed
by the Creator directly and others by those to whom it
has been given to share in authority.
If I understand correctly the purpose of this Institute,
we are assembled here today to show from history that
there has always been recognized by man not only posi-
tive laws but a law written by Almighty God upon man's
immortal soul which, in fact, has proved the basis for all
moral laws. Since this certainly is of inestimable worth in
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these troubled times when so many people are turning
their back upon God, we beg our Creator and supreme
lawgiver to enlighten us and to guide us during these two
days that our endeavors may be fruitful and conducive not
only to our own spiritual and moral growth but to the
honor and glory of that same all-wise and eternal law-
giver.
MOST REV. PAUL C. SCHULTE, D.D.,
Archbishop of Indianapolis,
Honorary Chairman,
Second Natural Law Institute Proceedings
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INTRODUCTION
It has been most gratifying to see the second Natural
Law Institute conducted by the College of Law of the
University of Notre Dame accorded the same enthusi-
astic reception which greeted the first Institute in De-
cember of 1947.
The members of this year's Institute were privileged
to review, under the expert tutelage of the eminent jurists
and scholars whose papers are reprinted in these pages,
the development of the doctrine on Natural Law from the
Greco-Roman period to the present.
The full flowering of the philosophy of Natural Law
had to wait upon the rise of the Scholastics of the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries. Yet, even in the era preceding
the advent of Christianity, incontrovertible evidence of
the recognition of its existence and innumerable refer-
ences to the Natural Law, are to be found. The Greek
poets and philosophers spoke reverently of it as of some-
thing higher than the law of the land. They regarded it
as a gift of the gods, implanted in the reason of man who
alone among creatures was possessed of a sense of right
and wrong. The poets, and especially the philosophers,
emphasized the fact that the Natural Law was unique
among laws: it was unchanging and unchangeable, uni-
versal; furthermore, it was a law that was eminently prac-
tical, and not merely a topic of philosophical speculation.
Cicero and the Roman jurists echoed these teachings of
the Greeks.
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Only with great difficulty can the value of these testi-
monials to the Natural Law by writers, and thinkers, of a
pre-Christian era be overestimated. Too many jurists
today tend to view insistence upon Natural Law as a
Christian - and more particularly, a Catholic - precon-
ception and prejudice. And for them, as for so many
persons in all walks of life today, the only prejudices that
may legitimately be allowed to influence one's judgment
or one's teaching, are the prejudices that bear the stamp
of the materialistic, the agnostic, the positivistic
philosophy.
The Honorable Robert N. Wilkin in his excellent paper
notes that "within the last eight or ten years there are
unmistakable signs of dissatisfaction over the insufficiency,
the aridity, of modem positivism, and very definite indi-
cations of a revival of Natural Law philosophy."
This is very heartening news. If the University of
Notre Dame and its College of Law can, through these
Natural Law Institutes and the publication of their pro-
ceedings, help to hasten progress in this direction, we
shall have fulfilled a patriotic as well as a religious duty.
For thus we shall have helped foster a return, not only
to the truths taught by the great philosophers and theo-
logians of the Church, but to the truths deeply loved and
steadfastly defended by the Founders of our Country and
by them written into the laws of our blessed land.
REv. JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, C.S.C.,
President of the University of Notre Dame
NATURAL LAW IN THE GREEK PERIOD
Maurice Le Bel
T HE problem of natural law, which this Institute has
worthily undertaken to reexamine, is certainly one of
the most ancient in human thought as well as one of the
most subtle in its aspects and one of the most far reaching
in its conclusions. Lawyers and philosophers have long
been waging an enormous battle of books and ideas over
it, so that I owe the perilous honor of delivering this ad-
dress to the fact that I am neither a lawyer nor a philoso-
pher. And it is very much to be regretted, for, to treat
natural law in Ancient Greece, as it should be treated, to
see it and present it as a whole, one should be altogether
a lawyer and a philosopher, an historian and a humanist.
This is not said to overexaggerate the difficulties of the
question, but to emphasize, right at the beginning, both
its academic and practical importance.
It is customary to praise our age as being unique for
its practical science. But its achievements in other fields
are equally remarkable, although they may not always
be obvious to the public. There has been lately, for in-
stance, an outstanding revival of interest in the study of
Antiquity; our contemporaries are burning with the de-
sire of finding the primitive sources of truth and of the
past institutions. Moreover, we are eager to rebuild the
social unity of the world, which has been broken up in
its religious origin ever since the Reformation, to mention
only one cause of division; we are trying to organize the
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State on the basis of a common law, better appropriate to
the nature of man; our world, however chaotic and
troubled it may appear to the observer, is earnestly
searching for unity. One World seems to be the motto of
our century.
Natural law may be one of the bases of unity for our
world. China, the mother of civilization, with a popula-
tion of over 400,000,000 people, managed to live on nat-
ural law for over three thousand years, from 2600 B.C.
to 600 A.D. I After the First World War, the new Repub-
lic of Austria, strange as it may seem, officially recognized
natural law in the seventh article of her National Code.
A good deal of contemporary jurisprudence, for instance,
in America and in Great Britain, is still based on natural
law, although many writers on legal science never use
the expression, partly because they find it too ambigu-
ous, partly because they do not recognize natural law.
With the ever-growing importance of the international
law and with the deep changes in the life of nations
brought about by war and conquest, it is not surprising
that a revival of interest in natural law should take
place nowadays; the science of natural law has got to be
reviewed afresh and to be restated in the light of prog-
ress, almost in the same way as the love and the taste for
the Classics have got to be fostered every generation by
popular and scholarly editions and translations.
Besides being commanded by the extraordinary devel-
opment of international relations, the study of natural law
1 In Indonesia, Adath is the word for Natural law; with a present
population of about 40,000,000 people. Indonesia still administers
justice for the natives according to natural law.
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may be regarded as a vigorous element in the new Hu-
manism which is taking place under our eyes. Dr. Car-
rell's book, Man The Unknown, which will perhaps re-
main the greatest book of the first half of the century,
was certainly written to be a beacon to man, who, in his
desire to conquer matter, is rather inclined to forget him-
self and his nature. A great many men have forgotten,
if they have ever known it, where they come from and
where they are going to; all of us may know more or less
about our specialized field. But what do we know about
Man? "I look into myself," first said Heraclitus.2 "Know
Thyself" was written on the fronton of the temple of
Delphes.3 "Man is the measure of all things," said Pro-
tagoras. 4 The study of natural law may teach us some-
thing about the true nature of man.
To avoid a good deal of confusion prevalent on the sub-
ject, I shall first endeavor to define and describe the
terms of the question, without indulging in too many ab-
stract definitions and thus losing ground with reality and
synthesis. After trying to clear the ground of any mis-
understanding, I shall pass on to the main point: Natural
Law in the Greek Period, which I shall present in two
parts; in the first, it will be natural law as seen by the
non-philosophers; the second will deal with natural law
2 Heraclitus, fr. 116 (106): &V0dQtobL0 aoL RET&Tt YLYVd)0C EtV &au-
-Vob Va.l 0(0CQOVEEV.
Heraclitus, fr. 115 (0): JmXi; bhL .6yog ka' v a w (v. Diels,
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker)
S Plato, Theaet. 183 B: H wvi' v8QdL ndv3co-v XQTI1LdtCov PrQov LIVCL.
4 ryoh osavr6v. Plato, Phaedrus 229 e: o 8vapai no xaT& zb
Ae).qAX<v yQett&ta YVOv .aL aUT6V.
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as seen by the philosophers. In the conclusion, I shall
summarize my paper and draw the main conclusions.
To begin with, by Ancient Greece I mean primarily
Athens, "the school of Hellas," as Pericles and Euripides
used to call the Athens of their day. Since the history of
Greece is generally centered upon that of Athens because
her past happens to be better known than that of the
other city-states, I shall leave aside the colonies and the
islands, as well as the city-states of the homeland; our
knowledge of their legal institutions and literature is too
fragmentary to be relied upon for this paper. On the
other hand, the principles of Athenian law are well
known; it is in Athens that the study of Greek law was
most flourishing and produced fundamental works,
which are still analyzed in Colleges of Law.
Law is a Greek invention, the word itself and the con-
ception. It is grossly inexact and unfair to repeat the
commonplace that Greece gave the world arts and philos-
ophy, whereas it was left to Rome to give mankind gov-
ernment and jurisprudence, as though reality could pro-
duce such cleavage. Too many Greek laws, it is true,
have perished. Nevertheless, Greek law is original; lim-
ited by time and space, it was not, like that of Rome,
adopted and applied for centuries in a huge empire made
up of divers races. Yet, Plato's Academy, which was, in
some measure, the first College of Law, used to teach
jurisprudence and draw up codes for colonies, which
were the very basis of the Roman law; Plato's Laws are
the legislator's masterpiece, and he would certainly not
have written the four last books of his Laws, which deal
mostly with civil and criminal law, had there not been any
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systematic and technical study of Greek jurisprudence in
his Academy. Isaeus was the first jurist of Greece in the
fourth century; Aristotle and Theophrastus were the
greatest jurists of Greece, since they were the first to
write an Esprit des Lois and to compare divers legisla-
tions and constitutions. Although it is difficult to talk
about the spirit of Greek Law, since Greek jurisprudence
and court practice underwent only a slight development
from Solon to Ar'stotle, yet the conception of law is
originally Greek and is the result of a long process of
thought.
The Greeks used several words for law: 6of6g, XO'o0,
v6tog, TO LXCLLOV. 'OQft6g is a metaphor belonging to
geometry; it means that which is right, the right
line, rectum, regula, as in orthopaedics; there is no
equivalent in Greek to the Latin jus, that which unites or
binds men, jungere, jugum, conjugium. The word X6yog
means law made by reason and based upon reason, in op-
position to fatality or Destiny; it means also relation,
principle or formula. The word v6tiog, which does not
exist in Homer and is first found only in the seventh cen-
turn poet Hesiod, means till the second part of the fifth
century the old and traditional custom; it means also the
habit resulting from the necessity of conforming to exist-
ing conditions, that is to say the political and social en-
vironment as well as the psychological dispositions that
go with the existing conditions; the word v6tog suggests
the idea of sharing, of division, separation, equal parts; it
is used for law, justice, statute. The word Tb txatov (8x)
is the abstract and absolute right or justice; 8*txatov
is a part of it in the same way as lex is a part of jus;
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8&XT is that which directs, shows the way towards an
aim, as can be seen in the Latin words: dicere, digitur,
indicare, judicare. And natural law is rightly called by
Aristotle: To cpioLxov 8(XaLov, qpo'ut G LaLov, natural jus-
tice, that is to say, justice recognized and admitted with-
out any formal or conventional declaration, resulting
from the nature of men and based upon the nature of
our being.
The Greeks had a peculiar conception of law. To us,
the word suggests a court and a judge, a set of technical
rules or regulations which are accumulated, revised and
understood by specialists especially. The Greeks did not
regard the law exactly in the same way, since their genius
was rather metaphysical. They were inclined to consider
the law as something absolute, permanent, which it was
not a good thing to change, because they thought that
law, like poetry, was of divine origin; although Greek
laws were changed and revised at times, yet the Greeks
were inclined to regard the law as sovereign. Socrates
is not speaking metaphorically when he declares himself
the slave of the law, in the Crito, where he converses with
the Laws and admits the absolute sovereignty of the law.
To the Greeks law stood over the society; it was the bind-
ing force of the city, it was born with the city itself, it
was the force that brought and held the city together.
The Greek city was an ethical society, originally formed
to secure justice to all; it is essentially an educational in-
stitution, the city itself being the organ of education for
the citizens. The keyword is education; Plato's Republic
contains the ideal curriculum of secondary education,
the Laws present the ideal curriculum of university edu-
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cation, in the same way as Aristotle's Politics deals with
the best form of government and the best form of educa-
tion. There is no distinction in Greek between the
science of politics and the science of jurisprudence; to
look for the best form of government to live in so as to
fully develop one's self as a citizen, is to look for the ideal
law and the best theory of law; the subtitle of Plato's
Republic is "Concerning Justice."
The expression "natural law" is ambiguous, confusing
and misleading, not to the Greeks who believed in city
education and in generation, but to us who have a two
thousand year old heritage of Christianity, for the expres-
sion "natural law" has today a definite Christian con-
notation; it has none, of course, in pagan Greece, where
natural law is considered as a thing of human reason
alone. Moreover, the word law suggests nowadays some-
thing fixed, laid, proclaimed, written; the word natural
connected with law suggests something peculiar to human
nature. On the other hand, natural law is unwritten,
and, as such, cannot always be defined and grasped eas-
ily; it is universal, all men have a natural, infallible and
practical knowledge of it; man must do good and avoid
evil; he who sins should be punished; man must preserve
his own being. These precepts are immanent in human
nature, they are part of our nature, they are the very
expression of the universal notion of justice; they are im-
planted in us, we would not be what we are without them.
Having described the terms of the question, I shall now
turn to the first part of this paper. How did the Greek
writers, the non-philosophers, express the idea of univer-
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sal justice? Is it possible to see in their expression a de-
velopment of the concept of natural law? That is the
point now under discussion, and I shall follow the chron-
ological order.
Partly because poetry is several centuries older than
prose in Greece, partly because poets are usually endowed
with deeper feeling and insight than most people, I shall
begin with Homer, the father, the source of all poetry. In
the Iliad, where we can trace the beginning of the inter-
national law with Achilles and Agamemnon being made
friends, Homer does not use the word law, but he clearly
sets forth, in the first book of his epic poem, the problem
of justice and injustice, of right and wrong. For him,
justice is of divine origin; in the very first lines of the
poem he describes the Achaeans carrying a staff in their
hands, as "the judges who under Zeus preserve the or-
dinances." 5 In the eighteenth book of the Iliad, there is,
on the shield of Achilles, a lively description of justice in
a city, and that is new and important.
"The folk gathered in the meeting-place. Here a
dispute had arisen, and two men were disputing over
the price of a man slain; the one claimed to have
paid all, putting his case to the people, while the
other denied having got any payment and both were
eager to get a settlement by a referee. The folk
were shouting for both, helpers on either side, and
heralds were keeping them back. And the elders
were sitting on seats of stone in a stately circle, and
they held in their hands the staves of the loud-voiced
heralds; with these they got up and gave their judg-
6 Homer, The Iliad I, 237-239: v~v ctuxi gtv uleg 'AXaCtGv iv xa dLXQLg
WpoQioUO bmaxUr6kOot 61 TE4LG Oitngn~ A~ EIQ&-LcLL
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ments, each in his turn. In their midst were set two
talents of gold, to give him among them who should
pronounce the decision most rightly." 6
Strange as it may seem, justice is still administered al-
most in the same way in China today. In Homer, law
was customary.
Hesiod is the first poet to have coined the word "law."
His most famous poem, Works and Days, he wrote to
protest against the injustice of which he had been the
victim; he dedicated his work to his brother Perses, to
whom he gives the following advice:
"Perses, take this to heart and so lend an ear to jus-
tice and put violence from your mind utterly, for
this is the law that the son of Cronus ordains for
mankind: Though fishes and beasts and winged birds
devour one another, since justice is not in them, yet
to men he has given justice, and best it is by far. For
if one has a mind to know and to speak what is just,
to him far seeing Zeus gives a good life; but whoso-
ever wilfully bears false witness and forswears him-
self, and therein offending justice suffers hurt incur-
able, his offspring in time to come are left the more
in darkness; but the man whose oath is true, his off-
6 Homer, The Iliad XVIII, 497-508
Aaol 8' Elv dyogfi goav d0Q6 oV evfta 8 veixog
hQd 3QEL, 860 8' Qv8g & vExov EvExa ioLVg
dV8QO6g dnroq,01tvoU- 6 AV oXET ' dro oiva0
8flA4 XLtpacOXQoV, 6 8' &dVCLvEro t,18iV WcLaL.
eit~qo) 8' lioftv bd IOQL TELOa .Q Woom.
Xaaot 6' dAq-,o9Q0L0oLV brAMOV, dacpL; dQCOYoL
fl'rQuxeg 8' ?IQa XcZ6v IQA-hov- Ot 89 yiQov 8~
oOXIA C8 XnQ1CXov v XEQG' 9xoV hEQo(Pd)Vv
JQ'be EoFTOZL Mi;~ 1EQQ bt ,Xp.
rTOtiV !;e& ILiwaOV, dpwL61bigL U 8(,xatov.
xElTo 8' 6&Q' iv oLUooLtG 8o XQ O O "6liavra
"tj 86pev 6g E-& -roiat 8ixyv Mw6vzra EtoL.
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spring are the better in time to come." 7
This conception of law and justice is much clearer than
that of Homer. Theognis, who was robbed of his prop-
erty by tyrants in the sixth century, asks himself this
burning question, which is still very modem in tone:
"Yet how can it be rightful, Father Zeus, King of
the Immortals, that a man that hath no part in un-
righteous deeds, committing no transgression nor
any perjury, but is a righteous man, should not fare
aright? What other man living, or in what spirit,
seeing this man, would thereafter stand in awe of
the Immortals, when one unrighteous and wicked
that avoideth not the wrath of God or man, indulg-
eth wanton outrage in the fulness of his wealth,
whereas the righteous be worn and wasted with
grievous Penury?" 8
7 Hesiod, Works and Days, 274-285:
'Q MlUYI; ai B 69c TC&E-1 qQErOi.&6XXEO (finL,
X VU UX1qg btiXOJE, O1tlq B' aL)./lOEO nt v.
T6v8E yQ dVtOQmIOLL v6 iov 8&rtct KQoVcov,
tXUO Iti xa NtOcoQat xaov ooo ;-E6 6og
h•JE dkoX q iA "c' 8LXoTI€ ia-et tL'PT'O .. .C&Tt-
&V0QW)(OIAL 6' rO)XE Bi Tl, atoxv cQ(G71yl
Y(YCav Et dQ TL9 X' 0AT8XI 16L &LL' dyOQ66CL ZEi9-
-YLYV(60XCLV, 74) tLiV T' 5).60V &6iBO EUQUOt
8 ixE RaQwt'VQ(th Ix~v lntooxov 6R6oaa;
141'oerUL, IV &~ 8Lv.Tiv 6 61pa; VijvEWrov e&oOfi
-roi) bi T' d~RanQo-riQin y~vei1 pt63nwfte XEW"Ut~V
dv8Q6; 6' EO6Qxou yrvrii wc6rnov d~e(vcov.
8 Theognis, 743-752:
Kal -ror', &OaV&rowV ft=Wie, RCO; &t~ 8MOV,
007JV OL; &WfQ &.6g bV0 dbiww,
4AL utv' 6 EQ6 a.oLwV xa-ixov R718,' 6QX0oV d.tTQ6V,dl),eL & Xatog &.Lv, Rth "r & bivatm ReiOn;
Tig 8ij ,CEv DQoz6; 61ko,, 6Qrov 3LQ6S -70U0v, E3xEL-ra
&tovc' dO11V&-roug, xal 7Lva Ornt6v fxwv,
6nns16" &vAQ dmog X 1 &dzdcloo.xog, ozire reu MvSBQg
ogrp %Eu dOovdizv R1vtv &Xeu6.LEvog,
(160 t Onio1W XEXoQT'iVog, o 1 i xOL
7Q1&XovxcL XcLXE3TI -gQ6gEVO 3tevin;
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This passage shows that the objective notion of justice
and injustice, independently of the legislator's will, is
the real foundation of natural law; this feeling of what is
just and of what is unjust in this world is implanted in
human nature, it is universal. Moreover, the idea of
justice being satisfied in another world is implied.
It was left to Sophocles to be the champion of
natural law in the Athens of the fifth century; no other
poet, I should say, not even any philosopher, has more
exactly and poetically described the concept of natural
law than Sophocles. He makes us conscious of it, in the
same way as Paul Claudel makes us conscious of the pres-
ence of God and of the working of Grace in man's soul.
Oedipus Tyrannus contains several passages on natural
law, among which I have chosen this short prayer.
Listen to this magnificent prayer for purity in word
as in deed. The theme of this prayer is the following:
May I ever be pure in word and in deed, loyal to the
unwritten and eternal law.
"May destiny still find me winning the praise of
reverent purity in all words and deeds sanctioned by
those laws of range sublime, called into life through-
out the high clear heaven, whose father is Olympus
alone; their parent was no race of mortal men, nor
shall oblivion ever lay them to sleep; the god is
mighty in them, and he grows not old." 9
9 Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, 863-872:
XO 91 tIOL twtIVE(J (QOVL
poiQa t&v e&J lo'ov dyve(av 6yew
FQyO~V TE a.vrixv, &V V6"6o :T6xELVTMrc
fll)tOk, OUQavlav
8L' aU1Qa rEVo)ODiVrEg, &V 'OXVJ=0qo
=rt Q 16vog, oi~g vLv
Ovacr& cPia; dviQgov
ITrLev, oma X Ore XdoQa( XearTxoctdan"
iya; Av To6To; 0 6, o068 YrQ6.o02L.
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The play of Antigone contains a passage even more ex-
plicit: it reaches the sublime. The whole tragedy itself
is based on the distinction between the written law and
the unwritten law; Creon sticks to the word of the law,
his son and his wife pay for it with their lives; Antigone
sticks to the spirit of the law, but she dies gladly for it,
she even rushes to death, which is unique in Greek litera-
ture; her sacrifice has made the world brighter.
Cr. Now, tell me thou - not in many words, but briefly
- knewest thou that an edict had forbidden this?
An. I knew it; could I help it? It was public.
Cr. And thou didst in deed dare to transgress that law?
An. Yes, for it was not Zeus that had published me that
edict; not such are the laws set among men by the
Justice who dwells with the gods below; nor deemed
I that decrees were of such force, that a mortal
could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes
of heaven. For their life is not of today or yesterday,
but from all time, and no man knows when they
were first put forth. Not through dread of any hu-
man pride could I answer to the gods for breaking
these. Die I must - I knew that well (how should
I not?) - even without thy edicts. But if I am to
die before my time, I count that a gain: for when
any one lives, as I do, compassed about with evils,
can such an one find ought but gain in death? So
for me to meet this doom is trifling grief; but if I had
suffered my mother's son to lie in death an unburied
corpse that would have grieved me; for this, I am
not grieved. And if my present deeds are foolish in
thy sight, it may be that a foolish judge arraigns my
folly." 10
10 Sophocles, Antigone, 446-470:
KR o 8' EW tto 1k ptixog, &)ket ouvr6ptwg,
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The grave Thucydides, the most scientific historian of
Antiquity, admits the existence of the unwritten law. He
makes Pericles say in his famous funeral speech:
"Our form of government does not enter into rivalry
with the institutions of others. We do not copy our
neighbors, but are an example to them. It is true
that we are called a democracy, for the administra-
tion is in the hands of the many and not of the few.
But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in
their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also
recognized.... We are prevented from doing wrong
by respect for the authorities and for the laws, hav-
ing an especial regard to those which are ordained
for the protection of the injured as well as to those
unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of
tbnafta XiiQUX~vrCi ph lQdZOELV -retft;
AN jtfh" TL 8' o 1pekkov; ipcw Y&Q Av.
KR XOL 8 tT' f6t.tag 01608' 'MQ6LVELV v6poug;
AN o6 ydQ n' tm Zvbg Av 6 xnQ15ag -r&8e,
00,8 AI t6voLXo; rCG) vo CX Eav AbcTJ
TOLOUG8' IV dVOQ)XtOLULV &3QwEv v6poug-
oW"o fo tV o zoaoto p6vonv -r& a6
Q Y W', 40T' dYQ =CL Xd, a(PA OEGiV
V6LL &it'aat wo OV T6V 8W0 {EQ8Q 1L -V
oi 'yeQ TL VU-V ye Xd~Dig, M~' dEE XeOre
tfi rCiiMna, noOME088. It~ 5 rou 4Pq,1.
.1flow I &yO II&EXOV, &dJ8Q65 o0,8EV~
4pQ6vfqpu becca', IV ftotci Thv 8!xvv
8d0EtV- 4Oi"iii y&Q i -jI, r 8' 00;
X81 gh 0au ;(QwkoUn Qcg- Et U& .100 XQ6VOU
3tQ6aftev favoI4Dt, %iQ68O aM' IVcb MiYw.
80rng YaQ IV nouow, 65 1-16, ,cuxotg
tt, cg 58' oZX1 nzrfT0aV&V nk~bog qgQE&;
OfMrCog 9POLYS rOi,8E TO 0(S0v TUXELV
itQ' 009&V dyog. d)X' dv, EL g6v Ig i &fiq
taivg oav&vt dowrcov irmx6av Vixvv,
nedvots e&v qjxyouv- -Votaf 8' olkn dky;iotvo.
Cot 8' Et 8On6O VFM tWOQC 8QGCOL eUY~dVELV,
OXE86V TL ILL)Q(41 tg(flQCV 6qLX&~nVO).
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them the reprobation of the general sentiment." n
Xenophon, who was in his youth the disciple of Socra-
tes, has imagined the following dialogue between Hippias
and Socrates in his Memorabilia:
Socrates Do you know, Hippias, said Socrates, what is
meant by the unwritten laws?
Hippias These laws, replied Hippias, are those which
are observed everywhere in any country.
Socrates Could you say that they have been established
by men?
Hippias How could I say that, Socrates, knowing that
men cannot get together and that they do not
speak the same language?
Socrates Who do you think is the author of those laws?
Hippias I believe that these laws are from the gods, for,
among all men, the first law is to respect the
gods.
Socrates And to respect parents is it not also a universal
law?
Hippias It is so, Socrates.
The dialogue, which deals with justice, is rather long.
It ends this way.
Socrates Then, Hippias, do you believe that the gods
command what is just or what is contrary to
justice?
Hippias No, by Jove, they do not command what is con-
trary to justice; for, if a god did not make just
laws, it would be very difficult for another leg-
islator to make some.
11 Thucydides, L. II, 87: 'AvwaZOnog 8 r& &ta tox; oaouXoov-reg r&
8 tl&UM 8UL 86g IJtA!ZTra Ob 3aQCLVO0LU1&v, TrWV U, dt Iv dQXfi
6YV9)V dXQO60EL %W zav v6 1ow, Xal RL IT E 4Ef T)V 500L E ' be&PE-
O rV duoujvav )CIVEULL Xfal 800L 'yQaqot 5V1E; axl4vrWtXv 6tto-
4oyoutdvrv q(iQovolv.
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Socrates In consequence, Hippias, the gods recognize the
identity of what is just and of what conforms
to law." 12
As we see from those quotations, and I could still mul-
tiply them, we are now a long way from Homer; there
has been in Greece a gradual development of the concept
of natural law and also a gradual improvement in the de-
scription of it in poets and historians especially; it is of
divine origin, natural, universal, known to all. I inten-
tionally started with the non-philosophers in order to
show that natural law is not a philosopher's conception
alone; it was talked about in conversation, it was brought
on the stage, it was admitted in the writing of history.
And as we move towards the fourth century, the concept
is clearer and more easily understood and defined.
II
There is also a certain evolution in the philosopher's
conception and expression of natural law. I shall now
turn to the second part of this paper. To begin with, I
shall try to show the origin and the development of the
12 Xenophon, Memorabilia, L. IV, ch. IV: 'AyQ&pou; U uvag
o100a, 9(pn, i 'Irtfa, v6poug;
'Exotg av o~ov &twrtv, gqp, 5 ot vftQcirnL aioi,
giftwvo; Kdatg aG v, &R dt yE ofmE ouvOftEt
avrsg v buvnftiev oUTE 6t6qcovoL EiCL; Tlvag ov,
9q)71, VO~ttLg TCEIrX&Ma -tot, v61toug To~rroug; 'Ey&
piv, 9qpl, ihobg olgat "rorg v6govg "roikovg zoig
dvffo~dnoLg ftdva. Ki yeLQ xaQ. Adotv dvOQd~ro;g
nrQ&OV vo09tETrc1L OEoig oi6ELv. O oiv xat yo~iag
zqpdv navraXaii VORLEUL; Kal -roir-o, grl..
fl6rrrQov obv, d 'Ia=Ca, robg fteobg oiy yt XQQaa voAoOefrfev & XX
r(OV 8LXL(OV 06X AU.)t tteL AV', !(n Xoki Y4Q AV U109; -Y9 ; rL 8&-
XMa vo&ioC'rLEorv EL & 6g. Kl "rog Oroia d a, & 'Iada, -6 ak6
8txaL6v rs xczt v6tutwv elvca d4QiO .
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concept of natural law from Pythagoras to the Stoics.
Then I shall endeavor to show that the evolution of the
concept of natural law is bound up in Greece with
the evolution of the concept of the individual. And lastly
I shall study natural law in relation with slavery and
usury.
The first difficulty concerns the definition of natural
law. Its existence is admitted by experience and reason;
its subject is man or human nature; its object is made up
of a few general principles such as: good must be done
and evil, avoided; damages must be repaired; its basis is
the sense of justice; its qualities are based on human na-
ture: it is universal and it is immutable. But it is only
after a long process of thought that this definition has
been arrived at; the main phases of this development may
be seen in Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle and
the Stoics.
It is to Pythagoras that we owe the first study of the
principles of justice. For him and for his disciples, jus-
tice was a square number, that is to say, a number multi-
plied into itself; the word number had then a wider
meaning than today: it meant both quantitative relation
and qualitative essence. Anyhow, a square number, be-
ing composed of equal parts, is perfectly harmonious;
each part has an equal numerical value and the whole is
perfect. It follows from that conception of justice as a
square number that the State is made up of equal parts,
is the sum of equal members. The state will live and
justice will be preserved as long as its parts are kept
equal; it is only a matter of adjustment and equilibrium.
Equality is conceived as the principle of law. But how is
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equality going to be kept? By measuring out to every-
body what is measured to him: justice is requital. Hence
the theory of punishment, the law of retaliation; every-
body must suffer as he has acted.
Pythagoras' theory of justice perfectly conforms to the
deep rooted feeling of the Greeks for equality. When a
colony was founded, and even on the homeland, the heads
of the families used to think of themselves as equals; they
thought of forming a sort of community of equals. That
feeling is thus expressed by Aristophanes, in The Clouds:
"What is the use of geometry? says Strepsiades. Why, for
measuring lands into equal portions. - Do you mean the
colonists' land? No, I mean all the land." 13 Plato
adopted the Pythagorian conception of justice in the
Republic, but he greatly enlarged upon it by giving it a
deeper meaning and a more spiritual content. Aristotle
objected to the conception of justice as mere requital, in
his Ethics, but he admitted that proportionate requital
was the very bond of the state.14 Moreover, Aristotle's
theory of "particular" justice, as distinguished from "uni-
versal" justice, owes something to Pythagoras.
If Pythagoras may be credited with being the first to
have thought of equality as the principle of justice, which
is Aristophanes, The Clouds, 202-204:
AAA. rEwIpE-Qta.
IT. Tom' olv ,d iwa XQiOtLIMv;
MA. Fv tvalwrOiLoca.
MT. 116rea ,iv X.TI1Qovxtx1)v;
MA. Ox, e et v ,c aiv.
14 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1132b: AoXEE b8 tL Xa T6
v&ov, 6g evaL d6ark 6(awv, &UnsQ 01 fllrMY6QUoL 1(PC aVt"
do)Q(oo y LQ &tnk r6 bxnatov z6 dvttaog 0 W .. ,6 6' dmu2rxov-
06 o& ipaOQUtE okr'' bei - 8tav inxcwv czxLov orz' bd T6 8toQ-
6o tl. ......
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is so important in the concept of natural law, Heraclitus
is the first philosopher to have shown the relation between
the divine law and the human laws.
Heraclitus, one of the greatest political thinkers of
Greece in the fifth century, is remembered mostly for this
hatred of democracy, his prophecy about global war and
his pre-Christian utterances on the vanity of all human
affairs. But he does not seem to have been, so far, fairly
appreciated by scholars. To begin with, long before Plato
and Socrates, he had a lofty conception of the law and he
was the first to transform the concept of law into some-
thing real. For him law is reason; it must rule and gov-
ern, because it is neither transitory nor capricious; it is
constant, serene, eternal; it deals with the general and the
universal. The city where man lives must be based on
law, because law is reason and reason is universal; the
science of politics is derived from the knowledge of the
universal law. Although his theory is not systematically
expressed, yet his fragments are numerous enough to re-
veal his conception of the law. "The people must fight
for the law just as for a city wall." (fr. 44/100/) "With
god all is beautiful, good, and just, but men hold that this
or that is unjust or is just" (fr. 102 /61/). "All human
laws are sustained by the one divine law, which is infinite-
ly strong, and suffices, and more than suffices, for them
all" (fr. 114/91b/). 15
15 Heraclitus, fr. 44 (100) 9QXEoOL XQh1 '9v 8f.&ov frtQ ToU v611ov
6XOOX3EQ T6XEO;.
Heraclitus, fr. 102 (61): ) Li~v Oftr xa& advra %a! &yaft& xal 8i-
xuta, &vOQw0:ToL 8i 5 gv ?btxa reLkqmcatv I N 81xata.
Heraclitus, fr. 114 (91b) rQ&pov-raL YeLQ t E9r ol dv1J0d@=tot v6iot
6 & o -cl Onow xarXE y&Q vocofov 6x6cov Wk XEt 2aL azQxdt
tdat xai m yyvero : (Diels, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker).
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Heraclitus was the first to see man or the human soul
as the center of the world. He was the first to ask him-
self the ever burning question. What is man doing in the
cosmos? What is his place in the universal struggle be-
tween Being and Becoming? "I look into myself," he
used to say. In fact, by looking into himself, he became
conscious of his place and of his effect in the world, for
knowledge has a relation to life. And the soul has a deep
insight; reason is universal. Man sees the laws of the
universe; his duty is to learn and obey them. He must
follow the truth of nature which is infallible, because it
is the divine law of nature. Man is a whole in the scheme
of the universe; he is not only a physical being that has
to obey the laws of the universe; he is also an intellectual
being who has to obey the laws of the city in which he
lives. In short, Heraclitus was the first to see and to ex-
press the relation between the divine law and the human
laws. He humanized the law, and that is new.
Plato, who owes so much to Heraclitus, does not seem
to have ever forgotten the oath which he took, like the
other Athenian boys, when he was entered on the role
of his deme: "I will hearken to the magistrates, and obey
the existing laws, and those hereafter established by the
people." 16 As a matter of fact, Plato seems to have been
obsessed all his life with the idea of justice; it forms, with
the true, the good and the beautiful, the basis of his con-
ception of the moral order. But justice is never a legal
matter for him; throughout the Republic, he never sees
society as a legal society, being busy with the maintenance
16 Poll. VIII, 105; Stol., Floril., XVIII, 48.
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and the correction of rights; for him society is ethical,
citizens have got special duties and functions to perform;
justice is in the soul, it is a spirit, an attitude, a habit of
life that animates the citizen in the accomplishment of
his duties and functions.
In Minos, which is a short dialogue dealing with
natural law, Plato - the question is still debated as to
whether he is the author of this dialogue - tries to dis-
cover an absolute and immutable law behind the diversity
and the contradictions of the laws established by different
societies. In Crito and the Apology, he analyzes the rights
and duties of the individual in his relation to the state
and to the law. Socrates, like Antigone, dies for some-
thing higher than the law of the state. Should Socrates
obey the law or stick to the inner sense of justice with
which the law is conflicted? That is the eternal question
of all martyrs. "Acquit me or condemn me, I shall never
alter my ways," says Socrates, prefering death when
something spiritual, a spiritual question is at issue. In
the Laws Plato admits the sovereignty of law; that legis-
lator's masterpiece contains an interesting passage on nat-
ural law, on matters about which written law is silent:
"In the private life of the family many trivial things
are apt to be done which escape general notice, -
things which are the result of individual feelings of
pain, pleasure, or desire, and which contravene the
instructions of the lawgiver; and these will produce
in the citizens a multiplicity of contradictory ten-
dencies. This is bad for a State. For while, on the
one hand, it is improper and undignified to impose
penalties on these practices by law, because of their
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triviality and the frequency of their occurrence, on
the other hand, it detracts from the authority of the
law which stands written when men grow used to
breaking the law in trivial matters repeatedly.
Hence, it is impossible to pass over these practices in
silence, it is difficult to legislate concerning them." 1
There is also in Protagoras a beautiful passage on the
sanctity of law and the equality of members of the state.
"So Zeus, fearing that our race was in danger of
utter destruction, sent Hermes to bring respect and
right among men, to the end that there should be
regulation of cities and friendly ties to draw them
together. Then Hermes asked Zeus in what manner
then was he to give men right and respect: "Am I to
deal them out as the arts have been dealt? That
dealing was done in such wise that one man possess-
ing medical art is able to treat many ordinary men,
and so with the other craftsmen. Am I to place
among men right and respect in this way also, or
deal them out to all?"-"To all," replied Zeus; "let
all have their share; for cities cannot be formed if
only a few have a share of these as of other arts. And
make thereto a law of my ordaining, that he who
17 Plato, Laws, 788 a-b: 'I8bt y&Q xal xa,' otbag xoX.& xal OpA Q&
xal o&, &cpCtvij XtdL yLyv6tEva, &8w; b Tft kx&omvv .M19 "E xa
?i8 ovVA xcL btuftag xEQa =UQ6 -rd&; Toi votkoftov u Lu6ovX.ig naa-
ygv6iievc, avto8ax& xal 6 om' d1XA ~fXotg daeQyitoL' dv -r& irGN
ArCObV f thq. Toi~o U& vxuxv Tat; ;t6XEayv xdi y&Q L a (J8Q&-qTra ai -
Tbv xci mr.v6"-ra, 3tLrta TLrft4VTa Iot dv v6poug &rQeitg ip a 2al
&oX1UWv* 8LcfE(QEL ?ii xcii zojg yaQctpf xirvag v6poug, kv Tot;
opLxQOo; vaL n3uxvoiq MtOOvrcv "W v tvoftQaOwv notgavopEv. too'e
dXoQLCL Aiv 23TEQ aIt VOiOOTENV oLY4VV i d56vaov. & Ue iyao, Bi-
-oCna AELQcriOv V 88tylAQ1a ritEVEyX6vTcLtg 4prg" VOV y&Q XEyOP-
vOt; 9otxs xac6 U ox6zo;.
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cannot partake of respect and right shall die the
death as a public pest." 18
Plato seems to have been conscious of the rigidity of
the law in the mind of his countrymen, who were not very
keen on changing the law. In order to better the laws
and to accommodate them to particular situations, Plato
becomes the champion of equity, as may be seen in Gor-
gias. Equity, in Greek, has a non-technical meaning.
Aristotle defines it: "that natural justice which exists in-
dependently of human laws." 19 It was very often re-
sorted to in Athens by the orators, following Aristotle's
advice: "If the written law tells against our case, clearly
we must appeal to the universal law and insist on its
greater equity and justice." 20 The Athenian judges used
18 Plato, Protagoras, 322c-324A: Zcbg ov bdaoag =Q1 -ctj yvE
i 1odv &pt6 oito ndv, 'EQpv agzrcL 6yovra EL- dvffQ~oovq atbo
r xaL 8(xilv, IN' Elev n6kcwv x6apoL tr xal 8EGILoL ) t.kg uvayoyo.
'EQCWTq o&~ 'EQpfi; Ata, ruva odv rQ~xov 80bl btTiv xalt dM~o dvffQo6-
XoL9" I16Trcov 6)g at TgXVat EV tJVTu, oihw xctt zairra vdtco; Ne-
vila1viaL 89 (MV E19 9XmOV tccTQL~h 1kv t'XLXaV6g 18LO~raLq, nat ot
&XX01 8TiULVQ-Y0V Kat l & 8ht xal 8) do ro,& -vrotL; dvfQd~rotg,
I i bt 3t~vrag vuc(o; 'Ent ;vivraq, F(P 6 Zct~;, Xal 7uiVrc; iicrCX&MVt.
od YeQ &v yivoLVTo X6 4 .g, Ft 6 XVyOL Tv lEcdxotcv 6onrC0 CLXoV
TcXvrv" XuL v61ov yE R; XaQ' por T6v gh 8uv64Lcvov atboi; xal 8bmn;
jPcT9XELV x-rclvct j); v6oov :r6Xcwo;.
19 Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 1374a: T6 y&Q bnca 8XEot 68CXLoV EtvoCL,
go0tv bwExi; T6 XOnzt& z6v YeYQaCi4Lo V6pOV 6 LXOvOV.
20 Aristotle, Rhetoricl, 1375a: OavQ&V yeQ &L, M&v gv ivavriog
b 6 YEQL00 TQ) atQ6!LWLTL, Tro 2OLVr) XQllCFlSOV XCEt '901 IMELME~i-
QoL xal , 8txatorQot;.
Demosthenes, Contr. Lept, 118: XQh toCvuv, d dv g 'AfhivaEot,
X&dXVv' 1VOUhEoiftCL Xal 6(UV, L v0v 6pogon6rc; XCLU! To, v6goug 8txi-
oetv fxvce, o ,x. :ob; Aaxe8tLpoY(ovv o6i ei6amcov, oM6' otg aor' xQ'1-
oav*' ot QG)Tno Gv :Qoy6 voWV, 4X& xaf' oO MXa6ov -&; duc.ca;, oO;
&q aLQc1.ro.& vBV obog rj v6wP, X01 :MQ1 &v &v v61tot I 6t. Yvd)tn rt
c&"O &on t XQL T .V.
cf. Contr. Tiinocr. 149-151; Contr. Aristocr. 96.
NATURAL LAW IN THE GREEK PERIOD 25
to swear that they would judge according to equity all
the cases which the law had not foreseen. Equity was
conceived as being halfway between natural law and
positive law, between natural justice based on the nature
of man and positive justice which is established by laws
or statutes. The notion of equity, as expressed by Plato
and Aristotle, is in accordance with human nature and
the unwritten common law; it is like a link between the
absolute perfection of natural law and the relative imper-
fection of human laws.
It is in Aristotle, the greatest exponent of moral philos-
ophy, that we are bound to find the most complete defini-
tion of natural law; Aristotle is more systematic than
Plato, whose statements are often contradictory. Besides
analyzing and summarizing the conclusions arrived at by
his predecessors, Aristotle marks the concept of natural
law with the stamp of his own genius.
He thus defines nature in his Politics: "What each
thing is when fully developed we call its nature, whether
we are speaking of a man, a horse or a family." That con-
ception of nature is typically Greek, and is that of a biol-
ogist; the child does not count much in Greek art, as in
classical ages on the whole. "It is characteristic of a man,
says Aristotle, that he alone has any sense of good or evil,
or just or unjust; and the association of living beings who
have this sense makes a family and a state." 21 Moreover,
21 Aristotle, Politics, I, a: 'H 8' tx u.EL6vwv xwpcov xotvcova T9XEoq
n&Ag o 871oad"- Exoua ng ag o0q a .aQxEtag d Enoa Etiiv, ytvogg,
JI& 0&~ oji tjV EEV, ObUC bi TOi) 6 tiiv. Atb nrdoa xr64& qni~an bnmv,
eumrQ xali d XtQ0YraL XOLVWVLaL.TXoycQar1nev, 8qa rXo
irc otov YeIQ Xaar6V &0rEL ting YEVEOog reI, wrjqCpagv -1V
(p1i-0v EEL Wia-tou, (to;TEQ d1VftO)3ToV Utanou olixtag... ix t-rroinv04
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he establishes the following distinction between natural
and conventional justice:
"Of political justice part is natural, that which
everywhere has the same force and does not exist
by people thinking this or that; legal, that which is
originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down
is not indifferent. The things which we are just by
virtue of convention and expediency are like meas-
ures; for wise and equal measures are not every-
where equal. Similarly the things which are just
not by nature but by human enactment are not
everywhere the same .. . though there is but one
which is everywhere by nature the best." 22
In his Rhetoric Aristotle draws a distinction between
particular and common law, and then describes natural
law:
"Law is in part particular and in part common; the
particular is that which different peoples establish
among themselves, and is in part unwritten and in
part written; the common law is the law of nature.
It is what all men, by a natural intuition, feel to be
common right and wrong, even if they have no com-
mon association and no covenant with one another.
(PQvFQ6v t -rdv q4)aV 1 A6Xg iGTd, XCL OtL V0Q(03tOo 7OXLfTtX6XV to ...
Toiro -YeQ 3tQbg T4 aXC) tj "9og v0QcrnoLg M8 LOv, -r6 4i6vov dyaboB xal
XCux0 Xa[ 6MMou xal dbixou xul r6v dkkov uftO v Extv.
Plato, Phaedrus, 230 d: r& jikv ov X(oQLa xal r& 8gvBQu oi8v 1A'
10EL 8L6(OXELV, 01 8' iV Tro CLUTCL MVQ(0aOL.
For Socrates, both the country and the trees are not willing to
teach him anything; it is the men living in the city that are willing
to do so.
22 Aristotle, Nichomachea Ethics, V, 1134b-1135a: To) 8 noXiT'-
Xo0 8&Xnaou 6 giv qvtx6v loa& T6 U voktx6v, pvatx6v av 'r6 nav-
TUXol, ThiV CtZhV 9XoV 8&tUV, nut o rVj 8onEIV j tt, VOIzin6V U 5 it
d4QX]; U&v oiOiv 8&qiQEL o§Tro A Wicag, -rSav 8 06v'aL, 8LaqCQFL, ooV
L6 vd XvTQoucOcu, ej T6 Uaya 0-69v dXkt 1 o nQ66a-go...
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Thus Sophocles' Antigone is represented as saying
that it is right to bury Polynices despite the inter-
dict, because she feels that this is a natural right;
for nowise today nor yesterday, but through all time,
this law has its life, and none knows whence it came.
And, as Empedocles says of the prohibition against
taking life, this is not in some cases right and in
others wrong, "but this universal law reaches on and
on through the broad domain of heaven and over
the immensity of earth."
"Whereas rights and wrongs were of two kinds,
the written and the unwritten, those for which the
law makes provision have been discursed, and the
unwritten are of two kinds. They are partly mat-
ters connected with exceptional goodness or badness,
the occasions of denunciations or eulogies, disgraces
or preferments, or gifts or honor - as, for example,
being grateful to a benefactor and repaying kindness
with kindness and helping one's friends and all such
things - and they are partly matters not covered in
particular written codes. For it is admitted that
what is reasonable is right, and it is a kind of right
which goes beyond the written law. This is brought
about partly by the intention of the legislators, part-
ly without their intention - without their intention
when a point is overlooked, by their intention when
they cannot define precisely, but have to use language
of universal application, and cannot but make a rule
that will apply in a majority of cases.
"It is also reasonable to make allowance for hu-
man limitations; also to consider not the law but the
legislator, and not the legislator's language, but his
intent, nor the action but the motive, not the part
but the whole, and not what a man's character is at
the moment but what it has been always or predom-
inantly in the past."
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And he concludes this part by saying that one could go
"into arbitration rather than a court of law, in order that
equity might prevail." 23
Aristotle's concept of natural law is somewhat limited
to the philosopher's concept of the city and of men; it
excludes the slaves, the greatest number of people. For
Aristotle man was a political animal that could not live
and develop himself but in a city. The Stoics were the
first to draw a sharp distinction between the city and the
23 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1373b-1374b: Aiyo bi v69ov T6v iv [61ov,
TOV 8 XOLV6V, 8LOV giV T6V &X4oTOL; (bQLOIVOV JWQ8  U'Ol;, XOL TOTO oY
TOV 1.EV dY ftPOV, TOV bi y~yQagp.iVOV, xOLV6V 8 *V6V X nc& q(P1aV. "EoT
"iQ 0 PaVTEUOvaTt T MiVTEg, qpOEL xotV6v 8Lxatov xal ad8ov, x.v RT18C-
pavotvo)VL 3TQO; et?,3)ou; tj ILT18i ouvfrxi1 , otov xcil A' Moqoxxioug
'Av-ty6vn pafvErct X Youoa, 6hL bixctov dAtrQ1nlivov 01PO& L T6 v fo X.-
VELY'., bg (pqOEL 5v Toy-or 8LXrOv.
6P -Y6Q TL VbUYC eye q etX' &CL 3OTE
t -oOTo, XoU Eg ot1Ev i OTou q&v7.
KaL ; 'E~RnEox.fig X 3,rt =Ql rofo h wrE t  tv x6 Fnt ;zov "tofyo y6a o
tOL 11EV bLX.CUOV TELGL 8' Oil 6LXCILOV,
&XUr -6 piv ivrcov v6 tLLov Ba T' 6eU0g8oVTo;
al0gQog Vxgwoco dTTaat 6Ld T' cbrX4roU ab Yi1 ;.
Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1374a: 'Etl 8T rv 8t6Xa(ov X1 TCOV 1&8Cv
lv 8o E1811" (r: iv -y"iQ yeyQag.va .r& 8' .yoQapo), -n3ct &v .iv ol v6got
d-YoQ6oUOLv ErTTUL, OV 8' d&YQc6q0Ov HOo oTIV Et8T- rTOTa 8' rriv -r
AN v Vi1' iMtQ6oXhv dOutfi; xoai xaxatg, ft' org 6vEI8 I xtaLvot Xal UTL-
11uL xal T4Iai.L XUL 60)QEUL, OLOV TO6 XO.QLV 9XEtV TQ0 7COLllOftVTL EbXUEL dLTElJ-
3TOtMIV tv v tOL oCotat V.011 6O'#TLX6 V Elvat Totq (PXOt; xaL, 6oc ( XXa
TOLbTa, ult 8i -cob O8iou v6iiov xalt yvyQujlivou EXiI4La.
(1374b) : Kat z6 Ot; dV0Qom(voL g IJyytV6(oXLV btLELEg. Kcd T6 gt
aQ6; T6v v6ttov dke aQ0g "t6v vogo0ftzylv, X4'L 1 3TQ6; T6v X6-yov d&X.
TQ06; hV 8tivoav o0 Volto-ou ooX[EEV, Xal Pil aQO; Plv :Q( tv d,.Xe
aQ6; -thv 2tQoaLQECLV, XQL 1 T0T6g T6 aQog dOkk X 6; T6 TO 6ov, 1 1 6i aoi6g
Ttg VUV, dJt.a ao6g rt; Av &Et A &g be r6 xoL6. Kal Th 1AV1flOV6E0LV 1dx-
).ov 6v 9a#Ev dYC06v V 'aLv, Yl.a dyafdtv &v bga0t 11dkkOV inoulomv.
Kai tb dviyEa0at &8txo4&Evov. Kai 6 16dL.ov X6yq 0 ,Ev XQLVEof o fi
ey(q). K& r6 T6 6tEcL~'v L1d .),ov f itg 6Lxrlv 6o0U.00L IUvot. 6 "6aQ btL-
TTJi61 T6 bEtyetti 6Q4, 6 6i txCaOars T6V V6ROV* al XOkTOu EvExa 6LOLgTI;
6QiOfl, &anwg T6 itetyi; tovmn. It is also in his Nichomachean
Ethics (V, 10, 1137 a 31 sqq.) that Aristotle studies equity (imai-
xEba, tuxi;) and distinguishes it from justice (6txooaoM, 8biznov).
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world, or the relations between all human beings, inde-
pendently of any origin and of any political philosophers.
And their cosmopolitan outlook was based on a new con-
ception of law and justice; it came about when the Greek
city states were falling into partial bankruptcy; instead
of clinging, like Aristotle, to the conception of the city,
they wanted "to embrace under a unique law all the fam-
ilies of reasonable beings." 24 For Aristotle, law and
justice do not go beyond the city; the Stoics, like the
sophists, call themselves citizens of the world. With them,
justice governs the relations of men, no matter where
they are. This natural law of theirs is based upon the
identity of the nature of men and gods as reasonable be-
ings. Plato's conception of society is based upon a dis-
tinction of classes and the inequality of individuals; Aris-
totle does not consider slaves as citizens, although he is
convinced that slavery is natural and also that the city
itself is natural. Completing and correcting Pindar, who
had already said: "custom is the king of all things." 25
Chrysippus says: "Law is the king of all things divine
and human." 26 The Stoics build their society on equal-
ity; the individual becomes the moral unity, the law be-
comes universal. Following Heraclitus, they made the
individual the center of the world and in consequence
abolished the different classes established by Plato and
Aristotle. For them the principle of justice is in common
nature; it is from that principle we must start if we want
to talk of good and bad. All men are equal; the prin-
24 Dio Chrysost., Orat., 36, 29.
25 Herodotus, 3, 38: v6po; advrcov BaotX6,-
26 Chrysippus, On Law: "Law is the king of all things divine and
human." (Mar cianus, Instit., Arm., III no 314).
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ciples of unity, of equality and community that exist in
the physical universe, are also the principles of life among
men. For the first time the idea of a moral person ap-
pears, that person having nothing to sacrifice in order to
become a member of society.
This rapid review of the most important philosophers
that have dealt with the concept of natural law, covers
about four centuries of thought and reveals both the con-
tinuity and the tenacity of Greek thinkers about natural
law. From Pythagoras to the Stoics there is a definite
growth and development in the expression of the concept
of natural law. Aristotle accepted, with certain modifi-
cations, the principles of equality and reason set forth by
Pythagoras and Heraclitus respectively, may be seen in
his conception of justice. Justice, for him, is a virtue,
and virtue consists in keeping the just middle between
two extremes. Moreover, Aristotle is the last of the great
thinkers to have considered natural law as something
divine and universal, one and above man; with the Stoics
the concept of natural law becomes human, universal in
name, intrinsic and as manifold as the individuals.
Such evolution of the concept of natural law is closely
connected with the evolution of the concept of the in-
dividual, for the individual is the subject of natural law.
And the clear, distinct concept of the individual is a con-
quest of human thought. Moreover, in Greece, man was
not the only legal subject, for the Greeks considered also
the gods, the animals and the inanimate objects as legal
subjects. But I do not want to enter into the details of
this question. What I want to stress rapidly before con-
cluding this paper, is that the clear notion of the indi-
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vidual took several centuries to be expressed properly and
that it has. some bearing upon natural law, even upon
practical life, since slavery was found natural and usury
unnatural in Ancient Greece.
There may be seen two phases in the evolution of the
concept of the individual, as may be gathered in a study
of the Greek institutions relating to murder; I take mur-
der to illustrate my point, because the Greeks, from
Homer to Pobylius, used to be fond of murder stories or of
murder tragedies; that is why they always preferred the
murder to the trial, the Iliad to the Odysseus, Agamem-
non to the Eumenides.
At the beginning, there was the clan in which the honor
of the murdered person is absorbed in a divine or myth-
ical force which symbolizes the group; the honor of the
murdered person is satisfied by the clan or the family,
gathered together in religious ceremonies; these cere-
monies, accompanied with magical expressions, are car-
ried out to satisfy the gods or to reveal the god's sanction.
The outrage is objective and religious. With time, under
different economic factors, the clan transforms itself into
the city, and the city marks the beginning of individual-
ism; the concept of offense becomes secular, the offense
tends to be regarded as an attempt at the individual.
From the primitive and religious concept of offense, was
born the concept of the individual as an object of re-
spect; the outrage done becomes the offended individual;
and as it is the city now that reproves and corrects the
insolence, the concept of the individual becomes closely
associated with that of the city. There is a gradual sec-
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ularization of the idea of offense, and with it appears the
concept of the individual.
This development can be seen in Greek literature, from
Homer to Pindar; it reaches its climax in the 5th Century
with Aeschylus and Sophocles. Aeschylus was fond of
treating the problem of sin and individual responsibility
on the stage, particularly in his famous trilogy, where he
abolishes hereditary responsibility and replaces the blood
for blood vengeance by a religious sacrifice; Sophocles
treated the problem of suffering, particularly in Oedipus
Tyrannus, where the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary responsibility is clearly presented.
The concept of the individual was evolved in a Greek
world, where the problem of the city-state and of the
mutual relations of city-states occupies the mind of most
thinkers. Herodotus divides the individuals into Greeks
and Barbarians. He is the first to have described the
Greeks in a manner which must be most agreeable to our
contemporary nationalists and racists. He makes the
Athenians say before the battle of Plataea:
"There was nowhere in the world so much gold, or
land so excellent in beauty or worth, as would induce
them to be willing to join the side of Persia and to enslave
Greece, for that would be treachery to the Greek nation,
which had one blood, one speech, one religion and one
culture." 27 Isocrates regarded himself as a citizen of
27 Herodotus, VIII, 144: 'AT&( aLaXQ); yE ONaTctE it EAEUT6PEVOL T6
'Af-ivaltv qpQowvpua dQQw( "L- 5TL OEtt XQuOO6; ic yfg oApc.d&t To-
oo-ro; Ont X)QI X)4! Xal dQE-i' jgyu Q x pgQovaa, Tet AIjtEig 6ee-
lavot 0kotgrv dv gti8ioavreg xa ~ouo6,oat r~v 'EVAa ............ T6
'EW1'vtxv, Av xattt6v xn xlt 61t 6 ykwtooov, xal OEov t6Qix,4iTd "T Yotvcz
xa ftuo atiEd rr 6.tu6TQOao.
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Greece and the champion of the pan-hellenic world
order, an idea which Aristotle disliked immensely. Not
only did Isocrates want Athens to place herself at the
head of all the Greek peoples against Asia, but he consid-
ered Greek culture as something far superior to Greek
race. "Thanks to Athens, says he, the name of Hellenes
seems to mean less a race than a way of thinking, and
one deserves much more to be called a Greek, if he has
received the Athenian culture, than if he is only a Greek
by birth." 28 Plato held the same view as Isocrates and
limited his brotherhood to the Greek world; but he
strongly emphasized the idea of a common law which
regulates the relations of the Greek states. On the other
hand, Plato's bitterest enemies, the sophists, Protagoras
and Hippias - to whom Plato was so unjust - regarded
themselves as citizens of the world, for, together with the
Cynics and the Stoics, they held that all men were by
nature fellow-citizens. Aristotle was far too much of a
Macedonian to agree with Plato, Isocrates and the soph-
ists; he limited his outlook to the city, to the citizens
only, the slaves being considered by him merely as tools.
For Aristotle, slavery is natural, like maternity and
paternity. He justifies it by saying that it is based on
human nature. Although a slave is a property with a
soul, yet it is a natural institution. The slave is an instru-
ment for use in the family; it is even indispensable to it,
28 Isocrates, Panegyric, 50: Toooi ov 8, dxoXg.otxEv A :6.tq At
a8EQL -6 pqovelv Vctl kiy 1Jv ubgdoug dvfQtolg, &af' ot tcri~ pa"-
trat -rdv dXcov 8t6~axaoL yeydvactv, xat -6 tdr'v EXXkvwv 5VOPwL nJte',-
xE U~Tv wvbt toi3yVOUg, ed)XeA Ti 8LQVOC; boxeNv EtVmL, xal g±d)kov 'Ekkq.
va; xa~twtku -roi~ -r~ a!Ot8E1XY8 -t11 ApExiQag - t21- XOLV1g (P1-
auog tE-XOVTag.
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it is a natural wealth. But he does not recognize slavery
as the result of war, because that form of slavery comes
from war, which is against the common good of the city,
whereas the natural slaves are essential to the wellbeing
of the city. He writes in his Politics:
"The first coupling together of persons then to which
necessity gives rise is that between those who are
unable to exist without one another, namely the
union of male and female for the continuance of
species; and the union of natural ruler and natural
subject for the sake of security. Thus the female
and the slave are by nature distinct. Yet among
barbarians the female and the slave have the same
rank; and the cause of this is that barbarians have
no class of natural rulers, but with them the con-
jugal partnership is a partnership of female slave
and male slave. Hence the saying of the poets:
"Tis meet that Greeks should rule barbarians, im-
plying that barbarian and slave are the same by
nature.' "He is by nature a slave who is capable of
belonging to another (and that is why he does so
belong), and who participates in reason so far as to
apprehend it but not to possess it; for the animals
other than man are subservient not to reason, by
apprehending it, but to feeling. And also the use-
fulness of slaves diverges little from that of animals;
bodily service for the necessities of life is forthcoming
from both, from slaves and from domestic animals
alike. The intention of nature therefore is to make
the bodies also of freemen and of slaves different -
the latter strong for necessity service, the former
erect and unserviceable for such occupations." 29
29 Aristotle, Politics, I, 1252a: 'Adnxyl 89 EQG)TOV OVv&bdEoCaL
To; dve, Wlcov h 8uvyuvouv E tlv, otov OXV Riv XLIt dQQEV Tfi;
YEvGEOvg 9VExEV... 6QXov 8 4qP Uo Xal dQX6pevov 8ML Thv acnoxiav.
6 rkv YaQ 8UV&6EVoV xt 8UZvoig 3TQOOQcv QXoV pclae xi t 6tov (p~t,
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The Sophists, the Cynics and the Stoics did not reason
in the same way as Aristotle; for them slavery was un-
natural; they preached the equality of human beings,
whether they were citizens or slaves, whether they were
living in Greece or elsewhere, whether they belonged to
a democracy or to a kingdom. Hippias writes in Prota-
goras: "I hold you all kinsmen, relatives and fellow citi-
zens by nature, though not by law; for like is kin to like,
but law, the tyrant of mankind, often constrains by vio-
lence in contravention of nature." Philemon, a comic
writer of the fourth century, holds the following views on
the stage: "Although one is a slave, master, he is none
the less a man as a man is." "Even if one is a slave, he
has the same skin. For nobody has ever been born a
slave by nature. On the contrary it is destiny that has
T6 8 8uv64Evov Taftt TQp OI(46LUa nOLEtV dQX6oEV0V xal (PI0ELo 8oio  6
BEGA&sCn Xal 8o .X0 rn?6 oUR(P9QEV- (1JaL RiV OZV 8td)QLGF~cL r6 OiXu xci.
.6 80.ixov... v 8 Tog 6aQ6&Qot "6 t xo -rb 8o0ixov AV abAv Ext
Aristotle, Politics, I, 1252a: crtuov 8' 8-T 6 q,1oau oQXov o& FXouOov,
dDXet YLVErci moovva ci r@V 8d~XTi9 XCcI~ 8oLOU. 8U q~ciov ot notin-rci
"0a.)dQ0Q)v 8' 'EXX-n, vg a0XEV Ei6g", 63 ica&C6 60iQ6QOV Xci 8orxov
6.V ..
Aristotle, Politics, I, 125Sb-1254a: otro xal -6 xxijLa 6Qycvov xQ;6
tao v gari, xcil A XTf]IOL9 3tX10 6QYeLV0)V iOTL, xcii 6 8oi3xog ,c&-Rjb± u
EiUT)1JoV. XCO1L 65Q 5QYaVoV 3TQ6 6QY&Vo)V na1g kM10 xCIg... 6 yct0 R
cou (PioEL 61M)' d Xo aV§QOTo (J)&V, OkO; q>t6Ei 8o0iX6; klLV, k7ou
8' go-ev GV&Qrnog, Bg ttv x&v a v fVQ0oWo q v, xiot 8 5Qycivov nQc-
xCx6 xal W X(OoLQT6 V.
Aristotle, Politics, I, 1254b: 'EaL -y (P t 8oXo 6 8Uv64Lvo
WXOV EtVcit (Mc x ~Xa o M n10-) Xcii 6 XOLVcO)vrV k6YOU iociOZOV 80oV
acioDvwcc (MAX wii EXcLV T& YetQ MXCL t4rci o 6yqp atafcV614EVCi, Met
naicilpauoiv iVM0Q8EE. xiii A' XQe0c 81 a3tciLzXXrc& WxQ6v" A yeiQ tQ6;
i[dVcYXatLCi Tro 0 Goltci 6o4GtECu y~ve-raL gaoE' dpup6EV, XCt T8 rsiV 8oiXCOV
xcii nTcQ& -to)v hfldQcov tdxow. ooi5Xsezi otv ofyv Ai q)&L; Xcii T c&O-C
8Laqai'Q0VTCt AOLiVLv TG iW XEVN6QOW Xiii iOV 8OiiCwV, Te & tU~VLXUQa 3TQ6 ;
VIV dVQaCixCLV XQ oV, T& 8' 6QU0 xii tOXQT1hOCT 3Q6; cag tOLaticit lQyOCLGo5O.
ef. Nichomachean Ethics, VIII, 11.
1)0 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
enslaved the body." The sophists, as well as the Cynics
and the Stoics, were cosmopolitan citizens; they recog-
nized the individuality of men; they opposed Nature to
positive law; for them, nature is enthroned alone posi-
tive law.
30
There is one point, however, on which all Greek phil-
osophers seem to have agreed, and this is so rare - for a
philosopher is a man who by nature picks a bone with
another philosopher - that it is worth mentioning: that
point is usury, they were all against it. The rate of in-
terest, in the fourth century, ranged between 12 and 48
per cent. Usury, for them, is against nature; they even
find interest on borrowed money quite unnatural. 31
Aristotle has thus forcibly summarized the Greek
philosophers' point of view on the matter:
"The branch connected with exchange is justly dis-
credited (for it is not in accordance with nature, but
30 Plato, Protagoras, 337c: 'Q dV8 QE9, 9(R, o aQto6vE, YO lOa
iy& ld cvyyEvet tE xal o L foug xci nokvrag dnawvag EtvaL qPVOEL, o-
v~ly " T6 ye0Q 6piotov Trp 6potoq qipoeL ovyyEvig io~tv, 6 bi v6gog, TvQavvoq
&v T"ov dvogrntov, no),.Xc 1OQ6. Tiv (qotV 6IaETiLL.
E1 Philemon, op. Stob. Floril. LXII, 28:
K v 6ob).oq fj -t, o0fiv xjrov, oaxra
"Av0Qooq oZT69 4oTLV, V aVOQ=o3 b.
Id., Fragm. 39 op. Meineke Com. Nov. 1 IV, p. 47.
K~iv 8ouogo tj TL; (iQxa -chv ci,Tiv 9XE&*
'oEt yeLQ oE ,8 6o04.og iyevvi'loI toxg,
'H 6' (Ai -rixTI -r6 o0g41 xaTE~ouX~xoa-o.
Chrysippus goes as far as to consider slavery as an exchange of
service between the master and the servant. Moreover, the slave
may be a blessing for the master, as much as the master may be a
blessing for the slave (Seneca, De Ben., III, 22; Athenaeus, Deipnos.,
VI, 267b; Arn., III, nos 351-353).
Ulp. 1 Instit. Dig. I, 4: "Jure naturali omnes liberi nascuntur.
Uno naturali nomine homines appellamur."
NATURAL LAW IN THE GREEK PERIOD :5 1
involves men's taking things from one another.) As
this is so, usury is most reasonably hated, because its
gain comes from money itself and not from that for
the sake of which money was invented. For money
was brought into existence for the purpose of ex-
change, but interest increases the amount of money
itself (and this is the actual origin of the Greek
word: offspring resembles parent, and interest is
money born of money); consequently this form of
the business of getting wealth is of all forms the most
contrary to nature." 32
Aristotle finds usury unnatural. The money-lender's ac-
tivity is unnatural because he does not use money which
is an artificial medium of exchange, according to its func-
tions; it follows that usury, which is the result of this mis-
use is against nature. Interest tends also towards the
infinite, there is no end to it, and, for Aristotle and all
the Greek philosophers, the infinite is irrational and
against nature.
From these considerations it follows that natural law
is far from being a purely academic speculation, just good
enough for people with leisure to brood over; it is fun-
damental even in practical life. It follows also that the
concept of natural law has had a very strange destiny in
Greece. If we recall the sayings of Homer and Hesiod,
Theogenis and Sophocles, Xenophon and Plato, we shall
32 Aristotle, Politics, I, 1258b: Aut.fig 8' ogii akyig, 6(yoieQ Etno-
11EV, V . fi g giv XuQT4%g Tfig 8' oIXoVoLLxfj, cuxaL Tag iv dvayiaag
XaL gaLVoUJUVT1~, tfig 8 .CTa64.JTLxfig *yo.vLE, 8Lxc(ag (o y&Q xU't
qCP1oLv 14' da' dkkki Cov otov), e iXoyatci RtLGE['rcL 60OXOCTaTLXj 8Lt.
r6 &t' akU'oU oo voj LT9o Etva, -cihv x'reiaov xaL o&o ly' SXEQ koQLoO?1.
perc6oXf1 74yQ y &Ero x.QLV, 6 8 x6xog acnW notd nk.ov. Bftv al
rOZV CotLc rr' EUlTqEv" SotOLc yI Q t'l "rXT6Wva 'otg yCVVCotv cnirt& &nv,
6 bi "6xog ytvexat v 6toLLa ix voiudtatrog. 6 O¢e xal Iti) .Ora Xagc q Oiv
oktog rTwv XQTl W TrLO0V rV.
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remember that, in the minds of these writers, natural law
is something divine and universal; it is a gift of the gods,
like justice and poetry; it is to be found everywhere in
the world, because it is based on reason, which is proper
to man, it is immanent in human nature. For Pythagoras
and Heraclitus, the principles of justice, upon which nat-
ural law is based, are to be found in equality and in in-
sight, in the law of retaliation and in the law of reason;
justice is harmony and equilibrium, man is the center of
the cosmos. For Plato, justice is a spirit, a habit of life
that animates man's action; the inner sense of justice,
which is felt by the conscience, is something much higher
in spiritual truth and content than the law of the State;
natural law is eternal, like the gods who have given it to
mankind. With Aristotle, natural law is one, divine, uni-
versal ;33 with the Stoics, it is human, universal, as mani-
fold as the individuals themselves.
Strange destiny indeed is that of the natural law, for it
was first called divine and then, in the course of cen-
turies, became human. This destiny is quite as strange
as that of Fire, which was too, divine in its origin, gave
birth to love and kept unity as long as it was in the hands
of the gods; placed in the hands of Prometheus, it be-
came the source of the arts and of the inventions, the
very principle of division on earth.
There is, however, a much more tragic and strange
destiny than that: it is the destiny of men in the world.
88 The words "god," "divine" do not imply the same meaning to-
day as they did with the Greeks. They never believed in Creation. It
is therefore a grave mistake to translate 86e; by God with a capital
G, as is usually done even in the best translation of Plato and
Aristotle. Now, 6 06g, God is not to be found in Aristotle.
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Looking back on this achievement of the Greeks, who
were the first to conceive and express the concept of nat-
ural law, of a law which exists for every human being,
whether he is a slave or a freeman, looking back on this
achievement, with all its consequences on practical life,
one cannot help admiring the acuity of their mind as well
as their tenacity in research and their burning love of
man. With Saint Paul, they could have defined natural
law: "Quod semper aequum ac bonum est" ;34 this for-
mula is far too wide to be contained in any positive law.
One then easily understands Sophocle's enthusiasm, I
should say, his overwhelming pride in man as a creative
being; when he writes this beautiful ode, which is the
first definition of humanism, in Antigone:
"Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful
than man; the power that crosses the white sea,
driven by the stormy south-wind, making a path
under surges that threaten to engulf him; and the
Earth, the eldest of the gods, the immortal, the un-
wearied, does he wear, turning the soil with the
offspring of horses, as the ploughs go to and fro from
year to year.
And the light-hearted race of birds, and the
tribes of savage beasts, and the sea-brood of the
deep, he snares in the meshes of his woven toils, he
leads captive, man excellent in wit. And he masters
by his arts the beast whose lair is in the wilds, who
roams the hills; he takes the horse of shaggy mane,
he puts the yoke upon its neck, he tames the tireless
mountail ball.
And speech, and wind-swift thought, and all the
moods that would a state, hath he taught himself;
84 Paul, 14 ad Sal.
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and how to flee the arrows of the frost, when 'tih
hard lodging under the clear sky, and the arrows of
the rushing rain; yes, he hath resource for all; with-
out resource he meets nothing that must come; only
against Death shall he call for aid in vain; but from
baffling maladies he hath devised escapes.
Cunning beyond fancy's dream is the fertile skill
which brings him, now to evil, now to good. When
he honors the laws of the land, and that justice which
he hath sworn by the gods to uphold, proudly stands
his city; no city hath he who, for his rashness, dwells
with sin. Never may he share my hearth, never
think my thoughts, who do these things !" 35
35 Sophocles, Antigone 332-375:
XO. HoWL Ta 8 ELVU X0oU1WV eLVfQO)U 6CoLV6TQOOV 3RAW
Toko xa aoh.oU At8Q0V x6 VTOU XeII.&EQLq) v6Tqo
X(OQ, JtEQt6QUXtOtLLV
AE&QV 1Ja' oAvctatv-
0 T rdaV v0EQT&rav, rdv
dqi-rtov, cIa.&ruV U.MTQUETat,
1xopiwaw dQ6rQw)V 9TO; Ed; ITo;,
tmmupE~ YiVEL floxEUW.
.ovpov6owv xE qOov 60Qv0ofv dqutoakow &yet
xal 010Wv &YQLO v 9", n6vrou T' E tv4LLav qCuotv
OU,00Qct 8t LXTOXYTOt,
3stEQ 0QEI~T) &%fl0"
XQCTEd 8i AIxavaig IyO .UXoV
O11Q 6Q00L rc , X0L0LUUXV& 0'
Innov 6 XP:tET.Lt Liiq , X.qPov tUYCv,
ofioQEv z' dxpIiia za ooOV.
xcz qwyt ta xot! dvepkv
qQ6 nlJa nul dortw6aioug lbQy&lg M,84itaTrO xcal 8uora6Ov
iy(Ov lVafOoELa nat Ugoo0LQa q6q(LV OiXI,
nac-ryT6iQO;- &3WOQO; in' OU6Ev rQXCTCIL
T6 Izo kov A t 6vov 4pye tv oi ,ind rotw.
v6aov 8' c1LL11XL(0Vcv 4PUYUI; tVAA9cQaGTaL.
aop6v u -6 ginxav6tv
TiXVcig (iiQ iXk8' XONV TO E tiAV xax6v, kk. Lo in' ik&oV Q EV"
v6poug yEQ OLQov X0Ovog OTWv T' vo0Qxov &xav,
intnLg4- dnoxag, GT4) .6tO h~ xa),6v
tv otTL T6XJ4ag XiQLV" ILAT' JL nOaQi(FTL
ViVOLTO ATT' 1ooV PQOVW6V, 5; 168' 9Q896.
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The Greeks centered their interest on man especially.
Their concept of natural law was born of their study of
man. It is one of their greatest contributions to the
world's culture and civilization. It is a new idea, which
is still alive today; and the Greeks had the genius of coin-
ing words for this new idea. Thanks to natural law, there
is something humane and personal in Greek law, there is
a soul, a spirit in it. There is even too much poetry in
natural law not to be divine. The Greek saw it and ex-
pressed it, for they were poets, they looked at the world
in awe, like children. That is why everything they have
invented still looks so fresh; their literature and their
philosophy seem to be less old than yesterday's newspa-
pers; one never tires of studying Greek, as one never tires
of looking at the sun on the Aegean sea.
Natural law is, in fact, the expression of the divine law
in man. As long as man respects the divine in himself, he
lives in peace, for the divine, which is measure and order,
is peace. Socrates used to smile, when looking at the
Parthenon, for the Parthenon was for him the symbol of
order and harmony, of measure and proportion; it may
also be regarded as the symbol of natural law for the
Greeks of old.

NATURAL LAW IN THE ROMAN PERIOD'
Ernst Levy
THE subject assigned to me in this discussion is the law
of nature in the period of Roman history. Stretching
beyond the developments in Roman Law it includes the
currents among philosophers, rhetors and theologians,
and within the limi's of Roman Law it embraces the evo-
lution down to the age of Justinian and his compilation
in the sixth century A.D. However, time does not permit
me to cover such a vast field in an adequate way. A se-
lection is imperative, and there can be no doubt as to
how to make it. Roman jurisprudence in its classical
period suggests itself as the appropriate topic, for a num-
ber of reasons. It represents a unique achievement in
legal history and the greatest intellectual legacy the Ro-
mans have left to us. It is neither dependent on the
Greeks as are Roman philosophy and rhetoric, nor does
it herald the Scholastics, as do the writings of the Church
Fathers. It is, therefore, not likely to be treated by the
other speakers. Moreover, the attitude of the classical
jurists toward natural law is by no means settled, but is,
1 The following abbreviations are used: D. = Justiniani Digesta, edd.
T. Mommsen and P. Kriiger, Corpus juris civilis, Vol. I (13th stereo. ed.,
1920); Inst. = Justiniani Institutiones, ed. Kruger, in the same volume;
Gal. I etc. = Gai Institutiones, edd. Seckel et Kuebler (7th ed., 1935);
Ind. int. = Index interpolationum, edd. Levy and Rabel (1929 if); SZ.
-Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fir Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Ab-
teilung. The Loeb Classical Library and S. P. Scott, The Civil Law (1932)
have principally, though not throughout, been used for the translation of
Greek and Roman texts.
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on the contrary, still a highly controversial subject. They
are both invoked and rejected as witnesses for the recog-
nition of a law of nature, and legal historians as well as
philosophers are themselves divided on the issue. Another
attempt, therefore, should be made to clarify the prob-
lem. Everything else including the tendencies of post-
classical writers and Justinian's men can be given but
passing attention.
With one exception. Cicero holds an outstanding posi-
tion in the field.2 Greatly impressed with the doctrines
of Plato,3 Aristotle 4 and the Stoics 5 and brought up in
the milieu of the schools of the rhetors, he became ac-
quainted early with the subject of natural law. With or
without reference to the Greek models, he returned to it
so often and in such various forms of expression that, at
least to us, he has become the chief source of the Roman
theory of the law of nature. An outline of his views, how-
ever, will not only be an end in itself. It will also bring
into better relief the manner in which the lawyers looked
at the matter. And this by way of contrast. Cicero, for
2 The literature is large. See especially, M. Voight (infra n. 51) 1 176
if, R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the
West I (1903) 1 ff (the second edition of 1930 was not accessible to me);
E. Costa, Cicerone Giureconsulto (1927) I 16 if; C. H. McIlwain, The
Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) 114 if; R. N. Wilkin,
Eternal Lawyer, A Legal Biography of Cicero (1947) 223 if; G. Lombardi,
Sul concetto di 'ius gentium' (1947) 61 ff.
3 R. Morrow, "Plato and the Law of Nature" in Essay in Political
Theory presented to G. H. Sabine (1948) 17 ff. Voigt, loc. cit. I 81 ff
gives a survey on Greek doctrines at large.
4 F. D. Wormuth, "Aristotle on Law" in the Essays cit. in n. 3, 53 ff.
See also J. Bryce, Studies in History and jurisprudence II (1901) 567,
0. Lenel in Enzyklopidie der Rechtswissenschaft, 7th ed., I (1915) 331.
5 E. Bodenheimer, jurisprudence (1940) 107 if, H. A. Rommen, The
Natural Law, transl. by Hanley (1947) 21 ff.
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all his great talents, was a statesman and philosopher, an
orator and legal practitioner rather than a creative jurist.
He was a close friend of some of these jurists, but their
world was not his.
To Cicero, law is the highest reason, implanted in na-
ture, which commands what ought to be done and forbids
the opposite.6 The very root 7 and origin8 of the law is
in nature or, as he also puts it, in God. For the mind of
God cannot exist without reason, and divine reason can-
not but have this power to establish right and wrong. 9
God, therefore, is the inventor, interpreter and sponsor of
natural law.'" The Gods have given it to the human
race.1' It is the supreme law,i2 the only true law' 3 and
genuine justice.' 4  In fact, justice does not exist at all, if
it does not come from nature or right reason.'5
Consequently, that law is above space and time. It is
alike at Rome and at Athens,' 6 a ius gentium, as he says,' 7
it rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and
prohibition. It is eternal and everlasting, hence unchange-
able, so that neither senate nor people can relieve us from
6 De legibus' 1.6.18; cf. de re publica 3.22.33.
7 De leg. 1.6.20. i. f.
8 De leg. 1.13.35; cf. pro Milone 4.10
9 De leg. 2.4.9, 10; cf. de natura deorum 2.31.78, 79; 2.62.154.
10 De re publ. 3.22.33 i. f.; cf. de officiis 3.5.23.
11 De leg. 2.4.8.
12 De leg. 1.6.19 i. f.
13 De re publ. 3.22.33 int.; de leg. 2.4.10 i. f.
14 De off. 3.17.69 i. f:
15 De leg. 1.15.42
16 De re publ. 3.22.33.
17 De off. 3.5.23: "Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium,
sed etiam legibus populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica con-
tineture, codem modo constitutum est"; de haruspicum responso oratio
14.32: "quamquam hoc si minus civili iure perscriptum est, lege tamen
naturae communi iure gentium sanctum est."
46 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
its obligations.' 8 It is not reduced to writing 9 nor made
by man altogether. 20 It has its origin ages before any
written law existed or any State was established.21
The substance of natural law presents itself in a num-
ber of basic principles. It permits selfhelp against vital
aggression and defense against injury.22 It forbids one
not only to act insidiously or fraudulently 23 but even to do
harm to anyone.24 Although it is not against nature that
a man secures the necessities of life for himself rather
than somebody else, nature does forbid him to increase
his means, wealth and resources by despoiling others.25
More than that: it is a matter of injustice not to shield
from wrong those upon whom it is being inflicted.26 For
nature ordains that anyone desire to promote the interests
of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a
fellow-man. 27 There are, to sum up, two fundamentals
of justice: the negative that no harm be done to anyone
and the affirmative that the common welfare be served. 28
Greatly inferior in all these respects is man-made law,
the law originating in man's opinion,29 whether custom
or statute, unwritten or written. 30 It is not one but mul-
18 De re publ. 3.22.33; de leg. 2.4.8.
19 Pro Milone 4.10; de leg 1.6.19, 20.
20 De invent. 2.53.161; de leg. 1.10.28; 2.4.8, 10.
21 De leg. 1.6.19 i. f.; 2.4.9.
22 Pro Mil. 4.10; de inv. 2.53.161.
23 De off. 3.17.68.
24 De off. 3.5.26; 3.6.27; de fin. bonor. et malor. 3.21.70, 71.
25 De off. 3.5.21-23.
26 De off. 1.7.23.
27 De off. 3.6.27.
28 De off. 1.10.31
29 De oratore 3.29.114; de leg. 1.16.45; see also supra n. 17.
30 Part. orat. 18.62; 37.129; de off. 3.5.23; de leg. 1.15.42.
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tifarious, often different among different peoples, limited
in time and subject to change. As based on expediency
rather than reason, it can be overthrown by that very ex-
pediency. Moreover, expediency has little to do with
justice. In a passage most pertinent to our modem prob-
lems, Cicero illustrates his point by warning that a law
cannot be considered just which enables a dictator to put
to death with impunity any citizen he wishes, even with-
out a trial.3 ' And he continues: "if the principles of law
were founded on the enactments of peoples, the edicts of
rulers, or the decisions of judges, then the law would sanc-
tion robbery and forgery of wills, in case these acts were
approved by the votes or resolutions of the populace." In
this event, a law could make justice out of injustice.32
Therefore, a legal doctrine concerned with the origin of
law and justice cannot start from the Twelve Tables and
the edict of the praetor; it is bound to draw upon the
depths of philosophy and to inquire into nature's gifts to
men and the natural association among them.33  Such,
however, he adds, is not the point of view of the lawyers.
These men spend their time on minor details; they talk
and write about eaves and housewalls because they have
only the needs of the public and the practice of the courts
in mind. This, he concludes, means little for cognition,
though for practical purposes it is indispensable.34 And
that, in fact, makes all the difference. Lawyers proceed
in one way, philosophers in another. The law the lawyers
31 De leg. 1.15.42; see also de inv. 2.53.160.
32 De leg. 1.16.43, 44; 2.5.11.
33 De leg. 1.5.16, 17.
34 De leg. 1.4.14; 1.5.15-17.
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deal with is enforceable,3 5 while the law of nature has
no effect on the wicked. If he fails to comply with its
rules, he will suffer the worst penalties in his conscience,
but may escape legal punishment. 36 For civil law cannot
forbid everything ruled out by the law of nature.37
Cicero himself when speaking as an attorney did not
always see fit to allude to the natural law. In his oration
for Caecina 38 he made the point that even a statute duly
enacted could, in principle, 39 not deprive a Roman citizen
of his most vital rights, among them his freedom. Hence,
he inferred, not everything the people might have ap-
proved had legal strength.40 A higher law might bar
it.41 But he abstained from identifying this higher law
as the law of nature, probably because he felt that nature,
while the only forum to decide on the justness of a
statute, could not tell of its validity.42 In conformity with
this position, he takes the institution of slavery for
granted,43 as Aristotle did.44 He does not deem it unjust
either except for those who are capable of governing
35 De off. 3.17.68: "Sed aliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias:
leges, quatenus manu tenere possunt, philosophi, quatenus ratione et in-
tellegentia."
36 De re publ. 3.22.33: "quae (lex) . . . nec improbos iubendo aut
vetando movet; . .. cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis
aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia, quae
putantur, effugerit"
37 De off. 3.17.69.
38 33.95.97.
39 For the detail see E. Levy, Die r5mische Kapitalstrafe (1931) 9 f,
W. Kunkel, R5misches Privatrecht (1935) 67.
40 "Non quidquid populus iusserit, ratum esse oportere."
41 See the discussion by V. Arangio-Ruiz, "La Rtgle de Droit et la Loi
dans l'antiquiti Classique" (1938) in Rariora (1946) 255 ff.
42 De leg. 1.15.42-1.16.45.
43 For reference see Costa (supra n. 2) 1 74 if.
44 See esp. Politics 1253b 15 if.
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themselves.4 5 Assuming the fact that slaves were usually
treated rather harshly, he only warns his contemporaries
to have regard for justice toward them and to give them
their due like free employees. 46 Again he omits any men-
tion of the law of nature under which according to the
doctrine of the Sophists God left all men free; nature
made none a slave.47 He does refer to the Greeks in
tackling the problem of whether animals as living crea-
tures participate in natural law and so are likewise pro-
tected from injury. But he rejects these views as he found
them in Pythagoras and Empedocles.48 Instead he sides
with Chrysippus by stating that a community in the law
was only between men: they might lawfully use animals
to their best advantage.49  The world itself, he says, was
created for the sake of gods and men, and anything in it
was made to serve them.5 0
So much about the ideology of Cicero. It forms a
proper background for a review of the jurisprudence of
the classical era, i.e., the approximately three hundred
years beginning with the time of his death. As already
indicated, the sources, 51 at a glance, do not seem to offer
45 De re publ. 3.25.37.
46 De off. 1.13.41.
47 So Alcidamas of Elis according to a scholium on Aristotle, Rhetoric
1373b 18; see also the general reference in Aristotle, Pol. 1253b 20. Cf. M.
Salomon, "Der Begriff des Naturrechts bei den Sophisten", SZ .32 (1911)
154.
48 De re publ. 3.11.19. For similar views held by Greek rhetors see G.
Castelli, Studi in onore de Silvio Perozzi (1925) 55 if; cf. SZ. 46 (1926)
414 f.
49 De finib. 3.20.67.
50 De natura deorum 2.61.154-62.155 if; de leg. 1.8.25.
51 The first broad discussion of them was presented by M. Voigt, Das
Jus Naturale, Aequum et Bonum und Jus Gentium der Ramer, 4 vols.(1856-1875). The most recent comprehensive monograph is C. A. Maschi,
La Concezione Naturalistica del Diritta e degli Istituti Giuridici Romani
(XIX and 395 pp., 1937).
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an unequivocal line of thought. This does not mean to
say that they are barren. Their wealth rather is disturb-
ing. Hundreds of texts are concerned with ius naturale,
naturalis ratio, rerum natura and other phrases referring
to natura or naturalis.52 It is impossible to find a com-
mon denominator. The outlook brightens, however, if
different meanings are recognized and explained as such.
Cicero, the philosopher, believes in a universal and eter-
nal law. The jurists consider this type of natural law
only in a minority of instances which will be examined
later. As a rule, they refer to nature and preferably to
the nature of things when they deal with factual situa-
tions of daily life. There the jurists feel at home. To
master such problems they, and they alone, are called
upon. They have to do with the law binding here on
earth, and, if necessary, to be enforced by the courts. In
almost all the passages pointing to nature they discuss
questions of mine and thine, i.e., problems of the private
law, the very province in which their influence has not
been obscured by the passing of centuries.. They did not
call that positive law. And we, too, should avoid a term
which too easily suggests that they were normally engaged
in the interpretation of statutes formally laid down. Such
statutes were uncommon. The bulk of the private law
had gradually grown out of the practice in business and
court procedure. And gradually it had been built up by
the jurists into a system second to none in the harmony
52 A complete list of the passages written by or transmitted under the
name of classical jurists is found in Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae
IV (1914) 22 ff. The texts referred to in the following pages, unless other-
wise indicated, are considered as furnishing evidence of the classical situa-
tion even though their formal authenticity in one case or another may be
open to doubt.
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of its rules. It was this very situation that so frequently
caused the jurists to use nature as a yardstick. For "nat-
ural" was to them not only what followed from physical
qualities of men or things, but also what, within the
framework of that system, seemed to square with the nor-
mal and reasonable order of human interests and, for this
reason need not be in need of any further evidence.
To make this clear it will be advisable to present some
illustrations. 53 From the nature of man in its physical
sense it was derived that a person under puberty could
not act for himself and, therefore, had to be taken care
of by someone else, whether his father or guardian. 54
Equally, an insane person could not make or accept a
promise.55 As to relationship and the right of intestate
succession springing from it, the Romans distinguished
two groups. Under the ius civile only agnates were con-
sidered, i.e., those stemming from a common male an-
cestor or, more correctly speaking, those who were sub-
ject to the same paternal power or would have been. so
if the common ancestor were still alive, regardless of
whether the connection was created by blood or adoption.
They included persons related by blood, whether through
males or females, and, therefore, as Gaius puts it, tied
together under natural law.56 "Naturalis cognatio" was
also the technical term for the relationship of slaves. In
53 Other illustrations of which, however, not all would seem to be
classical are found in G. Rotondi, Scritti giuridici (1922, ex 1912) 11 200
ff.
54 Gai. I 189.
55 (Gai.) rerum cottidianarum D. 44.7.1.12.
56 I 156. See also Mod. D 38.10.4.2 (iure naturali connectuntur) which
in so far gives classical law; cf. H. J. Wolff, "The Background of the Post-
Classical Legislation on Illegitimacy" in Seminar 3 (1945) 25.
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these connections 57 natural children, fathers and sons are
often mentioned in the sources. None of these "natural
rights" could be affected by emancipation, adoption,58
or other cases of capitis diminutio.59 The right of self-
help against a present attack, as innate in every human
being, was likewise traced to natural reason.60 And
Florentinus enlarged on that idea by adding, in the man-
ner of Seneca, 6 1 that an insidious 62 assault on man by man
was particularly outrageous in view of the relationship
established between all of us by nature.63 In the field of
contracts an impossible obligation was deemed no obliga-
tion,64 as e.g. the promise to deliver a slave, when at the
time of the promise the slave was dead. This rule was
based on natural reason.65 Similarly, a performance was
not due while prevented by the very nature of human
conditions.66 So a slave child was not owing before his
birth. Nor could the construction of a house promised
today be expected to be finished tomorrow. 7
57 The extension of the use of naturalis to illegitimate relationship be-
tween free persons may not have been practiced until after the classical
period: H. J. Wolff loc. cit. 24 if; cf. 0. Gradenwitz, "Natur und Sklave
bei der naturalis obligatio" in K~nigsberger Festgabe fir T. Schirmer
(1900) 25 f.
58 Paul. D. 38.6.4; cf. also Ulp. D. 37.4.8.7 and Pap. D. 28.2.23 pr.
59 Gai. I 158, Ulp. ep. 28.9; cf. Pomp. D. 50.17.8.
60 Gai. D. 9.2.4 pr.; Ulp. D. 43.16.1.27, both, it seems to me, sub-
stantially genuine.
61 Epist. moral. 15.3.33: homo sacra res homini; ibid. 52: natura nos
cognatos edidit.
62 Cf. supra n. 23.
63 D. 1.1.3. The reasons advanced by some authors (G. Beseler, Bei-
trige zur Kritik der rimischen Rechtsquellen III (1913) 62, S. Perozzi,
Istituzioni di Diritto Romano 2nd ed. (1928) I 98, Lombardi 154 if)
attacking the text would not appear to be convincing. The cum is to be
understood as conditional (if) rather than casual (as).
64 Cels. D. 50.17.185 and 188.1; cf. Paul. D. 49.8.3.1, Paul. Sent. 3.4b.1.
65 (Gal.) rerum cottid. D. 44.7.1.9 on the model of Gai. III 97.
66 Cels. D. 50.17.186; Paul. D. 7.7.1.
67 Paul. D. 45.1.73 pr; see also Paul. D. 40.7.20.5.
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Invalid, however, was the stipulation not only of a
dead slave but also a temple or tomb,6" i.e., of things the
Romans did not deem susceptible of private ownership.
With this instance we come to those cases in which nature
was used as the rationale of a rule derived from legal
rather than physical principles. Nature is here the order
inherent in conditions of life as the Romans saw it. A
few illustrations must suffice to give an idea of the charac-
ter of this rather comprehensive group. According to
natural reason a man's legal position may, in principle,
be improved but not impaired without his consent. 69 Ac-
cording to nature the benefits of a thing go to that party
who bears the expenses70 and vice versa, so that the main-
tenance of a borrowed slave is on the borrower and not
the lender.71 According to natural reason expenses in-
curred in the production of fruits may be deducted where
the fruits are to be returned to another party.7 2 From
the structure of the Roman family it follows according to
nature that the father cannot any more bring a suit
against his son than he may sue himself.7 3  It also fol-
lows that a child born out of wedlock is related to the
mother only.74 The modes of acquisition of property are
generally realized as originating either in civil law or in
natural law.75 Among the latter methods the jurists list,
68 (Gai.) rer. cott. D. 44.7.1.9; cf. Gai. III 97.
69 Gai. D. 3.5.38.
70 Paul. D. 50.17.10.
71 Gal. D. 13.6.18.2; cf. Ga. D. 7.1.45.
72 Paul. D. 5.3.36.5.
73 Paul. D. 47. 2.16, hardly interpolated, as G. Beseler, Bullettino del
Istituto di Diritto Romano 45 (1938) 178 suggests.
74 Ulp. D. 1.5.24, substantially genuine except for the nisi-clause. Cf.
Lombardi (supra n. 2) 217 ff.
75 Ga. II 65; (Gai.), rerum cottid. D. 41.1.1 pr.
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e.g., delivery (traditio),76 occupation of something be-
longing to nobody or captured in war,77 and the accrual
of a building to the owner of the ground regardless of
who built it or owned the materials.78 Where a new
thing was made out of materials belonging to another
person, as wine made by A from grapes of B, there was
even a conflict of opinion on which was favored by nat-
ural reason.7 9
This habit of operating with nature in matters of legal
reasoning is greatly significant of the way in which the
jurists looked at their system. It appeared to them to be
rounded out and well-balanced like a living organism the
capacities and limits of which are determinable by its
nature. Accordingly, the basic concepts they used in their
mental processes gradually became so fixed that their
"nature" could not even be altered by statute. The laws,
says Gaius, 0 might decree that in certain circumstances
a man be treated as a murderer, adulterer or thief al-
though he did not commit the act himself, but they could
not state that he be a murderer, adulterer or thief, as
such notions were established by nature. The whole de-
vice of a fiction so successfully employed in Roman Law
rests, after all, on its reluctance to tamper with traditional
units of legal thought.
The jurists then called a rule natural when it seemed
to them in conformity with either the physical condition
76 Gai. II 65 and 66. Cf. Inst. 2.1.40.
77 Gai. II 66, 69; (Gai.) rer. cott. D. 41.1.3 pr; Flor. D. 1.8.3.
78 Gai. II 73; Gal. D. 43.18.2; Ulp. D. 9.2.50. See also Maschi (supra
n. 51) 284 ff.
79 Gai. II 79; cf. (Gai.) rer. cott. D. 41.1.7.7.
80 Gai. III 194. Gai. D. 7.5.2.1. offers another illustration.
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of man or his normal conduct or expectation in social
relations. Hence they considered such a rule as self-
evident and in no need of further explanation. Hence
they considered it also to be universally recognized. From
the latter point of view it was an easy step to place ius
naturale in a close relation with a technical term of long
standing: the ius gentium i.e. the set of rules in force
among all peoples,81 as opposed to the ius civile, the body
of rules exclusively reserved to Roman citizens. Only
citizens, e.g., might be related through agnation and
transfer or receive title in property by means of a manci-
patio, while cognate relationship and transfer through
traditio were applied to foreigners (peregrini) as well as
citizens (cives). In fact, more than once a device of ius
gentium was, in a truly Aristotelian fashion, 2 traced to
naturalis ratio3 or, conversely, the naturalis ratio derived
from the ius gentium character of a device.8 4 Occasion-
ally, the one term may have been chosen alternately for
the other.8 5
However, we should be careful not to press the equa-
tion. In classical times, the two notions did not coin-
81 This is the central point of the fine and provocative book of Lom-
bardi (supra n. 2).
92 Eth. Nicom. 1134 b 18; Rhet. 1373 b 2. See also Cicero (supra
n. 17).
83 Gal. I 1 and 189; see also Gal. II 65 (lure naturali). Cf. (Gai.) rer.
cott. D 41.1.1 pr.; cod. 9.3.
84 Gal. III 154.
85 The usual comparison in this regard of the Institutes of Gaius with
the Res cottidianae would offer full proof only if Gaius were also responsible
for the detail of the latter work. Such a view, however, is hardly maintained
by modern authors, whatever their positive suggestions about the origin:
see especially V. Arangio-Ruiz, Studi Bonfante I (1930) 495 if; F. Schulz,
History of Roman Legal Science (1946) 167 f, S. di Marzo, Bullettino
(supra n. 73) 51-52 (1948) 1 ff.
NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
cide.8 8 The one stated the fact of universal usage, the
other its motivation. Moreover, while ius gentium was
a hard and fast category indispensable to the technique
of the jurists, naturalis ratio never obtained an organic
status in their reasoning. They used it or not at conveni-
ence. And where they used it, the relation to ius gen-
tium was not always the same. So Gaius contrasts a
partnership created by informal consent as an institution
of ius gentium and thus based on naturalis ratio with the
archaic community of the coheirs (sui heredes) after the
father's death which he calls a natural, i.e. normal and
automatic partnership and yet peculiar to Roman citi-
zens.8 7 So he points out on one occasion 8 that natural
rights cannot be impaired by the civil law;8 9 on another
he states that statutes might change regulations of ius
gentium,90 and as subject to such a change he cites the
rule otherwise presented as lex naturae9' that the child
of a free woman be born free. In still other instances it
is more or less certain that a Roman jurist alluding to
86 Contra the predominant opinion, e.g., Lenel, (supra n. 4) 331 f, P.
Kruger, Geschichte der Quellen, 2nd ed. (1912), 134, Perozzi, (supra
n. 63) I 91, 100, Arangio-Ruiz, Istituzioni, 9th ed. (1947) 25 if, Lombardi
loc. cit. 126 if, 143 ff and passim. But see also W. W. Buckland, Textbook
of Roman Law 2nd ed. (1932) 52 if, F. Pringsheim, SZ 46 (1926) 352 ff.
87 Gai. III 154a according to the parchment edited 1933 by V. Arangio-
Ruiz in Pubblicazioni della Societi Italiana no. 1182. It reads: "Sed ea
quidem societas de qua loquimur, id est quae nudo consensu contrahitur,
iuris gentium est; itaque inter omnes homines naturali ratione consistit. Est
autem aliud genus societatis proprium civium Romanorum. Olim enim. mo-
tuo patre familias inter suos heredes quaedam erat legitima simul et natu-
ralis societas. . . ." See also Levy, SZ. 54 (1934) 261, 279; C. W. Westrup,
Introduction to Early Roman Law II (1934) 38 if, 63 ff.
88 Supra n. 59.
89 I 158: "civilis ratio civilia guidem iura corrumpere potest, naturalia
vero non potest." For III 194 see supra n. 80.
'90 I 83 if: "animadvertere tamen debemus, ne iuris gentium regulam
vel lex aliqua vel quod legis vicem optinet, aliquo casu commutaverit."
91 Ulp. D. 1.5.24; supra n. 74.
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ius gentium would have found it inadvisable to substitute
ius naturale as an equivalent and vice versa. Gaius de-
clares a verborum obligatio, produced through the strictly
formalized question and answer 'promittis ? promitto',
to be iuris gentium and thus accessible to non-citizens.92
But he is silent about natural reason as the root of the
rule, and this is hardly due to mere coincidence. For else-
where, as noted before, he deduces the "natural" charac-
ter of contractual partnership from the very fact that it
flows from informal consent, 93 and, vice-versa, Paul
states that a lease is contracted not by formal words but
by any consent because it is a natural transaction com-
mon to all peoples..P4  Conversely, a house built by any-
one on somebody's ground belonged to the latter, and
this, we are told, in accordance with natural law.95 Was
the rule at the same time regarded as ius gentium and
practiced everywhere? If the Romans knew anything
about the pertinent customs prevailing in large parts of
their empire,9 6 they could not very well have answered
in the affirmative. 97 These various asymmetries demon-
strate that the idea of natural law, such as hitherto dis-
cussed, was handled rather loosely and had no firm place
in the classical system. The result would square with the
general and plausible assumption that the idea came
92 III 93.
93 III 154a; supra n. 87.
94 D 19.2.1: "Locatio et conductio cum naturalis sit et omnium gen-
tium, non verbis sed consensu contrahitur." The reasons advanced to deny
the authenticity of this text (see Lombardi 233 ff with references) do not
seem convincing. Cf., in general, also Arangio-Ruiz (supra n. 86) 26.
95 Supra n. 78.
96 Lombardi 133 is inclined to deny that.
97 See Maschi 291 if, R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman
Egypt (1944) .180 f.
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from foreign, namely Greek, thought. If so, however, it
was markedly adapted to the Roman ideology. For in
all the cases considered as yet the jurists moved entirely
within the limits of the actual and enforceable law.9
But there are other passages. They show the natural
law holding a position of its own and leading to legal con-
sequences which originated neither in ius civile nor in
ius gentium. The outstanding case in point is the insti-
tution of slavery. Under both ius civile and ius gentium
the slave is not a person but a thing, not a subject but an
object of rights. He cannot have ownership or personal
rights or obligations. By nature, however, he is a person
as the freeman, and born free: all men are equal. This
contrast is explicitly and pointedly stressed in three pas-
sages of the Digest. Ulpian states:
As far as the ius civile is concerned, slaves are not
regarded as persons. This, however, is not true
under natural law, because, so far as natural law is
concerned, all men are equal. 99
Ulpian, also, points out:
Manumission... took its origin from ius gentium.
For under natural law all men were born free and
manumission was not known, as slavery itself was
not recognized. But after the ius gentium intro-
duced slavery, the benefit of manumission also came
in.1 00
98 Cf. also H. F. Jolowicz, Law Quarterly Review 48 (1932) 179f.
99 Ulp. D 50.17.32: "Quod attinet ad ius civile, servi pro nullis haben-
tur: non tamen et iure naturali, quia, quod ad ius naturale attinet, omnes
homines aequales sunt."
100 Ulp. D. 1.1.4 pr.: "Manumissio ... a lure gentium originem sump-
sit, utpote cum iure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur nec esset nota manu-
missio, cum servitus esset incognita: sed posteaquam iure gentium servi-
tus invasit, secutum est beneficium manumissionis."
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Finally, Florentinus sets forth:
Freedom is a man's natural capacity of doing what
he pleases unless he is prevented by force or law.
Slavery is an institution of ius gentium by which
one man is made the property of another contrary
to nature.10 1
A number of modem legal historians consider the opin-
ion on the law of nature as it presents itself in these pas-
sages to be incompatible with the position taken in the
great majority of tcsts from which I have made a selec-
tion. They are, therefore, inclined to believe that those
passages, as alien to the classical authors, must be due
to interpolation. 10 2  Such a view could not easily be re-
jected, indeed, if the three statements were entirely iso-
lated. This, however, would not seem to be the case.
There is no lack of evidence. It flows from many sources.
The emperor might grant a manumitted slave the
rights of a freeborn man and thus release him from his
duties toward the manumissor. In this way, as a jurist
comments, the freed man is restored to those rights which
originally were vested in all men.10 3  More than that:
such a man is technically known as "natalibus suis resti-
tutus," as reinstated in his rights of birth. The same idea
of the natural freedom of any newborn human underlies
101 Flor. D. 1.5.4 pr. and 1: "Libertas est naturalis facultas eius quod
cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut iure prohibetur. Servitus est consti-
tutio iuris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subicitur."
The nisi-clause does not seem to be open to such objections as advanced
by V. Scialoja, Teoria della Proprieta (1928) I 260 f and F. Schulz, Prin-
ciples of Roman Law (1936) 140 ff n. 2.
102 Perozzi, Albertario (see Ind. int.), H. Siber, Obligatio naturalis
(1925) 5f (in part), Lombardi 159 if, 205 if, 209 n. 7, 375 f.
103 Marcian. D. 40.11.2: "illis enim utique natalibus resituitur, in qui-
bus initio omnes homines fuerunt."
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another reasoning. I have already mentioned that an
illegitimate child followed the personal status of his
mother. That status was generally determined by the
time of conception. When, however, the mother, though
slave at that time, was freed before the birth, the child
was deemed free, and this, as Gaius argues, "naturali
ratione."'0 4 Furthermore, the young of an animal given
in usufruct belonged not to the owner but to the usufruc-
tuary of the animal as its fruit. On the other hand, it
was held after some controversy, 10 5 that the child of a
slave woman should be dealt with differently.' 6 It
would, as Gaius states, l07 seem absurd for a human being
to be thought of as fruit, while nature has made every
fruit for the benefit of human beings. Or, as Ulpian
terms it,1 0 8 one human being cannot be treated as fruit
made for another. This comes very close to the view
proffered by Cicero.0 9
The patent fact that slaves were endowed with reason
and acted as other humans was bound to leave its mark
on legal practice and doctrine. What is revealing, how-
ever, is that the jurists in forming a pertinent terminology
liked to use phrases borrowed from nature. Let us con-
template this triad: Naturalis cognatio, naturalis posses-
sio and naturalis obligatio. A cohabitation of slaves of
a permanent character, the contubernium, frequently
practiced and frequently favored by their masters, could
not constitute a marriage. Such natural cognation there-
104 I 89; see also Paul. Sent. 2.24.1,2.
105 De finibus 1.4.12.
106 Gai. II 50; Paul. Sent. 3.6.19.
107 D. 22.1.28.1.
108 D. 7.1.68 pr.
109 Supra n. 50.
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fore, as resulted between parent and child or between
children born out of this connection, did not qualify for
a right of succession after the slaves were set free. But it
was not entirely devoid of consequences: it barred them,
e.g., from intermarriage 1 0 and established duties of rev-
erence11 ' with both effects being referred to the natural
law. Similarly, the actual control of a slave over prop-
erty, real or personal, was considered a possessio natur-
alis1 2 and consequently denominated in the same way as
the factual control of free people who held specific things
for others, as a tenant, a borrower or a son in the power
of his father. Such possessio was distinguished from the
possessio civilis of a man holding the property for himself
and, therefore, under certain conditions capable of ac-
quiring ownership, whether through legal transaction or
lapse of time. A possessio naturalis did not carry these
privileges nor could it as such, as a rule,"1 3 be recovered
through legal proceedings. It only presented that phys-
ical element without which a possessio civilis could not
arise. The concepts of cognatio and possessio naturalis
as against cognatio and possessio civilis had much in com-
mon. Both put the emphasis on the natural point of
view: the one in stressing the relationship by blood and
the other accenting the visible holding of a thing regard-
less of title. Both were originally used in regard to free
110 Pomp. D. 23.2.8; Paul. D. cod. 14.2 (classical in substance); cf.
Inst. 1.10.10.
111 Paul. Sent. 1.lb.1 = D. 2.4.6.; Ulp. opin. D. 37.15.1.1 notwith-
standing the postclassical composition of these texts. Cf. E. Levy, Pauli
Sententiae (1945) 64, Wolff (supra n. 56) 28.
112 Ulp. D. 45.1.38.7; see also Javol. D. 41.2.24i f. (probably genuine
in so far); cf.,W. Kunkel, Symbolae Friburgenses in Honorem Ottonis
Lenel (1935) 44.
113 For its qualifications see, e.g. Kunkel, loc. cit. 61 if, Arangio-Ruiz
(supra n. 86) 273 ff.
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men and hence transferred to slaves. Both were already
familiar to preclassical jurists, as e.g. Servius," 4 Cicero's
friend, and synchronizing with the then fashionable view
of the natural law.
Different in all these respects was naturalis obligatio.
This notion can at the earliest be verified late in the first
century A.D. 1 5 It was an abstract concept and directly
created to meet situations peculiar to slaves." 6 Where
a slave entered a contract, which happened daily to slaves
in charge of estates, factories or shops, his master might
be liable within certain limits. He himself could not be
sued even after he was set free. But payment made under
that contract, whether by him or a third person, could
not be recovered; his contract was also a sufficient basis
for a suretyship or pledge. 117 Such a payable though
not actionable obligation might have been called hybrid
or imperfect. The jurists, however, coined it obligatio
naturalis. "Slaves" says Ulpian, e.g., "are liable on con-
tracts not in a civil way (civiliter), but in a natural way
(naturaliter) ."118 Where did this conception originate?
The idea could certainly not have been that it was natural
for an obligation not to be actionable; the very contrary
was true. The choice of the name cannot be accounted
for but by the consideration that as the slave was a person
only under natural law so his contracts produced obliga-
tions of merely natural law character. Neither his free-
dom nor his contract was enforceable. But either one
114 For naturalis possessio see Jul. D. 41.5.2.2.
115 Javol. D. 35.1.40.3; cf. Gradenwitz (supra n. 56) 26 f.
116 For the detail see J. Vizny, Studi Bonfante IV (1930) 145 if; see
also SZ. 51 (1931) 555.
117 Gai. III 119a.
118 D. 44.7.14; see also Jul. D. 46.1.16.4 and Paul. D. 12.6.13 pr.
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had some other, minor legal consequences. The equation
is even documented in the statement of Tryphoninus: "as
the freedom of the slave is a matter of natural law...,
so the question of whether or not a debt existed in regard
to an action of the master against the slave for recovery
of money which was not due has to be considered under
the aspect of natural law."'119 This statement, too, has
been suspected.120  But it seems difficult to accept these
doubts as long as no other plausible explanation of the
assuredly classical term naturalis obligatio has been ad-
vanced.
There are incidentally more illustrations of the fact
that the jurists classed slaves among persons. They are,
says Paul, ineligible to serve as jurors, but not by nature
as the dumb and deaf, the incurably insane and the per-
son under puberty12 1 who are deficient in judgment ....
Women and slaves, he continues, are rather barred by
custom, not because they lack reason, but because it is
established that they cannot serve in civic positions.'
22
It should not be forgotten either that in certain excep-
tional cases slaves had procedural standing, 12 3 that the
emperors showed an increasing tendency to insist on their
humane treatment, 12 4 that the religious law (ius sacrum)
in many respects dealt with them as persons. 125
119 D. 12.6.64: "ut enim libertas naturali jure continetur ... ita debiti
vel non debiti ratio in condictione naturaliter intellegenda est."
120 See the authors listed by F. Pringsheiin, SZ. 52, 139 n. 5 and Lom-
bardi 188 ff. The classical origin of the thought has been maintained by
Gradenwitz loc. cit. 28, Lenel (supra n. 4) 332 n. 1, see also Kunkel (supra
n. 39) 167 n. 2.
121 He consequently is not liable iure naturali: Lic. Rufin. D. 44.7.58.
122 D. 5.1.12.2.
123 P. Bonfante, Corso di Diritt& Romano I (1925) 154 f.
124 Cf. Kunkel 67 n. 6, also Carlyle (supra n. 2) 48 f.
125 A Pernice, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissen-
schaften 1886, 1173 if, Bonfante 1 145 f.
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Under these circumstances it would seem difficult to be-
lieve that, in the matter of slavery, the jurists should
never have referred to the natural law as a basis of legal
effects and terms and thus as an order different from both
ius civile and ius gentium. Hence I do not see any con-
clusive reason to throw overboard in substance those
three texts in which Florentinus and Ulpian present these
distinctions in general terms.126 Moreover, we found
Florentinus pointing to the natural relationship of all
men,127 and the weight of Ulpian's assertion that under
natural law all men are equal is fortified by the inscrip-
tion of the passage which suggests that it was part of a
discussion of the so-called obligations of slaves. 128  Ulti-
mately, there can be no doubt but that the jurists knew
about that concept of Greek philosophy as transmitted
to them by Cicero, Seneca 129 and others.
But the use of the concept is one thing and its appraisal
another. In this respect, the three most technical ap-
plications of the term "natural" which we have just dis-
cussed seem to offer some guidance. Natural cognation,
as we have noted, was of consequence in the praetorian
law,130 to a lesser extent in regard to slaves, and of none
in the matter of succession under the ius civile. Natural
126 D. 1.5.4 pr. and 1; 1.1.4 pr.; 50.17.32.
127 D. 1.1.3.
128 Ulp. D. 15.1.41. See 0. Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis (1889) Ulp.
no. 2899.
129 Seneca, too, took the institution of slavery for granted. But, from
his Stoic point of view, that meant little to him. On the one hand he urges
"corpora obnoxia sunt et adscripta dominis, mens quidem sui iuris" (De
benef. 3.20.1) and "Quid est praecipuum? in primis labris animam hebere.
Haec res efficit non e iure Quiritium liberum, sed e jure naturae. Liber
autem est, qui servitutem suam effugit" (Natural. quaest. 3 praef. 16). On
the other hand, he warns: " 'Servuse est.' hoc illi nocebit? ostende, quis
not sit: alius libidini servit, alius avaritiae, alius ambitioni, omnes timori."
(Epist. moral. 5.6.17). For more detail see Carlyle 19 ff.
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possession, held by free men or slaves, failed, in principle,
to be protected at law.' 3 ' A natural obligation was pay-
able but not enforceable, and this very defect may have
contributed to the choice of the word. In all these cases
then the attribute naturalis indicated a reduction, if not
denial, of legal effects. To dismiss this fact as a mere
coincidence is obviously inadequate. Instead, a definite
evaluation seems to emerge. The Roman jurists to whom
theory meant little and practical results meant everything
cannot have looked upon natural law as an order of equal
status. They did not deny its existence and credited it
with the absence of slavery in prehistoric times.' 3 2 But
within the framework of their actual system they must
have thought of natural law as inferior rather than su-
perior to the law in force.
In the light of these statements we have reason to
doubt the authenticity of that trichotomy which appears
in the opening passage of Justinian's Digest as a quotation
from the Institutes of Ulpian :133
Private law is tripartite; for it is composed of nat-
ural precepts, of those of (all) peoples and of those
of Roman citizens.134
This triple division of the law has long been suspected as
being at variance with the common bipartition between
ius civile and ius gentium. It is now almost generally re-
1&0 The duties of maintenance as introduced in the cognitio extra ordi-
nem (cf. Bonfante I 279 if) are of too late an origin to serve as evidence
for the reasons behind the coinage of classical concepts.
131 Supra n. 113.
132 Ulp. D. 1.1.4 pr., Marcian. D. 40.11.2. The more general statement
in Inst. 2.1.11 is not verified for the classical law; its much discussed rela-
tion with (Gai.) rer. cott. D. 41.1.1 pr. lies beyond the scope of this paper.
133 D. 1.1.1.2-4; cod. 6 pr.
134 "Privatum ius tripertitum est: collectum enim est et naturalibus
praeceptis aut gentium aut civilibus."
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garded as spurious. 135  The suspicion grows when we
read the definition of ius naturale which follows imme-
diately:
The law of nature is that which nature has taught
all animals. This law is not peculiar to the human
race, but belongs to all creatures living on the land
or in the sea and also to birds. Hence arises the
union of male and female which we call marriage,
hence the procreation of children, hence their rear-
ing; for we see that all animals, even wild beasts,
appear to take part in this knowledge of the law. 136
This community of law among men and animals is foreign
to Cicero 137 and to the Stoics such as Chrysippus, 13 8
Seneca139 and Marcus Aurelius the emperor. 140  Advo-
cated though it was by some Greek philosophers and
rhetors, 141 it appears inconceivable for a classical jurist.
Discernment and reason which made the doings of slaves
have repercussions in the actual law were wanting in the
animal. Confused are mating and marriage, instinct and
sensible action. 142  Ultimately, it is an open question,
135 The most recent list of pertinent authors is found in Lombardi 196.
136 "Ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam ius istud
non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium, quae in terra, quae
in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc descendit marls atque
feminae coniunctio, quam nos matrimonium appallamus, hinc liberorum
procreatio, hinc educatio: videmus etenim cetera quoque animalia, feras
etiam istius iuris peritia censeri."
137 Supra n. 49 and 50.
Is& As quoted by Marcia. D. 1.8.2 (ov q,6aL noXLTLxv oW).
139 De benef. 4.5.2; 6.7.3; epist. moral. 12.3.8; 20.7 passim.
'14 Trov Elg lavx, 7.9: v6jw; g£, k6yog zotvg zvrcov x6v voeQr0V
141 Supra n. 48.
142 E. g. Ulp. D. 9.1.1.3: "nec enim potest animal iniuria fecisse, quod
sensu caret."
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whether the Institutes of Ulpian were written by him-
self.143
There remains, however, a famous saying of Ulpian,
likewise found in the opening title of the Digest, which,
while not mentioning the natural law in so many words,
substantially states its principles, as they are recognized
to the present day.144 It reads:
The precepts of the law are these: to live honestly,
to harm no one, to render every man his own. l a5
There is no sufficient cause to attack the text as of By-
zantine origin. 146  So we should enjoy the fact that such
lofty words came from the pen of a classical writer. And
yet: two definite qualifications seem unavoidable. In the
first place, not one of the three propositions shows any
original thinking. Each is familiar to Greek philosophers
and from them transmitted to the Romans by Cicero who
in part presents them in the very same phrases. Ulpian's
borrowing is today an undisputed fact.14 7 Second, none
143 Schulz (supra n. 85) 171 f.
144 See, e. g. H. Coing, Die obersten Grundstze des Rechts. Ein Ver-
such zur Neubegrandung des Naturrechts (1947) 29, H. R. McKinnon,
Notre Dame Lawyer 23 (1948) 134.
145 D. 1.1.10.1: "Iuris praecepta sunt hae: honeste vivere, alterum non
laedere, suum cuique tribuere."
146 So E. Albertario, Studi di Diritto Romano V (1937 ex 1930) 99.
147 Compare Cic. de finibus 2.11.34: "Stoicis consentire naturae
quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste, vivere"; ib. 3.8.29:
"beate vivere, honeste, id est cum virtute, vivere."--Cic. ib. 3.21.71:
"ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura,
alienumque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum
etiam nocere"; de off. 1.10.31: "fundamenta iustitiae: primum ut ne
cui noceatur."-Cic invent. 2.53.160; de re publ. 3.11.18; 3.15.24 and
particularly de leg. 1.6.19: "eamque rem (i.e. legem) illi Graeco
putant nomine a suum cuique tribuendo appellatam" (cf. the note by
Keyes in the Loeb Classical Library edition: v6wg from vigwo i.e. to
distribute).
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of the three tenets has played any integral part in the im-
posing system of the Roman Law. The extant thousands
of rulings and discussions of the jurists would stand and
form a coherent whole as they do, if those tenets were
completely missing. 148 In fact, the approach of the clas-
sical authors would have been different, if they had been
guided by a conscious attachment to the three precepts.
The first demand "live honestly" is not only counter-
balanced by the other saying "Not everything permissible
is honest.' 49 It is specifically disregarded when Pom-
ponius as well as Paul and Ulpian hold that in stating a
price or a rent the contracting parties are free to take ad-
vantage of one another, and this in accordance with nat-
ural law (naturaliter).150 It is no less contrary to the
fact that the master may treat his slave with reckless
severity if only he refrains from unwarranted killing or
inhuman measures. 15' The second tenet "harm no
one"'152 is called in question by the rule "no one is con-
sidered to act fraudulently who keeps within the limits
of his rights.' 5 3 If, in particular, a man diverted the
water flowing through his property to his own exclusive
148 It seems worthwhile to quote J. Bryce (supra n. 4) 591 in whose
view such tenets "had after all not much more to do with the way in which
they (the Romans) built up the law than the flutings of the columns or
the carvings on the windows have to do with the solid structure of an
edifice. These decorations adorned the Temple of Justice, but were never
suffered to interfere either with its stability or with its convenience for the
use of men."
149 Paul. D. 50.17.144 pr.: "Non omne quod licet honestum est"; cf.
even Cio. p. Balbo 3.8: "est enim aliquid quod non oporteat etiamsi liret."
On Modest. D. 23.2.42 pr. = D. 50.17.197 see M. Kaser, SZ 60, 118.
150 Pomp.-Ulp. D. 4.4.16.4; Paul. D. 19.2.22.3.
151 Th. Mommsen, R~misches Strafrecht (1899) 616f, Schulz (supra
n. 101) 218 ff.
152 This goes far beyond the rule 'hominem homini insidiari nefas esse"
in Flor. D. 1.1.3 (supra n. 63).
153 Gal. D. 50.17.55: "Nullus videtur dolo facere qui suo iure utitur."
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use while hitherto it had also served the needs of his
neighbor, the neighbor could not bring action, unless he
had a pertinent easement provided for by agreement.15 4
Nor could the heir of a deceased be forced to pay a be-
quest if the will was void due to an inadvertence in draw-
ing it up.'5 5 The third proposition "render every man
his own," great as it is as an ethical principle, seems, from
a legal point of view, to beg the question. For everything
depends on what in a given case is considered to be A's
due rather than B's. This is, after all, the question which
virtually underlies any problem in the private law. Is a
buyer bound to pay for the thing accidentally destroyed
before delivery? Is a buyer bound to return to the owner
the thing he got from his seller whom he had reason to
believe to be the owner? The tenet would not yield an
answer.
The classical jurists, however, examined these and
numberless other problems in their profound and rea-
soned way without caring much for generalities. They
did insist upon the nullity of transactions at variance with
good morals. 156  They did set aside a vast province of
legal relations to be governed by the principles of bona
fides or bonum et aequum. But they also saw fit to sub-
ject other fields to formalities and rigid rules where they
believed them necessary for the benefit of clarity, of the
security of creditors, the power of the head of the Roman
family or other interests they thought worth protecting.
All in all, they did an admirable job in balancing strict
154 Ofil.-Labeo-Ulp. D. 39.3.1.21; Treb.-Ulp. D. 39.2.24.12; Lab.-Ulp.
D. 43.8.2.13; Proc.-Ulp. D. 39.2.26.
155 Cf. SZ. 48, 675.
156 Recently discussed by M. Kaser, SZ. 60, 144 ff.
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and flexible standards. But the idea of natural law had
no place in these considerations. 157
And yet one question, we may in this gathering say:
the question remains. Why, you will probably ask, were
the Roman jurists not moved by the fundamental problem
of a law far above what many would denounce and
Cicero did belittle as technicalities in comparison? Why
did they not see the wood for the trees? Why did they
not notice the law for the rules? The answer may not
differ too much from the one which suggests itself when
we try to find the clue for the aversion to the natural law
on the part of the great majority among outstanding jur-
ists in the last 150 years, from Savigny' 58 to Gierke,1
59
157 The sporadic passages relating equity and natural law have correct-
ly been traced to postclassical tampering. The most general text is Paul. D.
1.1.11: "Ius pluribus modis dicitur: uno modo, cum id quod semper
aequum ac bonum est ius dicitur, ut est ius naturale. Altero modo, quod
omnibus aut pluribus in quaque civitate utile est, ut est ius civile." Here
the antithesis of ius naturale and ius civile is stated in a way both uncom-
mon and incongruous; if followed through, it would almost suggest that
ius civile was held to be in contrast with bonum et aequum; see also Loin-
bardi 224 if, 384 and the critical remarks of Kaser, Zeitschrjft fur auslan-
disches und internationales Privatrecht 12 (1938) 328f on Maschi (supra
n. 51) 178 ff. Gai. D. 4.5.8 has been attacked from many points of view:
Perozzi, (supra n. 63) I 517 n. 2, II 24 n. 1, Lenel, Edictum perpetuum,
3rd ed. (1927) 305 n. 4, V. Arangio-Ruiz, Responsabiliti Contrattuale,
2nd ed. (1933) 246, H. Siber, Naturalis obligatio (1925) 16 and others
(see Ind. int.) ; the connection, at least, between the two sentences is most
questionable. The opening words of Ulp. D. 47.4.1.1 which seem unique
in opposing naturalis and civilis aequitas defy explanation; cf., moreover,
Pringsheim, SZ. 42 (1921) 667 n. 5. For Pomp. D. 12.6.14 and D.
50.17.206 see Pringsheim, SZ. 52 (1932) 139 f, 145 n. 5. Ps.-Dosithei
fragrn. 1 (Jurisprudentiae Antejustinianae Vol. 1, edd. Seckel et Kiubler,
[1908] 420) is too obscure in regard to both text and origin to furnish
evidence for the classical thought.
158 Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and jurisprudence,
transl. by Hayward (1831) 17 if, 61 if; System of the Modern Roman Law,
transl. by Holloway, I (1867) 11 ff. Cf. also Bodenheimer, (supra n. 5)
235 ff.
159 Deutsches Privatrecht I (1895) 181 f.
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from Austin 160 to Holmes.161 These men lived in peace-
ful ages. The wars they experienced and the injustices
they saw happening in their lifetime did not affect the
validity of basic human rights. These rights were taken
for granted. The relation between individual and gov-
ernment did not yet hold the outstanding position in legal
discussion. Lawyers, as distinguished from philosophers
and political scientists, kept immersed in problems of pri-
vate law, and the remedies they thought of were ordinary
actions brought in court. In a similar way, the Roman
period before us was marked by peace. Life in the capital
where most classical writings were conceived knew little
of the implications of the wars fought far out on the
periphery of the empire. To be sure, it witnessed the
wrongs done by such voluptuous emperors as Caligula
and Nero, Domitian and Commodus. But their regimes
were never aimed at a systematic interference with civic
rights as they then were understood. Mass extermination,
deportation or expropriation of citizens was something
not even imagined as a potentiality. Nor did anyone con-
sider the overthrow of monarchy or a radical change in
the economic or social order as imminent or worth vis-
ualizing.
Quite different is the outlook when mankind in gen-
eral or some country in particular faces a cataclysm
threatening to destroy or distort the fundamental liberties.
The problems arising under such conditions transcend the
normal means of legal approach. Court procedures are
either not available or utterly futile. Only wars or revo-
160 Lectures on Jurisprudence, 5th ed. (1885) 154 if, 175 ff, 567 ff.
161 Harvard.Law Review 32 (1919) 40 ff.
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lutions may help the victims if they live to see them. And
responsible lawyers, confronted with the complete inade-
quacy of their usual resources, turn to the ultimate
groundwork of justice for a solution. These are the great
moments of the natural law.
At such a juncture did Jefferson invoke the "Laws of
Nature," "when," as the Declaration states, "a long train
of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
object, evinces a design to reduce mankind under abso-
lute despotism." At such a juncture has mankind arrived
in these days under the shocking impression of unbeliev-
able mass crimes committed under totalitarian rulers in
conformity with their positive laws. Full of fear that the
waves of such lawlessness may spread, men are appealing
to that higher law which holds out the promise of ensur-
ing their basic individual rights against encroachments
of tyrannical powers. In this state of mind they find com-
fort in the works of past philosophers and theologians, in
the constitutions and legal writings of many countries and
periods. The classical jurists themselves offer only spor-
adic support. But some of their pertinent statements,
supplemented by postclassical additions, were given a
prominent place in Justinian's Corpus juris.162 From
that time they have never ceased to form a vital link in
the chain of arguments for the recognition of a law of
nature.
162 D. 1.1.1.2, 3, 4; 1.1.3; 1.1.4; 1.1.6 pr.; 1.1.10.1; 1.1.11; i.5.4.;50.17.32. Inst. Tit. 1.1 and 1.2.
MEDIEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF NATURAL LAW
Gordon Hall Gerould
D URING the slow decline of the Roman world concep-
tions of justice and respect for legal procedures did
not perish. Even when the power diminished to give the
conceptions adequate support in practice, the respect in
which they were held appears to have continued. Though
confusion and violence mounted as the result of forces
which men of the period did not know how to combat,
memories of a better-ordered world persisted. Proce-
dures that had once been effective were clung to even
when their present usefulness was impaired, and they
were thus preserved as a heritage of value to later cen-
turies. The principles of justice, moreover, which formed
the basis of Roman law, still commanded veneration; and
they were slowly modified and invigorated by the far
nobler doctrines of the Christian Church. Anyone who
reads the letters which St. Gregory the Great wrote at
the troubled close of a disastrous century cannot fail to
see that in his mind and heart reverence for the divine
law was completely in unison with a sense of equity
handed down from an earlier time. Along with his zeal
as defender of the faith and his sternness in reproving
error went an eager care that justice be done to men of
all degrees: to ecclesiastics if falsely accused, to peasants
if they were in danger of oppression, to Jews if there had
been interference with their worship. His rectitude, a
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strict adherence to law both human and divine, was as
marked as his Christian humility and kindliness. If it be
said that St. Gregory was not typical of his age - and in
what age would there be many like him? - he neverthe-
less showed that conceptions of orderly justice were not
alien to his century.
Earlier in the sixth century, indeed, the unwieldy
corpus of Roman law had been explored and to some
degree codified at Constantinople. It is well to remem-
ber that Justinian, through whose initiative this was ac-
complished, was a barbarian, not a member of one of the
races which had been drawn into the immediate orbit of
Rome and felt her civilizing influence. If the compilers
of the Institutes, the legal manual which rounded out the
Corpus Iuris, erred in setting down as their basic axiom
the sentence quoted from a third century commentator:
"Ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit,"
the confusion in terms did little harm to the thinking of
the medieval period that was to follow. The dictum at
least asserted the supremacy of law in the world, and not
till relatively modem times did men often forget that nat-
ural law as applied to rational beings does not mean an
absence of law and a descent to a so-called "state of
nature."
By the early part of the seventh century, when Isidore
of Seville explicitly stated that the divine law rested
"upon nature," the human "upon custom," churchmen
and jurists had agreed upon the identification of the law
of nature with the law of God, which was to be the foun-
dation for the theories, political and legalistic, of the
Middle Ages. The doctrine had not yet been perfectly
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explored, or the notions derived from Greek and Roman
philosophy and practice fully adapted to Christian belief,
but a basis for later study had been established.
During the centuries that followed, the eighth, ninth,
and tenth, there appears to have been little speculation
as to problems of government or jurisprudence. In the
struggle for power and place among rival dynasties there
would have been little incentive for calm study of the
social and political organism. The Church was extend-
ing and strengthening its domain; for a moment the Em-
pire of the West seemed to be recovering something of
its former glory, only to sink again into feeble discord;
and regional groups of mixed blood were by slow degrees
settling into place as inchoate nations. Intellectual ac-
tivity did not lessen, as we know from the record of
achievement in various fields. There were devoted schol-
ars like Bede of Jarrow, who in a secluded monastery
close to the edge of the known world displayed a breadth
of interest and a capacity for taking pains that would
have been notable at any era. In one way and another
Christian civilization was extended, even though the
Iberian peninsula, not without later profit to the rest of
Europe, fell into the hands of the Moslems. We cannot
suppose that men failed to think about the laws they were
endeavoring to enforce, but we need not be surprised that
they did not attempt to define in new ways the founda-
tions of juristic practice. The law-givers were engrossed
in war and in improvised expedients of government, while
men of learning tried as best they could to perpetuate the
civilizing ideas of the past. It was a period of absorption
and instruction, marked, however, by one phenomenon
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which gave evidence of an intellectual vigor newly de-
veloped and prophetic of activities in various fields during
later centuries. In certain languages of the north hither-
to never put to literary use there appeared poetry and
prose of a high order. Europe was making ready for the
triumphs of imagination and reason that distinguish the
Middle Ages.
Before the middle of the twelfth century, as the dis-
cussions of many basic problems of theology and philos-
ophy grew more and more active, the validity of gov-
ernmental control could not fail to come into question.
How was the good order to be secured which was so nec-
essary for society, and on what grounds could it be de-
manded? The disruption out of which the European
world was emerging, the violent passions which still con-
vulsed it and which led to ventures frequently noble in
purpose but sordid in execution, gave the matter an im-
mediate interest which it would not have had under other
conditions. Men of good will craved security as they
must always do when there is no peace in the world. They
wished to find out how to get order, since they lived in a
time still troubled by inherited confusions. Inquiry as to
the foundations of law was not then what we call an "aca-
demic question": such inquiry was a matter of vital con-
cern. Whatever may be true of it in other eras, the art
of jurisprudence was of tremendous and troubling im-
portance in the Middle Ages. Quite possibly laymen in
later periods, lost in a fog of carefully exact phrases, have
sometimes underestimated its value.
Such speculations were focussed by the compilation
shortly before 1150 of the work usually known as the
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Decretum of Gratian, though that somewhat shadowy
figure may well have had the help of other scholars in a
vast undertaking comparable with the one instigated by
Justinian six centuries earlier. The canons of the Church
were in a state of confusion, and probably only at Bologna
could the work of setting them in order have so well been
undertaken. In establishing, as it did, the principles of
Canon Law, the Decretum based all justice on natural
law, which was older than ius gentium or ius civile, terms
in a tripartite division taken over from Isidore of Seville.
The law of nature, indeed, goes back to the beginning of
human creatures (ab exordio rationalis creaturae), and
it is immutable, since moral precepts do not change. Any
customs or legislative enactments which run counter to it
vana et irrita sunt habenda. By asserting at the outset
that natural law is quod in lege et evangelio continetur,
"by which everyone is commanded to do to another what
he wishes to be done to himself, and is forbidden to do
to another what he is unwilling to have done to himself,"
the Decretum identified it with the divine law. This as-
similation though fundamental was not so logically de-
duced, however, that it required no further exposition.
What is the true bond between the law of God embodied
in the Golden Rule and natural law?
This question was perhaps best answered by Rufinus,
a canonist of Bologna and Bishop of Assisi, who wrote a
Summa Decretorum some ten years after the completion
of the Decretum.1 He postulated a "certain power im-
planted by nature in the human creature, impelling him
to do good and to avoid the contrary." This divinely
I Ed., with elaborate introduction by H. Singer, 1902.
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ordered power is the -law of nature.2 Though a succes-
sion of learned continental jurists continued to refine the
doctrine of the Decretum throughout the remainder of
the twelfth century and well into the thirteenth, it is not
apparent that they did very much more to clarify the
fundamental problems of jurisprudence.
Meanwhile, in 1150, John of Salisbury produced his
influential Polycraticus, which without dealing specific-
ally with natural law in detail expressed ideas as to the
source and the basis of justice which were of great con-
sequence. "Law is the gift of God, the mould of equity,
the pattern of justice, the image of the divine will," he
wrote.3 Since nature is the will of God, according to
Plato, nothing takes place contrary to nature ;4 and the
true prince is he who acts in accordance with law, while
the tyrant is he who fails to observe the law and plunges a
people into servitude. This distinction was to become a
commonplace in the following century and thereafter.
Equity, John declared, is a harmony of things, rerum con-
venienta est, "which equalizes everything.by reason, as-
signing to everyone what is his own." Law is the inter-
preter of equity.5 Throughout all its stages the Golden
Rule remains immutable. 6 No more than Gratian, it will
be observed, and less clearly than Rufinus, did John un-
dertake to explain how the law of nature operates to con-
trol human behavior except by divine ordinance. That
2 Est itaque naturale ius vis quedam humane creature a natura insita
ad faciendum bonum cavendumque contrarium. Pars I, Dist. 1.
3 Policraticus, ed. C. C. I. Webb, 1909, viii, Ch. 17.
4 Op. cit. 1, Ch. 12.
5 Op. cit. iv, Ch. 2.
6 Op. cit. iv, Ch. 7.
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problem was left for solution to the theologians of the
next century.
Until the earlier part of the thirteenth century, indeed,
the discussion of natural law had been carried on for the
most part by jurists. Theologians had been concerned to
explain such deviations from approved social behavior as
the polygamy of certain Old Testament figures, but they
did not enter conspicuously into inquiries about most
legal questions. The scholarly ardor of the new orders
of teachers and preachers, however, which resulted in
fruitful speculations along so many lines, brought many
problems of jurisprudence into fresh review, and among
them what we may call the nature of nature. Dominicans
took the lead in the search for a clear definition of nat-
ural law and its function in the universal scheme, though
other ecclesiastical philosophers were equally concerned
with the question.
William of Auxerre, who embodied his teachings in a
Summa Aurea somewhat before 1225, illustrates very
well the direction in which the thought of the time was
moving, which was toward the solutions arrived at by
St. Thomas later in the century. William recognized, as
had the later canonists, that the term natural law was
used in at least three different senses: 1. a concordia om-
nium rerum; 2. the conception of the Roman jurists, in-
volving all instinctive functions and therefore all animate
creatures; and 3. quod dictat naturalis ratio, which af-
fects human beings only. It is in the last-named sense
that natural law serves as the origo et principium omnium
virtutum et motuum ipsarum, operating as it does both
through the teachings of experience and through percep-
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tions divinely implanted in the human mind. The em-
phasis given reason and the frank acknowledgment that
man, being what he is, must live as best he can under im-
perfect conditions preserve the doctrine from cloudy
idealism. Only by the path of reason can he find the
guidance which will free him from error.7
Some two decades after William of Auxerre wrote,
Albertus Magnus completed his Summa de Creaturis, the
third part of which contains his views on the law of na-
ture.8 His treatment of the matter reveals, as one might
expect, the independent and trenchant quality of his
mind. He would have nothing to do with the Roman
opinion that the term natural law should be used as gov-
erning animals as well as men, and he discarded the re-
finements of the commentators on Gratian. To him est
ius naturale nihil aliud quam ius rationis. The law of
nature, thus defined and limited, was present in every
field of human action, even the most instinctive, natura
ut natura, for reason is not totally divorced from them.
Procreation, the education of the young, the preservation
of life are in the domain of natural law, thus considered.
In another way acts of moral virtue, the concern of justice
or religion, for example, are both rational and yet an-
chored in nature, which has the seeds of good in it. There
is, again, a third category of acts, which are based on fun-
damental axioms of natural law and are deduced from it
7 My citations are taken from 0. Lottin, Le droit naturel chez Saint
Thomas, 2nd ed., 1931, pp. 33-35.
8 Not included in editions, but conclusively shown to be genuine by M.
Grabmann, Drei ungedruckte Teile der Summa de Creaturis Alberts des
Grossen, Heft 13 of Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte der Domini-
kanerordens in Deutschland, 1919. I follow the synopsis with copious cita-
tions from MS. Bibl. royale de Bruxelles 603 in Lottin, op. cit., pp. 42-44.
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by human reason. By such means authority in govern-
ment has been established to secure the good of society,
and private property has been found necessary. The law
of nature, Albertus asserted, is not the finality-conclusio
- of law so much as the first principle of it. Institutions
may vary with circumstances, but the obligations laid
upon man by the Decalogue are there because in the be-
ginning he was endowed with reason.
It is no disparagement of the other great thinkers who
made the thirteenth century illustrious to say that of them
all Thomas Aquinas had the acutest mind and the most
compelling power of exposition. Certainly his analysis
better than any other brought into sharp focus the con-
ception of natural law which prevailed, however ex-
pressed, during the later medieval centuries. At least
three times he dealt with the subject, most fully in his last
great work, the Summa Theologiae. Though in some de-
tails of emphasis his ideas changed during the two decades
in which he reverted to the problem, particularly through
his greater regard for Roman law as time went on,9 his
general position was clear from the beginning. Through-
out he kept constantly in view and reiterated the three
axioms upon which he rested his arguments for the exist-
ence of natural law. 1. There is a divine order in the
universe, an eternal law. 2. Man is a social and political
animal, and cannot live by and to himself. 3. Man has
been endowed with reason.
With these axioms as premises, St. Thomas approached
the problem as to whether there is prevailing in us any
natural law,10 and asked how it could be operative in
9 See 0. Lo*ttin, op. cit., pp. 61-63.
10 Summa Pars I-II, Ques. xci, Art. 2.
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man, since man is governed by divine law. Is there not
a contradiction in saying that both have validity? St.
Thomas denied the contradiction, and went to the heart
of the matter by explaining that man, inasmuch as he is
a rational creature, participates in eternal reason. "And
such participation by the rational creature in eternal
law," he went on, "is called natural law." And further:
"The light of natural reason, by which we discern what
is good and what is evil, which pertains to natural law, is
nothing else than the impress of the divine light in us."
This from the Summa. In De Regimine Principum St.
Thomas had already used an analogy which helps one to
a clear understanding of his thought. "For, just as the
universe of corporeal creatures and all spiritual powers
come under divine government, in like manner are the
members of the body and the other powers of the soul
controlled by reason, and thus, in a certain proportionate
manner, reason is to man what God is to the world." 11
The scope of divine law, obviously, is immensely wider
than that of natural law, since it governs all created
things, and is the basis of human law, even though the
latter sometimes follows it imperfectly. 12
St. Thomas was not blind, of course, to those attributes
shared by man with other animals which had so often
led jurists to make the law of nature cover the whole
range of animate life. He did not for a moment deny
that tendencies in man which are irrational and instinc-
tive are indeed "natural," for man has a double nature,
being at once a creature of instinct and a creature en-
11 I, Ch. 12. Quoted from the translation by the Rev. Gerald B. Phelan,
On the Governance of Rulers, 1935.
12 Summa I-I, Ques. xciii, Art. I and 3.
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dowed with reason. Natural law, in the view of St.
Thomas, holds sway over all actions of man whatsoever,
but only through the operation of reason. 13 Here as else-
where, it must be said, the Angelic Doctor did not evade
observed realities. His common sense was as admirable
as his subtle logic.
Similarly, there is a difference in the way the law of
nature exercises control. Though the rational spirit is in-
clined to virtue, not all virtuous acts are equally spon-
taneous. 14 Precepts against murder or theft are so clear
to human reason that they need no teaching; others must
be learned from one's elders, like respect for the aged;
and still others, like "Do not take the name of thy God
in vain," are established by divine injunction. 15 All such
rules of conduct, however, spring from one root.' 6 What-
ever can be controlled by reason lies within the domain
of natural law. The views of St. Thomas concerning its
operation in the experience of the individual have been
well summed up by a recent writer as follows: ". . . the
best description of its purpose and meaning is perhaps
that which has been made many times, of a bridge
thrown, as it were, across the gulf which divides man
from his divine Creator. In natural law is expressed the
dignity and power of man, and thus of his reason, which
allows him, alone of created beings, to participate intel-
lectually and actively in the rational order of the uni-
verse." '1
13 Summa 1-11 Ques. xciv, Art. 2.
14 Summa I-II Ques. xciv, Art. 3.
15 Summa I-I, Ques. c, Art. 1.
16 Summa I-II Ques. xciv, Art. 2.
17 A. P. d'Entreves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought,
1939, p. 21.
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As with individuals, so with the human multitude. The
difference between the way the two are affected is one of
quantity but not of quality.' 8 St. Thomas contends that
Isidore's statement, Jus naturale est commune omni na-
tioni, is true if it be meant that the first principle of it
are everywhere the same, again because "all the inclina-
tions of men" are guided by reason. Although these prin-
ciples are immutable, natural law must be supplemented
to meet conditions as they exist or come into being. Be-
cause of the corruption of human nature, intrinsically
sound though it be, men may fail to distinguish between
good and evil, and thus they do need control. Further
than that, the possession of all things in common and in-
dividual liberty of action have been modified for the sake
of the general good, not because men are evil but because
they must live with one another. There must be positive
law, controls somehow established. 19 What St. Thomas
called subjectio civilis, the relationship of obedience to
authority, a political relationship, is a necessity in no way
derogatory to man. As long as positive law does not con-
travene the principles of natural law, upon which it is
based, it may rightly take different forms, since those
principles cannot be applied in the same way to "the
great variety of human affairs." 20
It is impossible in brief space to give an adequate no-
tion of the elaborate pattern of thought by which St.
Thomas explained the meaning of natural law and its
operation in the scheme of things. The complexities are
18 De Reg. Prin. I, Ch. xiv.
19 Summa I-I, Ques. xciv, Art. 4-5; I, Ques. xcii, Art. 1; I, Ques.
xcvi, Art. 4.
20 Summa I-II, Ques. xcv, Art. 2.
MEDIEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF NATURAL LAW b.
present because he probed deeply and weighed with de-
liberate care so many questions converging on the central
theme. Man as an individual being, man as a member
of society, man as a child of God, all had to be taken into
account. In following through what he wrote about nat-
ural law on various occasions one is equally impressed by
his honest candor, his acumen, and his expository power.
He took into account the views that had been held by
juristic thinkers from Aristotle onward, and he was not
impatient of their wisdom, but he came to conclusions for
himself which rested on solid foundations and were in-
escapable by logical deduction from his premises. There
was no confusion in his thought, but throughout a clear-
sighted understanding of the nature of man. As has been
said, he brought into focus medieval conceptions of the
law of nature, and, more than that, he so firmly estab-
lished those conceptions that nothing essential was added
to them or subtracted from them by later political philos-
ophers of his era.
The comments of a great English jurist, Sir Frederick
Pollock, on the general outcome of medieval thinking
about natural law, which was brought to a brilliant cli-
max by St: Thomas, are worth pondering. "The so-
called 'state of nature' is, from the point of view of the
schoolmen, merely human society conceived as governed
by the 'secondary law of nature' in default of positive
ordinance, or any human society so far as it is actually
found in that condition. What the canonists and school-
men added to the classical Roman theory was the iden-
tification of the law of nature with the law of God as
revealed in human reason. . . . The natural revelation
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through reason and the supernatural revelation commit-
ted to the Church are equally divine, and cannot contra-
dict one another; and the law of nature is no less para-
mount to any positive rule or custom of human origin
than express revelation itself. . . .Hence the scholastic
theory... was on the whole rationalist and progressive.
...Nothing can more strongly illustrate the confusion
which resulted from neglecting this distinction" (between
fundamental principles and rules deduced from them
which may be modified as convenient) "than the modem
belief that natural law as a whole depends on the 'state of
nature,' or assumes it to be better than civilization. The
scholastic habit of mind was alien from ours in many
ways; but at any rate the schoolmen took some pains to
know what they were talking about." 21
To say that Thomistic conceptions of natural law so
prevailed during the later medieval centuries that little
essential modification of them by later writers can be dis-
cemed does not imply any lack of interest in the subject
by political thinkers. What impresses one is that men so
diverse in their interests and tendencies as Egidius Ro-
manus, William Occam, and John Wyclif, had little to
say about the law of nature which had not already been
said and accordingly agree with one another to a notable
extent. One can only conclude that the influence of Aris-
totle and St. Thomas was so pervasive, and that the argu-
ments of the latter were so solidly based that new argu-
ments led to similar conclusions. Not until the sixteenth
century, when a different approach was made to the prob-
lem, did any fundamental change appear.
21 H. S. Maine, Ancient Law, ed. F. Pollock, issue of 1924, pp. 114-115.
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I do not find that the makers of what we call imagin-
ative literature, the poets and story-tellers of the period,
were much concerned with the law of nature in its juristic
and philosophical sense, at least to the extent of frequent
allusion to it. Those among them who were seriously con-
cerned with problems of human fate could not well have
been unaware of views about the ordering of the world
which were so unanimously held; but the law of nature
had been thoroughly integrated with divine law, most
satisfactorily by St. Thomas, and no doubt could be taken
for granted. The absolutism of Dante, which pervades
the Divine Comedy and is explicit in De Monarchia and
the Convivio, rests upon assumptions in which he was at
one with St. Thomas, even though he held divergent views
as to the relative authority of church and state. During
the latter part of the same century, Geoffrey Chaucer,
who was a widely read man and had some practical ac-
quaintance with legal matters, used the term natural law,
or law of kind, as well as the adjective natural, in contexts
which clearly indicate an understanding of the juristic
theory, but did not dwell upon it. The same assumptions
are clearly evident also in Piers Plowman, that great al-
legory of spiritual education by Chaucer's contemporary
Langland. His professed disciple Thomas Occleve, it
may not be amiss to note, made a verse translation of a
famous treatise on government by Egidius Romanus, of
which there was also a version in French prose.
It was through the lively discussion of governmental
theory, indeed, that interest in natural law made itself
most apparent as the Middle Ages drew to a close. The
treatises of Sir John Fortescue, the English Lord Chief
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Justice whose long and active career ended between 1477
and 1479, furnish perhaps the best illustration that could
be found. Fortescue's two Latin works, De Natura Legis
Naturae22 and De Laudibus Legum Anglie2 3 leaned heav-
ily on St. Thomas and Egidius in their review of the his-
tory and theory of natural law, but in the application of it
to political organization they showed such independence
of thought that they must always be regarded as im-
portant monuments of jurisprudence. In them, as well as
in The Governance of England,24 which is of major inter-
est as the first work on constitutional theory to be written
in English, the primacy of natural law is firmly upheld.
Though the English book is little more than a translation
and recasting of the relevant portions of De Laudibus, it
serves to show the vigor of the conviction held by all
thoughtful men of the period that law is more than an ar-
tificial convention. It was to them, as it must always be
in a healthy society, the implement and indeed the syn-
onym of justice.
Though it is true that medieval jurists and philosophers
were led by their desire for a well-ordered world to a faith
now repugnant to us in the undivided authority of indi-
viduals, they were saved by their belief in a law of nature,
divinely instituted, from thinking the state more impor-
tant than man. No king, no legislature could contravene
natural law with impunity, and tyranny of any sort was
abhorrent. What St. Thomas taught was what his prede-
cessors and followers from Gratian to Fortescue asserted:
the dignity of man under the sovereignty of God.
22 Ed. Lord Clermont, 1864.
23 Ed. S. B. Chrimes, 1942.
24 Ed. C. Plummer, 1885.
THE NATURAL LAW IN THE
RENAISSANCE PERIOD*
Heinrich A. Rommen
I
T HE Renaissance period is usually associated with the
Arts and with Literature; it is considered as a new
birth of the Greek and Roman classics but also as the
discovery of a new sense of life, as a period in which the
autonomous individual, as the person in a pronounced
meaning, escapes from the pre-eminence of the clergy
and a morality determined by the Church. Nourished by
the rediscovered philosophy of life of the classics, an
emancipation takes place of the man of the world, of the
man of secular learning, and of the artist and the poet,
who set themselves up as of their own right beside, not
against, the secular clergy and the learned monk. In
politics this means the dissolution of the medieval union
of Church and Empire in favor of the now fully devel-
oped nation-states and city-republics which stress their
autonomy against the Church as against the Empire.
While the Renaissance, thus conceived, was of tremen-
dous significance, it is nevertheless true that as such it con-
tributed little for the development of the theory of Nat-
ural Law. The reason for this is that the Humanists were
admirers of the stoic philosophy and of the great orator,
Cicero, the elegant popularizer of the stoic philosophy
and of the philosophical ideas of the Roman Law, which,
* Also printed in the Summer, 1949, issue of the Notre Dame Lawyer.
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at that time, freed from the Canon Law, conquered the
world again. But for this reason the philosophers of the
Renaissance, in the customary meaning, have little to
contribute to our theme, since they are satisfied with what
they read and reread in their beloved ancients. One
could, of course, object that Machiavelli should here be
mentioned as the great sceptic of the idea of the Natural
Law, as the man who first separated Politics and Ethics,
who first was concerned with a political science free from
value-judgments, interested only in the means, in the
techniques of gaining and holding an in itself morally
indifferent Power in which he saw the only meaning of
Politics. Yet the spirit of the time did not permit him -
just as a century later, it did not permit Hobbes- to
state openly his utter contempt of the Natural Law.
When we speak of the Natural Law in the Renaissance
period, we must look elsewhere. We must turn our at-
tention to another field, much neglected - the great re-
vival of the philosophy of the Natural Law in the second
flowering of Scholasticism. This also was a Renaissance,
namely of the aristotelean-thomistic philosophy. As the
other Renaissance had to overcome the empty subtleties
of the Nominalists in their meaningless hairsplitting and
their consequently crude Latin, so the second flowering
of scholasticism had to overcome the same decay of the
scholastic method and the philosophy of the via moderna.
Just as the one went back to the stoics as its great masters,
so this other Renaissance went back to St. Thomas. Yet
it had to conduct its great controversies, at the same time,
against the Reformers, whose exclusive Supernaturalism
led to a distrust in philosophy, in natural reason, and to a
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hollowing out, as a consequence, of the very substance of
the Natural Law. WKe are, therefore, justified if we re-
strict ourselves in the following discussion to that other
Renaissance which alone has contributed positively to the
theory of Natural Law, by saving the idea of Natural
Law from the stranglehold of Nominalism and by pro-
tecting it against the suffocating Supernaturalism of the
Reformers.
The great line of Natural Law philosophers begins
with Vittoria, who introduced the Summa Theologica
instead of the Sentences of Peter of Lombard as the basis
of teaching - a practice which became general when
St. Ignatius ordained that the professors of his order
make the Summa the basis of their studies and courses,
and reaches to St. Robert Bellarmine. Though originat-
ing in the Iberian Peninsula, and in its world famous
universities, such as Salamanca the Great, and Coimbra
the Glorious, attended by students from all nations, this
Second flowering of Scholasticism spread through the
whole of Christian civilization, as is proven when one con-
siders the publication places of the works of Suarez, Soto,
Lessius, Bellarmine, and Molina and their use as texts
in the leading universities of France, Italy, and Germany.
For instance, the De Legibus of Suarez, the Masterwork
in legal and political theory and in Natural Law, was
published in Coimbra, Cologne, Lyon, Antwerpen and
Mayence.
While a Renaissance is at the same time a revival of a
great earlier period and an overcoming of a desolate pe-
riod before it, it must be more than a mere repetition to
be pregnant of the future: it must be a new rethinking
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and broadening, a "vetera novis augere et perficere."
Nominalism and its consequence at least in part, the Re-
formation, constituted the dissolving desolate period in
the theory of the Natural Law: the development of what
was implicit in St. Thomas, and an enrichment of the
theory of its application to the problems of its time was
its own everlasting contribution.
II
The idea of Natural Law finds its full meaning only if
certain fundamental verities are accepted, otherwise a
corrosive criticism all too easily produces that kind of
cynical relativism which we know in the philosophy of law
as positivism. True, the Natural Law is so "engraved in
the hearts of men" that it cannot be wholly wiped out at
any time in all the people. Yet that corrosive criticism,
first decomposing the idea of Natural Law in the minds of
the legal profession and the Intellectuals, oozes down
slowly into the mind of the so-called common man and
then produces the loss of common moral principles and
indubitable convictions of what is justice, which finally
leads to the assertion that the Bill of Rights is a propa-
gandist trick of the Bourgeoise mind to fool the Prole-
tariat. If anywhere, then here, the good and ever-valid
rule "Principiis obsta" should be followed. It is on ac-
count of this that the verities which are philosophically
fundamental for the idea of Natural Law deserve our
attention.
The following are such fundamental verities. The
human mind recognizes the essence or the nature of things
out of which the order of the Universe presented in the
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Eternal Law arises, so that man recognizes in the natures
of created things also the order of creation as a whole.
Furthermore, the essence of a thing is also its end; the
causa formalis becomes in the process of production or
self-realization of a thing the causa finalis, the rule for
acts which realizes the idea, the nature of a thing. A
created thing is the more perfect the fuller it "realizes"
its idea; it has the more goodness, the more it is a realiza-
tion of the idea or nature. Finally, the intellect is su-
perior to the will in God as well as in Men. The intellect
recognizes the nature of created things and the order of
the universe, and per analogiam and imperfectly, the
Creator and His Eternal Law, by which the order was
created and is preserved. The natures and their order
recognized by the intellect as "oughtness," as to be re-
alized by free acts of man, become then the rule of action
for the will. St. Thomas points out frequently this inter-
dependence of the ideas of Truth, objective order, and of
Justice. For instance, he points out that the Justice of
God which constitutes the order among the things in con-
formity to God's Wisdom, which is the Law of the Order,
may appropriately be called Truth. (S. Th. I, qu. 21, a. 2)
The natures of the created things and the order in the
Creation are thus in the last analysis related to God's In-
tellect and Wisdom. Consequently, this order, the Lex
Aeterna and the Natural Law which, by participation, is
the same Lex Aeterna applied to the free act of rational
beings, is necessarily immutable. This means that perjury
or the killing of an innocent is always and under all cir-
cumstances wrong, that they are in themselves by nature
wrong, not exclusively by the positive Will of God or of a
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human legislator. Even God cannot make by His omnipo-
tent Will, by positive order, that right what is by contra-
diction to God's Essence and Wisdom intrinsically wrong,
because this is metaphysically against God's very Essence.
The Natural Law is, ergo, truly natural, i.e. a dictamen
of Reason recognizing the intrinsic goodness or evil of
certain free acts, because they agree with or contradict
nature and the natural order, and it is immutable as par-
ticipation of the Lex Aeterna, which issues from God's
Intellect and Wisdom and rules the Creation.
Occam, the venerabilis inceptor, held that God is pri-
marily absolute and omnipotent Will and that the natures
and essences of things are not recognizable by man's in-
tellect, and consequently that the natural order of being,
which belongs to practical reason, advising us what ought
to be done or omitted is not knowable to us. In God, so
Occam says, there cannot be any necessity; the decree of
God, the Lex Aeterna and the Lex Naturalis, do not issue
necessarily from the Essence of Him who promulgated
them. For that would make the absolute freedom and
the absolutely arbitrary omnipotent Will of God depend-
ent on a superior necessity. All precepts of the Eternal
and of the Natural Law are only absolutely arbitrary de-
crees of God's omnipotent Will. That which Occam con-
tinues to call natural law is neither Natural Law because
it is arbitrarily posited by God, nor is it immutable be-
cause God in His arbitrary infinite freedom could without
any contradiction to His Wisdom and Goodness ordain
something wholly contradictory to the now posited nat-
ural law, else God would not be wholly free and omnipo-
tent. God could, therefore, without inner contradiction
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ordain that the created will hate Him and that this hatred
should be meritorious. (In. Sent. IV, qu. 14 D) Occam
denies an intrinsic goodness or evilness of a human act,
such as the love of God or the hatred of God.
Occam, thus, in his metaphysics, has torn asunder God
and His Creation, insofar as he teaches that, besides God
being the external creative cause, there exists no intrinsic
relation between God and the World, between God's Es-
sence and the moral order, the foundation of which is the
general analogia entis and the God-likeness of man. There
is neither in man nor in the Creation a natural, a neces-
sary and fundamental order to God as the origin and as
the ultimate end of all being, which in its immutability
would become for the free rational being the ever-valid
moral norm of its acts. The absolute unity of Reason and
Will in God is denied and a "theological irrationalism"
arises. The Natural Law is hollowed out in its substance
though the term is still used, and in its place steps a moral
positivism, the doctrine that we know what is right and
wrong only sola fide.
We have long since given up the idea that the Refor-
mation "errupted" so to speak, out of the Christian con-
science so crudely deceived by the superstitions of Ro-
manism, so ruthlessly violated by the arrogance of a
power-hungry, morally corrupt Curia. Many of the theo-
logical doctrines which were espoused by the Reformers
are only the ultimate and ruthlessly drawn conclusions
from the speculations and discussions of the adherents
of the via moderna in its two branches: first, Fideism,
which means a crippling of natural Theology and an utter
weakening of the Praeambula fidei, because human rea-
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son is not to be trusted, from which issues the outspoken
tendency towards positivism; second, a particular form
of mystical Theology centered around the individual per-
son, his religious experiences, his subjective longings cul-
minating in the question: How do I find a merciful God
in the abyss of my essential sinfulness? The Reformers
rejected as superstitious, as pagan, the doctrine of the
sacraments and the sacramentals, the hierarchical struc-
ture of the Church, the Papal authority and that of Tra-
dition, and the Canon Law. Luther's public burning of
the Corpus Juris Canonici set him irrevocably on the road
to "Protestantism." The Catholic morality was, in their
eyes, a despicable Pelagianism, with rules for a merito-
rious bargaining with God by doing external good works,
such as giving alms, fasting, indulgences, etc. To them
the very essence of man under the curse of original sin be-
came the utter depravation of man's nature. Our nature
is wholly depraved, our will unable to realize the good,
our reason blind to truth. Nature is not vulnerated or
weakened by original sin, it is destroyed. Nothing good re-
mains in us. Of our God-given natural gifts (donum nat-
urale) remain only "deformed ruins." Thus from the
part of Theology the very foundations of the Natural Law
are denied, particularly the inner relation between the
Eternal Law and the Natural Law by reason of the par-
ticipation and conformity of the Natural Law with the
divine revealed law as the Catholic tradition taught. As
a consequence arises that significant dualism between the
Kingdom of God and the World, of the Spiritual and the
Secular, which Ernst Troeltsch has pointed out. Yet it
would be foolish to deny that the Reformers explicitly
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reject the Natural Law; they do that as little as the
Occamists did. They follow rather the tradition, cite
the Natural Law, use the term, and only slowly, if at all,
do they become aware that between the Natural Law
and their Theology there exists an irreconcilable contra-
diction. This is today a kind of opinio communis of
scholars in this field. The Reformers push this idea of
the Natural Law more and more into the background,
just because of this contradiction between the Natural
Law and their Theology in the doctrines on the state and
law, and use the Bible and what they conceive the posi-
tive Divine Law in the Bible as the basis of their political,
juridical and moral doctrine. (This is indirectly con-
firmed by the observation that the Theology of Crisis and
its founder, Karl Barth, who wants to revive, as against
the liberal Protestant Theology, the original doctrine of
the Reformers, vehemently attacks the idea of Natural
Law as one basis of Christian ethics, and instead recog-
nizes only the other basis, the revealed, that is, the posi-
tive, Divine Law.) But if later the Faith in the Divine
Law fades away by reason of Bible criticism and the rise
of deistic Rationalism, then the Divine Law as revealed
Law disappears and in Morality and Law remains only
relativist positivism. This positivism produces then what
Leo XIII called the Modern Law emancipated from the
Divine Law, and deviating from the Christian and the
Natural Law. (Immortale Dei) Yet the links which, ac-
cording to the theory of participation of all laws, bind
human law to the Natural, and this to the Eternal
Law, may never be broken without penalty. Further-
more, only if in the personal God the absolute unity of
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His reason and of His will is upheld, and only if the in-
tellect is considered superior to the Will, can the conform-
ity of the Eternal Law and the Natural Law, of the re-
vealed Divine Law and of the Natural Law be accepted.
III
It was the providential task of the great masters of the
second flowering of Scholasticism to reassert these funda-
mental verities against the Reformers and Occamism.
They were able to do so, because they went back, as we
said already, to St. Thomas, whom they revered as the
Doctor Angelicus, and from whose doctrines they devi-
ated only after the most scrupulous research. They show
this so salutary combination of loyalty to St. Thomas and
yet they possess a personal independence which character-
izes all the great philosophical schools in the history of the
human mind. Consequently this revival of Scholasticism is
not a mere philological one, so to speak; it is not a mere
repetition of the tradition, but a re-thinking and a re-
newal. Not only had the tradition to be sifted and freed
of obsolete matter, but new experiences and the new
spirit of the era had to be assimilated insofar as it was
possible, without the surrender of such doctrines as once
and for all belong to the Philosophia Perennis. In other
words the task of these masters was, as the great historian
of Theology, Petavius, succinctly put it, to evolve what
had been implicit and to develop fully what the masters
of the Middle Ages had left more in the stage of funda-
mental theses. Furthermore, they enriched the doctrine
of Natural Law in two directions: first, by refuting such
subtle attacks on its philosophical foundations as were
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espoused by the Occamists, and had never been made
before; and by this refutation Suarez, Soto, Molina and
Bellarmine had to enlarge the field of inquiry and of ex-
plication of all the parts of the doctrine which had been
scarcely touched before; secondly, they stood in their time
before new problems that cried for solutions, problems
which, again, could not even have been anticipated in
the Middle Ages, such problems as the Jus inter Gentes,
the relations between pagan and Christian States, the
Divine Right theory of kings etc., and in answering such
questions, they prepared the way for a further develop-
ment of Natural Law as the basis for the natural rights
as they have found their positive constitutional form in
our modem Bill of Rights.
Though they kept the proved and honored scholastic
method, they nevertheless show some distinctive method-
ological features which we do not yet find in the Middle
Ages. They are, so to speak, nearer to the concrete prob-
lems of their era; they are great controversialists as the
works of Bellarmine and Suarez against the Divine
Right-theory and Vittoria's treatises for the Indians so
distinctly show. In all these controversies they have to
base their arguments, to a great degree, on the Natural
Law, as we will see. They are, moreover, more history-
conscious than the Middle Ages were. This is caused
by their stronger regard for the Individual, the person as
a secondary cause, that in the World, in History, the field
of contingent Being produces, by its free decisions, by its
free initiative under the Divine and Natural Law, its
civilization. That is no wonder, if we imagine what an
expansion of experience and learning had taken place:
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the great discovery of the New World, the rise of the
nation-states and their national laws as against the Im-
perium and its Civil Law stemming from the Romans,
the rise of international trade, the great religious contro-
versies caused by the Reformation, the danger to the
Church universal by the rising national churches, the
formation of a new class, the lay "intelligentsia" so
mightily furthered by the Renaissance. All these pro-
duce, so to speak, a change in the intellectual climate.
The tendency to autonomy, to freedom from the guar-
dianship of the theologians in philosophy, politics, litera-
ture and in the sciences and in secular culture permeate
this period. This need not mean enmity to the Faith, to
the Church-authority. But it means a new relation be-
tween Church and State, between Community and per-
son, between contemplative and active life in the World.
It means a "weltzugewandte Frommigkeit" not flight
from the world, but Christian ethics for this new world
of a more autonomous political and cultural consciousness
of the contemporaries. It is significant of the more "per-
sonalist" tendency of this era that the greatest contro-
versy in theology is that of the relation between free Will
and Grace, known Letter as the controversy between
Thomists and Molinists.
The method of the Masters of the second flowering of
Scholasticism, compared to that of the Middle Ages, is
more empirical and, by reason of the great amount of
knowledge meanwhile accumulated, is comparative-
analytical, as is appropriate to the contingent character
of historical reality. In our subject this means a more
critical attitude towards existing social and political
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forms, an avoidance of the temptation to declare some-
thing as "natural" because it has been accepted, without
being questioned, for a long time. The institution of
slavery is thus much more critically studied and firmly
rejected than was ever done in the Middle Ages. In
legal and political philosophy we find, for instance, that
Suarez is not only concerned with a more accurate state-
ment of the relation between the common good and the
private good of the persons, but also with the limitations
of the human law. Thus he has already the doctrine
against the ex post facto law. Suarez makes one excep-
tion - provided that the act is not a grave and imputable
violation of the first and generally known principles of
the Natural Law. (cp. the juridical basis of the Nuern-
berg Trials in the matter of Crimes against Humanity);
in such a case a crime is recognized by all as such even
without a positive law declaring it a crime. The same
tendency appears in the answer to the question, whether
the state can command an internal act and punish for an
internal act. The answer is that by its very nature the in-
timate sphere of the person is closed to the positive law
which must and can be satisfied with the external con-
formity to its law, and not with the internal motivation
of this conformity, for the human laws are concerned
with the external peace of the human community. The
comparative-analytical approach is obvious in every
chapter of the works of these masters. They cite pro-
fusely not only the Roman civil law, but also the laws of
France, of Spain, of Venice, of Florence, etc. When Mo-
lina studies the problems of slavery, he tells us about the
inquiries he made about the Negro slave trade with ship
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owners and with traders, with the port authorities and
with the central authorities; he cites the various pertinent
documents in nine columns of his De Justitia et de Jure.
Vittoria tells us that he observed Indians and that he ob-
jected to the claim that they were barbarians and by
nature slaves of the civilized Spaniard, by pointing out to
his opponents that there were many peasant-folk in Spain
who were not more intelligent or well-bred than these In-
dians, and yet nobody denied civil liberty to these peasant
folk.
This historical-analytical and comparative-empirical
character of the method of the great Doctors explains
why they often give up the commentary, which was up to
that time the usual form of scholarly work. Instead they
write their voluminous treatises "On the Laws" or "On
Justice and the Laws" in which they treat extensively and
with great detail the subject matter that St. Thomas
treats in the nineteen quaestiones of the first part of the
second volume of the Summa Theologica. The familiar-
ity of the Doctors with the contemporary literature in
civil and canon law, with the philosophers and theolo-
gians of the medieval era and of the following centuries
is astonishing. On a question which one might think St.
Thomas has sufficiently or even exhaustively treated, we
may find a multitude of new points of view. This broad-
ness does not produce a certain superficiality as one
might suspect, but on the contrary almost all scholars
who have studied the works of our masters from Grotius
on assert that they are of an amazing profundity and rich
in fine but well proved and scholarly distinctions. It is
thus easily comprehended that these works were used
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even in Protestant Universities as textbooks and why they
present truly encyclopedic works for the jurist and po-
litical philosopher of our time, as is affirmed by such
eminent scholars as Hauriou, Mesnard, Barcia Trelles,
del Vecchio etc., and that they represent one of the high-
marks in the history of Natural Law theory.
IV
Let us now discuss some of the particular themes which
occupied the minds of the masters under the heading
"Natural Law." One important result of their effort
was the abolishment of the distinction between a primary
Natural Law as it existed before the Fall of Man and a
second Natural Law valid after that event. This theory
goes back to the stoic philosophy and the Roman Law
and was upheld by the Medieval Theologians. The stoics
and the Roman Law used it to find an explanation for
some generally accepted social institutions such as war,
slavery, private property or the division of goods, with its
implied injustices of the few wealthy, and the many poor
institutions, which could not be considered as just in the
sense of the ideal Natural Law. The Roman jurists
ascribed these institutions, e.g. slavery, to the Jus Gen-
tium, because according to the Natural Law all men are
born free. The Jus Gentium is then a kind of secondary
Natural Law, which Reason has instituted and which all
nations observe. In the Middle Ages the distinction
served partly for the same purposes; partly to save on
the one hand, the immutability of the Natural Law, and
on the other hand to explain certain sentences in the
Scriptures, when God is said to have ordered something
which is against the Natural Law. This distinction and
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the vague ambiguous character of the Jus Gentium which
contains, first, the conclusions from the first principles of
the Natural Law, second, those positive legal institutions
which the jurists found among all or almost all nations at
all times, and third, also the principal institutions of the
international public law, is either given up or freed from
ambiguity. Suarez, for instance, declares that all neces-
sary conclusions from the Natural Law belong to it and
not the Jus Gentium. This is, according to Suarez, pro-
prie dictum, a general law of civilized nations ruling such
general legal matters as contracts, forms of properties, the
legal division of property among men; it is in its char-
acter positive law and represents a general theory of such
positive legal institutions which we find among almost
all civilized nations because they have been instituted
natura instigante. But they are not of the Natural Law
and they are not immutable either; for they are the prod-
uct of human convention and of consent. From this Jus
Gentium in the sense of such a general law, common to
civilized nations, Suarez distinguishes, then, the Jus Gen-
tium in the strict sense as a Jus inter Gentes, as the posi-
tive part of the public international law which rules the
relations between nations as subjects of rights and duties,
as members of the community of nations. The positive
law of war and peace, of legations and armistices, of
international intercourse and trade is meant here, as it
was introduced by conventions, treaties and customs.
Quite evidently the Natural Law is valid for the rela-
tions among nations also, and so is the Divine Law.
Suarez is not a positivist in the doctrine of the Law of
Nations.
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Suarez has no use for a distinction between the pri-
mary and secondary Natural Law. The fall of man has
not changed the Natural Law as such, but has only added
to the political authority the compulsory power which it
would not have needed before the fall. The exegetical
difficulties are matters of exegesis, not of the Natural Law.
The consequence of the abandonment of this distinction
is that such bothersome institutions as forms of servitude,
warfare, forms of government (Monarchy as a more nat-
ural form of government) are now all strictly institutions
of positive human law and therefore changeable. The
right to conduct a just war in order to enforce one's rights
may become obsolete by the introduction of an obligatory
procedure of international arbitration. Slavery is now
an imperfection of the human positive law and cannot
any more be espoused as existing by nature, as we will
show below. We may now understand why a modern
scholar (J. Kosters) says that after the labors of Suarez,
after his classification of fundamental concepts, the fruits
on the tree of international law were ripe for Grotius to
pluck. The masters of the second flowering of Scholas-
ticism are the actual founders of the modem theory of
the International Law, as Hugo Grotius himself admits,
when he speaks of the Magistri Hispanorum and the
gratitude he owes them for their pioneering work. He
follows the Scholastics to a great degree and mentions
their books on almost every page of De lure Belli ac Pace.
V
A very interesting application of the Natural Law in a
concrete situation is the criticism of the colonial method
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in America by the masters of the second flowering of
Scholasticism. The espousers of the rather ruthless con-
quest of the Americas by the Conquistadores were first
attacked by the missionaries sent to convert the Indians
under the leadership of Las Casas. This missionary bishop
asked to have Vittoria as his theological consultant. Vit-
toria and almost all the other Doctors in their special
treatises on the Indians and on the Jus Belli, or in their
general treatises "On Law and Justice," treated broadly
and with great care the moral and juridical issues in this
burning problem. They all became the defenders of the
human dignity of the Indians and of the independence of
their states. One by one they tear to pieces all the argu-
ments of the espousers of that colonial imperialism and
defend against these, the rights of the Indians on the
basis of the Natural Law. Sepulveda, a court theologian
of the Spanish Monarchs, justified the conquest of the
Indian states and the brutal methods of colonization with
these theses: first, the Pope is the Supreme Lord of the
World- a thesis, formed in the Middle Ages by the
canonists or curialists in their fight against the claims of
the Emperor to the supremacy of the World, that small
world of Christendom and its arch-enemies, the Moham-
medans - therefore the Pope has the right, especially in
order to spread the Christian Faith, to grant Christian
Kings the political overlordship of the newly discovered
Americas. The rulers of Spain and Portugal consequently
could claim to be the legitimate sovereigns of these terri-
tories, their inhabitants and their chieftains, with the pro-
mulgation of Alexander VI's edicts, especially the edict
Inter Cetera of 1493. This "Donatio" by the Pope was,
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of course, kept in the terms of the Feudal Law; and it was
the kings who applied to the Popes for the "grant" of
these territories as "fiefs" according to the Feudal Law.
Nevertheless at that time the Feudal Law was already giv-
ing way to the modem law of national sovereignty, and
the political meaning of the Edict was in the last analysis
to establish the political sovereignty of the conquering dis-
coverers. Some theologians used the theocratic ideas of
a Henry of Segusia for the same purpose; the Pope, rep-
resenting the Church, has received from God the Lord-
ship of the World for the Christianization of the World.
By reason of this divine authority, the Pope may appoint
Christian kings as legitimate political rulers over pagan
nations. Another title to the same sovereignty was de-
duced from the medieval theory cast also in the formula
of Feudal Law, that the Emperor was the supreme lord of
the world and that he consequently could grant these ter-
ritories as fiefs of the Christian princes. A third claim
was based on the right and duty of Christian kings to
suppress the pagan barbarism, the habitual blasphemies
and the idolatry of the pagans, so offensive to God and
His Christendom. Finally it was claimed that the Chris-
tian civilized nations had by Natural Law according to
Aristotle, and with the approval of St. Thomas Aquinas,
Duns Scotus and many other authorities, the right to sub-
ject the Indians, because they were only "speaking ani-
mals," because they were full of vices and bare of intel-
lect and unable to rule themselves. They were, therefore,
by nature slaves and could, nay, ought to be subjected, in
their own interests, to the "Regimen despoticum" of
Christian rulers. (Lest we judge too hard about these
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arguments, let us remember that many of these were lit-
erally repeated by the Puritans in New England against
the Indians and by the defenders of Negro slavery in the
South.)
One by one the masters tear these arguments to pieces.
The thesis so generally accepted in the Middle Ages, that
the Pope or the Christian Emperor is the Lord of the
World by divine institution or by succession to the Roman
Emperor is rejected and, instead, the so-called Natural
Law theory of the State, as St. Thomas had established
it, though without drawing all the consequences of his
time, is elaborated. The state exists and the rulers rule
by force of the Natural Law. Man lived in true states
before there was a Church and a Pope. The rights and
duties of rulers and ruled, because they follow from the
Natural Law, are and remain independent of the State
of Grace. Non eripit mortalia, qui regna dat coelestia.
In the Scriptures we find not one sentence by which it
could be proved that Christ conferred any political
power on St. Peter or the Apostles; neither did Christ
exempt the Christians from the rule of pagan princes.
Referring to the famous Donatio Constantina, the Mas-
ters assert that this is a spurious document of no value at
all. By Divine Law, the Pope is not Master of the World.
Neither is he that by Natural Law. By Natural Law, on
the contrary, the pagan states of the Indians are fully
sovereign states. If the Pope claims any rights of inter-
vention into the internal affairs of these sovereign states,
this claim must be based on the Natural Law or on the
Law of Nations. To send armed forces into the lands of
the Indians with the pretense that they only served to
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protect the missionaries is unlawful and would give these
states a cause for a just war. But what if the pagan sov-
ereigns do not admit the missionaries or forcefully deport
them? Then, say the Masters, the Pope may appeal to
Christian princes to compel the pagan states to admit the
missionaries. Why? Because the pagan states were then
violating a recognized rule of the Law of Nations, they
were in the wrong. For at that time it was held that the
rule of free travel, intercourse and sojourn in the terri-
tories of the states was part of the Law of Nations and
thus established a right of the missionaries to sojourn
there and preach the Gospel. (Yet Las Casas would not
even accept this argument.) What is interesting here is
that the whole argument is based on the Natural Law
and on the Law of Nations and that all claims based on
the theocratic ideas of the Curialists are simply shoved
aside.
The same arguments apply to the thesis that the Em-
peror is Lord of the World. The partisans of the Impe-
rium Sacrum held that the Christian Emperor is insti-
tuted by Christ as ruler over Christendom, or that he
gained the rule of the World by translation of the Roman
Empire or by succession into the rights of the Old Roman
Emperor, as the Jurist Bartolus, the famous post-glossator,
tried to prove from Roman Law, coming to the strange
conclusion that he who denies that the Emperor is Lord
of the World, is certainly a heretic. But the Masters
argue that such claims are absurd; they are not based on
any positive law, they are disproved by history, which
shows that even at the time of the Roman Emperor there
existed independent states and certainly even at the time
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of Bartolus, the East-Roman Byzantine Emperor was sov-
ereign and also the Kings of Spain and France have been
sovereign kings for centuries. We see that the medieval
theocratic and empirical theories based on the Civitae Dei
of St. Augustine found no love with the Masters. In addi-
tion, and thus crowning their arguments, by Natural Law
the Masters assert that the states of the Indians are as
perfect societies truly sovereign. They have their own
laws and constitutions, their courts and administrative
offices. Any attempt of the Emperor to enforce his spe-
cious overlordship would grant the pagan states a cause
for a just war of defense.
What of the pagan barbarism, the idolatry, the "un-
natural" vices of the Indians as causes for conquest? In
this matter it is again interesting to observe that, if a right
of intervention is at all acknowledged, this right is based
rather on the Natural Law and on the Law of Nations
than on the Canon Law. Some of the Masters make here
a distinction between the Natural Moral Law and the
Natural Juridical Law. Idolatry, for instance, is a viola-
tion of the first, not of the second. The temporal state
does also not prohibit by its law all vices and sins, but -
rightly - only those which directly intervene in the pro-
tected sphere of another person and those which endan-
ger the proper end of the State, the common good. Simi-
larly there exists no cause for the intervention of Christian
States or for the Church on the basis of Natural Law in
the cases of idolatry and similar violations of the moral
law. But if the pagan rulers oppress their subjects who
have been converted and if their emigration is not feasible
on account of their great number or they are forcefully
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hindered from doing so, or if the pagan priests perform
human sacrifices, then, under due consideration of all cir-
cumstances the Christian princes would have an indubit-
able right to intervene by reason of the defense of Inno-
cents, even by warfare. This right of intervention is
based on the Natural Law and on the nature of the com-
munity of nations, which must demand of its members a
minimum standard of civilized morality; and it is sig-
nificant that Molina expressly states that the Natural Law
exclusively and not any papal authorization gives this
right of intervention. Yet it is interesting that this right
of intervention for the defense of Innocents was consid-
ered by some missionaries and by the great Dominican
Theologian Domingo de Soto as infeasible, because it
would make the spread of the Faith more difficult or the
ensuing war would cause much more suffering, i.e. the
use of the right of intervention would be unjust. In con-
nection with this discussion, the Masters of the second
flowering of Scholasticism have developed also their the-
ory of the just war which in some directions is an ad-
vancement over the medieval doctrine. Since their doc-
trine is known generally, let us only state that it is based
again on the Natural Law and was the basis of Hugo
Grotius's doctrine of the just war.
VI
A most instructive application of the Natural Law
may be found in the criticism by the Masters of the Di-
vine Right theory. This theoi-y, formulated in Byzantium,
and espoused later by the partisans of the mediaeval em-
perors, became essential for the justification and the
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definite securing of absolute monarchy as against the
theretofore unquestioned doctrine of the Divine Right
of the Pope. In accord with the religious spirit of the era
of the Reformation and its theological irrationalism (in-
imical to the idea of Natural Law), it seemed that only
by a divine call could the rule of the princes be firmly
established. Political authority, whether it were the mon-
archy of which Luther spoke, or the aristocracy of the
virtuous predestined viri egregii, after the example of the
men described in the Book of Judges, as Calvin taught,
by reason of the decomposition of the Natural Law by the
reformist theology, had to be based on a divine act of
institution. Furthermore, the Protestant prince had to
become also the Summus Episcopus; he had to unite in
his hands the supreme temporal and spiritual authority.
The democratic ideas of ecclesiastical constitution which
were to characterize the non-conformists were not yet
developed.
The Divine Right theory served two ends: first, it gave
the prince an originary power independent of and unlim-
ited by any covenant with the estates representing the
people; second, it established the prince as the sov-
ereign spiritual authority as against the national Hier-
archy and, particularly, the Pope. Dei gratia meant
"neither by the people's, nor by the Pope's, grace." These
ideas, in a somewhat attenuated form, were prevalent in
the Catholic monarchies. Nevertheless, it was also af-
firmed that the office of the prince is immediately insti-
tuted by God - like the office of the Pope; although to
the Pope, concurrently with ecumenical councils, belongs
the supreme doctrinal authority, to the prince belongs
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the jurisdictional and administrative authority in the
Church of the Realm. The prince has exclusively the
constituent power in his realm, and any participation by
the estates, or by the people, is thinkable only by an
arbitrarily revocable grant of the prince. This implies
that there is no room for an active or a passive right to
resistance based on Natural Law. Only meek obedience
is the duty of the citizens, at least as long as the prince
does not openly act against the Scriptures - that is, as
long as he does not become a "heretic." Against the
heretical prince the orthodox must, of course, rise in
arms. (In connection with this it is interesting to com-
pare the Thomistic doctrine that the theological heresy
of the prince as such does not destroy the mutual rights
and duties of authority and citizens based on Natural
Law, at least as long as the concrete political common-
good is not directly affected by the heresy of the prince.)
If the Natural Law is to be considered of any value, then
the prince is to be considered the sole and sovereign in-
terpreter of it because his authority is of directly divine
institution. As Hobbes expressed it: a law of the prince
may be iniquitous, but "it is not unjust," because the Nat-
ural Law, in Hobbes' view, is actually wholely immersed
in the positive law of the Leviathan, and, therefore, it
becomes a meaningless term. Among the consequences
of this were the nefarious principle of "Cujus regio, ejus
religio," the theoretical impossibility of any form of civil
tolerance; the identification of political and ecclesiastical
religious loyalty, which issued in the ruthless oppression
of religious non-conformists because politically they com-
mitted treason by their religious heterodoxy.
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Against this Divine Right theory arose the great Doc-
tors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to develop
more fully the Thomistic Natural Law theory of the State
and of political authority. The State, they taught, is an
institution of the Natural Law. Man is by nature a po-
litical being. The State as the natural "perfect society"
is in its institution and jurisdiction independent of Grace
and Supernature. Furthermore, though founded in
human nature and therefore necessary for its most perfect
realization, the concrete State comes into existence not
without the intervention of free human acts. That is,
the concrete State is to be thought to come into existence
by a consent, by a covenant, by a social contract of the
"family-fathers" who instigante natura see the necessity
to form a more perfect union. The juridical figure of a
pact, a true status contract, will signify not so much that
an historically documented solemn covenant has been
formally concluded, but that free human acts have pro-
duced the State, not a divine interventive act. Further-
more, with the initial formation of the however-rudimen-
tary body politic, political authority, ultimately deriving
from God as the Creator of human political nature, rests
immediately with the body politic, which is, therefore,
an immediate democracy. Any other form of govern-
ment, such as representative democracy or monarchy,
must consequently be considered as produced by a dis-
tinct act of the body politic; i.e., of the people in the po-
litical sense - by an act of transfer of political authority.
There is no intrinsic reason why this or that person should
have by nature a right to political authority since all the
partners in the original covenant are free and equal. This
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does not invalidate the duty of the covenantors to give
up the immediate democracy and to institute a different
form of government, a monarchy, for instance, by consent
in the interest of the more perfect and more efficient real-
ization of the common good.
But it is clear that all forms of government are derived
from an original constituent power of the people. Even
though it is indisputable that political authority is ulti-
mately derived from God, immediately it is derived from
the people. Consequently, all political forms of govern-
ment - and absolute monarchy, too - are merely crea-
tures of positive, man-made law: not of the Natural Law
-and even less of positive, divine law, as the Divine
Right theory taught. Demonstration of the validity of
the Divine Right theory would require a revealed act of
God, of which there is no historical record. Even the
rule of Saul and David, so often cited as examples by the
Divine Right theorists, is not acceptable to St. Robert
Bellarmine as being instituted directly by God.
Since all constitutions, all forms of government, are of
positive man-made law only, they are all "limited" by
the Natural Law. Every consensual act of transfer of
political authority to a person or to a group of persons
contains as an unconditional clause: salvo jure naturale
- and, consequently, salvis juribus naturalibus. The le-
gitimacy of political power rests, in the last analysis, upon
its service to the common good, because the right to the
realization of the common good is also an inalienable
right of the people. From this it follows that the people
have by Natural Law the right to active and passive re-
sistance, first, against the usurpator, and, second, against
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the tyrannus secundum regimen; i.e., the initially legiti-
mate ruler who gravely violates the common good.
The twin concepts of the limitation of political author-
ity and the right of the people to resist tyranny form, by
the way, the content of mediaeval constitutionalism,
which rested on three principles: first, the Law is su-
preme, rather than the king or the estates of the realm
separately acting - this is the theory of the supremacy of
the Law, Legem servare hoc est regnare . . . ; second,
the principle that the Law issues from a kind of co-opera-
tion between the royal authority and the estates, the for-
mer having the right of legislative initiative and the lat-
ter, by their consent, limiting the initiative of the king
through the public sense of justice that animates the
people; third, the principle that the people or the estates
have a right to resist an act of the king violating the Law
as a "pactum," a "covenant," a "constitutio," contracted
by the king and the people and binding, therefore, each
of them equally. If the king acted against the pactum,
then the legitimacy of the act (and even of the authority
of the king) was destroyed. This pattern of thinking was
especially valid if the act of the king was against the Nat-
ural Law. That meant also that the king could not in-
fringe upon the solemnly established and agreed upon
Liberties and Immunities of the estates, the cities and the
towns, the guilds, and other communities from which
were then derived the rights of the individual according
to the community spirit of the Middle Ages.
Thus it is significant that against the theory of the Rex
legibus solutus, against the Divine Right theory, which
made of the king a "Pro-Deus" (Bacon), a "'Deus mor-
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talis" (Hobbes), and made consequently an appeal
against an act of the king impossible, since there is no
appeal against a divinely instituted authority, the Mas-
ters established, besides the existing positive constitutional
law, the Natural Law as the basis of an appeal against
the tyrannical ruler. Seditio, i.e., unlawful rebellion
against legitimate (in the formal and in the material
sense) government was clearly distinguished from the
right to active as well as passive resistance, that is, lawful
revolution. The similarity of the arguments of the Mas-
ters of the second flowering of Scholasticism to the argu-
ments of the Declaration of Independence is so evident
that it need not be elaborated on.
VII
Still another characteristic feature of the development
of Natural Law doctrine during the second flowering of
Scholasticism - and this in a certain consonance with
the spirit of the Christian Renaissance and with
eighteenth-century theories of human rights - is the
elaboration of the concepts of the Jura Naturalia, espe-
cially those of liberty and property. What was contained
implicitly in the thought of St. Thomas was made ex-
plicit in the writings of this period. It is true that such
a nominalist as Occam in his day stressed the fact that
the Jura Naturalia were subjective rights existing in con-
sequence of the objective norm. The term Jus for St.
Thomas, meant primarily the objective Justum, the Law,
and very seldom did he mean by it the subjective right
as it was known to the Roman Law. But for Occam Jus
becomes "Potentas licita actum aliquem exercendi"; and,
NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
significantly, Occam singles out Liberty as such a Potestas,
natural to man as a person. This natural right of Liberty
may not be taken away from man without "guilt" or rea-
sonable cause against his will, though man may voluntar-
ily give up his Liberty. Occam, thus, has quite clearly
the idea of Natural Rights; and this is easily understood
if we are aware that the most positive among the many
negative features of Nominalism was its interest in the
individual generally and in the human personal will as a
creative cause of human political and cultural life.
The theory of the Natural Rights of the person and of
the State finds its full "explication" in the century from
Vittoria to Bellarmine. Vittoria points out - in his de-
fense of the Indians against the theses of Sepulveda, who
espoused a rather ruthless colonial imperialism, that the
Indians, as persons and as citizens of independent states,
are not by nature slaves or subjects of civilized Christian
nations. When Sepulveda cites the famous Aristotelean
thesis that some are by nature slaves, Vittoria tries to
excuse Aristotle by pointing out that Aristotle only means
that those who by virtue of high intellectual gifts are
capable of ruling themselves are shown thereby to be
capable of ruling those of "brawny bodies." But Aristotle
does not mean, according to Vittoria, that what Jefferson
was later to call "the natural aristocracy" has a natural
right to rule as masters those of weaker minds and lower
civilization, who by nature are destined to slavery. Slav-
ery was not conceived by Vittoria as an institution al-
lowed by Natural Law, not even of a secondary Natural
Law (as taught by the Stoics and the Mediaeval Scholas-
tics, who held that slavery was immoral in the status
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naturae purae - that is according to primary Natural
Law - but excusable as a consequence of sin - accord-
ing to the secondary Natural Law). For Vittoria slavery
as a hereditary status of servitude is exclusively lure
Humano; it is not even an institution of the Jus Gentium
- that somewhat vague medium between the Jus Nat-
urale and the Jus Civile. When Vittoria discusses mon-
archy, which he prefers to other forms of government in
accordance with the scholastic tradition (though we
should be quite clear that monarchy does not mean to
him the hereditary absolute monarchy of the seventeenth
century), he stresses that Liberty is as well, nay, better,
protected under monarchy, the clearly circumscribed and
stable rule of one, than under the rule of the few or the
many. This idea of Liberty as a right to be best pro-
tected under monarchy is new. Before Vittoria, the ar-
gument for monarchy was taken from the idea of the ob-
jective order requiring an objective authority of one will
to protect its own stability; with Vittoria, the argument
for monarchy flows from his concept that under mon-
archy the Liberty of the subjects is best protected.
From Vittoria on, the theory of Liberty as a natural
right of persons and of the State is developed further
concomitantly with the argument against servitude. The
distinction between the primary Natural Law and the
secondary is abandoned: the Fall of Man is no longer
considered to have any influence upon the core of Natural
Law. The Jus Gentium becomes, on the one hand, a posi-
tive general Law of civilized nations, an "allgemeines
Kulturrecht"; and, on the other hand, it becomes a Jus
inter Gentes, the positive part of the Law of Nations. If,
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thus, Liberty is a right based on the Natural Law, then all
forms of servitude are products of merely human law
with its imperfections. Aristotle's argument about slav-
ery as an hereditary status of servitude is declared un-
acceptable and absurd. Suarez, for instance, stresses that
personal Liberty belongs positively to Natural Law, that
it is a natural right, because man as a rational, free being
has a natural dominium over his Liberty. Liberty can be
lost only by free and voluntary surrender or "ex justa
causa"; i.e., as a punishment for crimes (and it is sig-
nificant that Suarez continues - just as the State may
take away the life of a criminal according to just criminal
law). As the life of an innocent man is sacred, so also is
his Liberty. For like life, so is Liberty given to each man
by the Creator Himself; and by nature all are free and
equal. These ideas are applied also to the State as a
persona moralis. The State is by nature a Free State,
with the right of self-determination. The constituent
members establish by the social pact, primaeva institu-
tione, an immediate democracy: this original democracy
ought ordinarily transform itself, by constitutional posi-
tive act, into a monarchy, absolute or limited; into an
aristocracy; or into an indirect representative democracy.
All forms of government are, consequently, of positive
historical law. There is no Divine Right of Kings; or of
Democratic Majorities.
Similarly, States have a natural right to Liberty and in-
dependence from one another under Natural and Inter-
national Law. Therefore, the great Doctors of this period
reject all the arguments of the defenders of colonial im-
perialism with the counter-argument that the pagan
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States of the Indians are by Natural Law free and inde-
pendent, and that all claims of the Spanish must be based
only on the International Law of the community of
nations.
It is significant that property and the natural right to
property are treated similarly to Liberty. True, the Mas-
ters of that time did not need to treat of these problems
as widely and profoundly as they required to be treated
in the nineteenth century under the impact of Marxist
Socialism. Yet the question arose in connection, again,
with the rights of the Indians. These have, so the Doc-
tors said, a true dominium of their properties, real and
movable; to take away their properties would be a viola-
tion of Natural Law. Suarez also criticized the doctrine
of some jurists who asserted that the temporal king could,
by reason of his absolute power, arbitrarily transfer the
property of one man to another, or confiscate it. This,
declared Suarez, is "'absurdissima" and also against the
natural right that everybody has to his legitimate proper-
ty. Suarez and others also taught that the division of
goods (i.e., private property as a legal institution) is not
a consequence of sin, but is convenient to nature and
might have been introduced even in the status naturae
purae. Under the influence of natural reason, private
property was introduced among all civilized nations, and
everyone has now the natural right to his property as he
has the right to the fruits of his labor.
An interesting sidelight on this positive evaluation of
Liberty is afforded by a short discussion of the ideas on
economic liberty and monopoly held by these Masters of
the Scholasticism's second flowering. The main problem
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has always been: under what conditions will the prices
of goods and services be just? Under what conditions
will they be what they should be, according to Natural
Law? Will prices have the best chance to be justly estab-
lished under conditions of a free market and under the
rules of ordered free competition? Or is it necessary that
the Government regulate the prices and exchanges in
order to assure just prices? And how far are monopolies,
private and public, permissible, which by their own eco-
nomic power can control prices?
Among the many theologians who have treated of
these problems from the points of view of ethics and the
Natural Law, Molina stands out particularly. In his re-
markable book, De Justitia et de Jure, he demands, first,
that economic exchanges must follow the rules of com-
mutative justice - the equality of value and price; and,
secondly, that the just price is not influenced by the eco-
nomic status of persons as exchangers, but is determined
absolutely through such factors as costs, supply and de-
mand, which altogether represent the "natural price"
under due consideration of the changes in the "value" of
money. Molina held that the natural (i.e., the just) price
has the greatest chance to be the actual market price un-
der conditions of a free exchange market and stability of
money. Regulated prices have much less chance to be just
prices, because Government regulation cannot meet the
frequent changes that take place among the determining
factors of the natural price. He condemns private mon-
opolies as usurpations and enslavements of the free market
in contradiction to the Natural Law. He accepts regula-
tion of prices only in emergency situations and rejects
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them as ordinary means of directing economic life by the
State. State monopolies are accepted on the condition
that they serve the common good, because they may be
considered as a source of public revenue; but they must
never serve private interests in the form of privileges. If
the King therefore grants, for reasons of the common
good, certain merchants' associations or craftsmen's
guilds, e.g. printers, monopoly privileges, then the prices
must be regulated in harmony with the Natural Law
principle of the just price. Molina's views thus show, in
accordance with the general tendency, a highly positive
evaluation of Liberty in the economic exchanges in a free
market, as a natural condition for the realization of the
just price. This positive attitude toward ordered Liberty
in economic life is further accentuated by his strong crit-
icism of unfair monopolistic practices and by his diffi-
dence toward Government controlled markets and prices.
VIII
After this survey, which by its very nature is sketchy
and cannot be considered at all comprehensive, it is easy
to understand why so eminent a jurist and scholar as Jo-
seph Kohler, professor at the University in Berlin, who,
recognizing the insufficiency of legal positivism, conse-
quently had delved into the Natural Law Tradition,
could write in 1916 that a revival of Natural Law must
return to the thought of the Masters of the second flower-
ing of Scholasticism, and not to Hugo Grotius and the
Rationalists. It is the tragedy of the rationalist Natural
Law as it developed on the European continent that it
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ultimately served only as political ideology and propa-
ganda able to attack the Ancien Rigime and to produce
the Revolution and the Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen and then be drowned in the Ter-
ror-Regime of the Jacobines, or to be forgotten by rising
nationalism and the general positivism which got control
of the universities and of the courts. The Common Law
countries have been luckier, at least to a degree. In its
tradition and under the influence of the clerics of the
Chancery, the idea of a Natural Law was better preserved
than on the European continent. This tradition was pro-
tected by the judges who mostly felt that they were in-
trusted with the Law and the administration of justice;
they held in the majority that Law is reason, right reason,
that is, positive law must be in agreement with the Nat-
ural Law and with natural Justice and Equity. Though
there are not absent dark pages in the history of the Com-
mon Law, it remains true that all through the centuries,
the tradition of Natural Law never was fully abandoned
in the history of the Common Law. It was the judges
who, animated by the Natural Law, took on the guar-
dianship of the Law as a Rule of Reason and for reason-
able free citizens, against absolutist kings and the thread
of tyrannical majorities in the legislatures. Jurists and
Judges who are philosophically mere pragmatists and
positivists cannot be the guardians of the Natural Rights
because they have abandoned the sources from which
these rights and their dignity are simultaneously derived:
the Natural Law.
STATUS OF NATURAL LAW IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE*
Robert N. Wilkin
T HE noted French philosopher, Etienne Gilson, has said
truly: "The natural law always buries its undertak-
ers." ' It now seems that we are witnessing the obsequies
of the Natural-Law morticians of our day. And our feel-
ings are expressed by the words of the United States sen-
ator who was asked if he expected to attend the last rites
for a national character of his day: "No," he said, "I am
not going to the funeral, but I approve of it."
The French philosopher's observation was based upon
the fact that history reveals man's necessity to return to
Natural Law concepts whenever they have been aban-
doned. Man is forced again and again to return to the
"Natural Law way of thinking" because it is an expres-
sion of his moral nature. There are principles applicable
to man's moral nature which are referred to as laws just
as there are principles referred to as laws of his physical
nature. The main thesis of this discussion is that we are
now in one of those periods when the circumstances of
life again force men to accept the principles of Natural
Moral Law.
Any lawyer whose professional career began during
the first ten years of the present century and who is still
alive and able to note the trends of current thought, has
Also printed in 24 Notre Dame Lawyer 343 (1949).
1 HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAw 242 (1948).
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witnessed two great changes in the philosophy of juris-
prudence. When he came to the bar, Coke, Blackstone,
Kent, Story, Minor, and Cooley were still respected
sources of legal learning, and the Natural Law philosophy
of the Founding Fathers was unquestioned. But during
the ensuing thirty years there was a great shift from those
authorities and that philosophy to what has come to be
known as modem positivism or realism. And now within
the last eight or ten years there are unmistakable signs of
dissatisfaction over the insufficiency, the aridity, of mod-
em positivism, and very definite indications of a revival
of Natural Law philosophy.
It is of course impossible to set exact dates or clearly
define the boundaries of trends in thought or philosophy.
Changes come about gradually, they are never complete.
There is always the remnant, the modicum, who adhere
to the former course in spite of popular deflections. The
boundaries of eras and trends are not clear cut; they
feather out. But the general effects of the great trends
are nevertheless quite apparent.
Positivism
It is unnecessary to trace in detail the extent or effect
of positivism during the early decades of this century.
That has been well done by Dean Pound, Mr. Ben Pal-
mer, Mr. Harold McKinnon, Mrs. C. P. Ives, and others.
As Mr. McKinnon says:
This teaching nullifies the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the preamble of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. It nullifies twenty-five hundred years of
progress in political and legal theory and re-enacts
in the present age some of the worst political and
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legal errors of ancient times. It is indistinguishable,
in its origin and its logical effect, from philosophies
which characterized lands against which we have
just fought the bloodiest war in history.2
At Home
In this country positivism tended to discredit the judi-
cial function and over-emphasize the importance of ad-
ministrative procedure. The fiat rule of administrative
boards was substituted quite extensively for legal proce-
dure of courts.3 Precedent was disregarded, balance of
powers was scoffed at, and the Constitution was openly
flouted.
This all came about in a very subtle and indirect way.
There was no open or frontal attack, and the overwhelm-
ing majority of the legal profession never knew that there
was a movement against the basic principles of our juris-
prudence until they discovered that all their arguments
based on inalienable rights, Natural Law, or the Consti-
tution, were being laughed at by public administrators.
The champions of modem Positivism, the self-styled Real-
ists, proceeded mainly by innuendo and cynicism. In-
spired by the pragmatism of Professor John Dewey and
the skepticism of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, they
arrogated a disdain for Natural Law and discredited all
claims of natural right. It then gradually became their
habit to assume, as some said, that "most of the best
2 Harold R. McKinnon, The Higher Law, an address delivered before
the conference of Federal Judges of the Ninth Circuit at San Francisco,
Sept. 3, 1946. Published by the Gillik Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1946. 33
A.B.A.J. 966 (1947).
3 JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, NEW INSTRUMENTS OF PUBLIC POWER (Cali-
fornia Bar Association, 1946).
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thinkers on politics (meaning themselves) of the present
day will agree that there is no such thing as a natural
right," and that "modem scholars (again themselves)
have totally abandoned natural law." One student was
told in open class by his law professor that he should
never again mention Natural Law, that its concepts were
unattainable, antiquated, discredited, and dead as the
dodo.
All the younger officers of the Ship of State during the
1930's and early 1940's were men who had been subjected
to this modem sophistry during the impressionable years
of their education. The older men, it seems, were intimi-
dated by the oncoming intelligentsia; they were afraid to
defend the Natural-Law concepts of right and truth and
justice lest they be thought puritans, prudes, or old-fash-
ioned. This attitude of skepticism, cynicism, and nega-
tion toward the moral and ideal concepts of Natural Law
philosophy found a very congenial climate of opinion in
the intense scientism, materialism, and secularism which
followed World War I.
The critical problems of our national life today have
come directly from this materialistic and positivist atti-
tude toward life and law. When the ethical and moral
content of our philosophy was abandoned, men felt free
to assert without restraint their novel theories and their
personal and class selfishness, avarice and greed. As a
result of the disrespect for courts and the judicial process
there followed a corresponding neglect of the common
interest and public welfare. The sole aim in life of most
men was profits or wages, and the affairs of government
were abandoned to policy amateurs or to self-seeking
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politicians who bartered and traded for self-aggrandize-
ment and success of party, bloc, or union. Disputes be-
tween the great monopolies of employers and unions led
to strikes which paralyzed the economic life of the coun-
try. Agents of government merely pampered and pan-
dered instead of enforcing the established principles of
law which for centuries had protected the community in-
terest. At a time when our national power reached its
maximum strength in the world it seemed to be disinte-
grating at home.
Effect on Judiciary
The clearest evidence of this disintegration was re-
vealed in the Supreme Court. The number of reversals
and dissents exceeded all previous records. The upward
sweep of dissents from the year 1910 to 1946 ranged from
thirteen per cent to sixty-four per cent.4 Landmark de-
cisions in constitutional law were overruled with alarming
celerity. The constitutional balance of powers was fre-
quently ignored, in accordance with positivist theory, and
the legislative function was usurped in order to overrule
long-established principles and promulgate the Court's
idea of what the "trend and policy" of law should be.
The decisions of the Court were not supported by any
uniformity of reasoning even by the justices who agreed
on decisions. There was no integrating science of law
because the fundamental and coordinating principles of
our jurisprudence and constitutionalism had been dis-
credited and abandoned. Decisions and opinions were
4 Ben W. Palmer, Dissents and Overrulings: A Study of Developments
in the Supreme Court, 34 A.B.A.J. 554 (July 1948).
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improvised according to the predilections of the various
justices. Informed observers seemed to hear again the
critical words of Cicero as he watched the disintegration
of the Roman Republic:
All confidence was banished from the Forum, not
by the stroke of any new calamity, but by the gen-
eral suspicion entertained of the courts of justice,
and by the disorder into which they had fallen, and
by the constant reversal of previous decisions. 5
The chief purpose of the law is to habituate that con-
duct which conserves the public good. When therefore
the law loses its certainty and no reliance can be placed
in judicial decisions, the law ceases to perform its func-
tion. Furthermore, the characteristic of our jurispru-
dence, which had distinguished it from the systems of law
in those countries with which we had gone to war, was its
devotion to reason. When judicial decisions departed
from precedent and were based upon the mere prepos-
sessions of judges, they lost the distinctive character of
Anglo-American jurisprudence and took on a similitude
to the arbitrary or fiat rule of totalitarian governments.
It was therefore not without reason that some commen-
tators remarked that what we had fought for abroad we
had lost at home.
Abroad
The effects of this materialistic and positivist attitude
toward life and law were not confined to our country. It
had a world-wide effect. It is now generally recognized
that one of the influences that brought about the revival
5 Cxczao, Dz LEGs AoRAmA, Oratio II, 3, Fin.
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of the positivist philosophy of law in modem times was
the assertion of extreme nationalism which followed the
break-up of the Holy Roman Empire into separate
states.6 The arbitrary demands of independent states
against one another and the fiat rule of such states within
their own boundaries could not be justified by the prin-
ciples of Natural Law. As always, the assertion of ar-
bitrary will was found to be at variance with the moral
and ethical ideals of the Law of Nature. The classical
philosophers, the Roman jurisconsults, the Scholastic
writers, and the great authorities on international law,
such as Suarez and Grotius, were therefore abandoned.
The champions of statism adopted those principles which
soon found expression in the teachings and practices of
Machiavelli and later were exemplified in the Fascism
of Mussolini and the Realpolitik of Hitler. Such theories
of government are responsible for the sordid history of
power politics and international anarchy which led quite
naturally to the two world wars and the fateful climax
that now confronts the world.
Effect on Peace
When the victors in World War II assembled at San
Francisco to form some organization for world affairs
they disregarded the proposal of China and several other
states to establish a government upon universal and fun-
damental principles of justice and resorted instead to the
old hoax of a tenuous and tentative balance of power
among independent sovereign nations. The inadequacy
6 ROmMEN, op. cit, supra note 1, at 128; William Seagle, MEN OF LAw
113-1 14 (1947); Irving Babbitt, DEMOCRACY AND) LEADERSHIP 37, 42, 53
(1939).
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of such an organization became apparent two months
later when the first atom bomb fell on Hiroshima. The
insufficiency of UNO to maintain peace and security in
the world has been demonstrated daily by subsequent in-
ternational events. Now of course United Nations Or-
ganization is a step in the right direction and must have
our full support in the good that it has done and is doing,
but it is to be regretted that it did not establish juridical
order at the beginning instead of a balance of powers.
The war was fought for human rights and human dig-
nity, but the victors failed to affirm and assert the eternal
principles upon which such rights and dignity depend.
On the contrary, they adopted and acted upon the false
theories of the nations which they had vanquished. They
built the United Nations upon the impossible and im-
moral doctrine of national sovereignty in international
affairs and ignored the universal and eternal principles of
Natural Law which had been expounded and exemplified
by the great philosophers and jurists for twenty-five hun-
dred years.
It is one of the great tragedies of human history that
when this nation came to its apex of power and exerted
a force and influence which no other nation had ever pos-
sessed, it deserted the basic philosophy of its Founding
Fathers,7 abandoned the principles upon which its legal
institutions were built, and insisted not on constitutional-
ism and the rule of law, but on the veto power for the as-
sertion of arbitrary will. In demanding the right of veto
7 Clarence Manion, The Natural Law Philosophy of the Founding
Fathers, Natural Law Institute, University of Notre Dame, 1947, THE PRO-
CERDINOS OF THE NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE, Vol. I (1949).
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it abandoned the states that represented our ideals of
government and united with the U.S.S.R., which is the
very antithesis of our form of government and our system
of jurisprudence.
The struggle of nations for ascendance has by a process
of elimination now been brought to a final contest be-
tween two great world powers. The juxtaposition of
these two great powers, with the attendant rivalry, sus-
picion, and friction, makes a final world struggle inevit-
able, if they continue to trust in the might of their own
armaments. If the disaster of a third world war is to be
averted, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. must acknowledge
the impossibility of national sovereignty in international
affairs and then unite in an effort to establish juridical
order for the world.
Revival of Natural Law
Thus we see that our most, critical problems at home
and abroad stem directly from the materialistic or posi-
tivist philosophy of law and government which had be-
come so prevalent in the twentieth century. But, as al-
ready stated, when the effects of this modem sophistry
began to appear, there also appeared some definite signs
of a counter-movement, a return to Natural Law philos-
ophy. Here again our limitations forbid a detailed ac-
count of the trend. But a few of the indisputable signs
of a renaissance should be noted.
In 1930 The Harvard University Press published the
doctoral thesis of Charles Grove Haines, entitled, The
Revival of Natural Law Concepts.8 The expansion of
8 CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS
(1930).
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such revival since the publication of that book is indicated
by the book's growing reputation and the ever-increasing
references to it. In June 1942 The Notre Dame Lawyer
published "The Revival of Natural Law," by Roscoe
Pound. This was a publication of four lectures delivered
at the College of Law, and in the first paragraph Dean
Pound said that in the present century there had been "a
revival of what was called juridical idealism, a revival of
philosophical jurisprudence, and as it soon came to be
called, a revival of natural law."
Dean Pound has been a powerful influence in such re-
vival, because he, like the jurists of Scotland, Italy, and
the Catholic faculties whom he mentions, never followed
the deflections from Natural Law philosophy which
began in the latter part of the nineteenth century. His
lectures, books, and articles in the legal magazines con-
tinuously and vigorously opposed "the skeptical realism,"
"the give-it-up political and legal philosophy" of the day,
and championed that philosophy which gives us "faith
that we can do things and so enables us to do things."
In November 1941 the Texas Law Review published a
devastating criticism of the positivist philosophy of law.
It was written by Moses J. Aronson, Editor of the Journal
of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence.9 A reprint had
wide circulation. Its significant title was The Swan-Song
of Legal Realism. It pointed out that the error of the self-
styled realists lay in their failure to accept thought, feel-
ings, and prevalent moral intuitions as part of experience.
In that regard they are not realists. By rejecting funda-
9 Moses J. Aronson, Book Review, 20 TEx. L. Rxv. 118 (1941). Re-
printed entitled The Swan-Song of Legal Realism.
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mental insights of human nature, the natural and empir-
ical reality of ideals and standards, they create an illusory
theory of realism and a distorted conception of law. The
processes that express the synthetical function of our sen-
sibility and understanding, for that very reason, possess
the validity of laws of nature, if we mean by nature the
totality of phenomena.
This renaissance of Natural Law is revealed more re-
cently in such publications (illustrative but not exhaus-
tive) as:
Magazine Articles
"Defense Against Leviathan," by Ben W. Palmer. 10
"The Higher Law," by Harold R. McKinnon."
"Law and Philosophy," by Harold R. McKinnon.12
"Thomas Aquinas: Advocate of Natural Law and Lim-
ited Sovereignty," by Wendell Phillips Dodge, Jr.13
The articles on Dissents and Reversals in the U. S. Su-
preme Court appearing serially and currently in the
American Bar Association Journal, and the accompany-
ing editorials.' 4
Books
The American Philosophy of Law, by LeBuffe and
Hayes. 5
10 Ben W. Palmer, Defense Against Leviathan, 32 A.B.A.J. 328 (1946).
11 McKinnon, op. cit. supra note 2.
12 HAROLD R. MCKINNON, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, Canadian Bar Re-
view, August-September, 1948 (reprint).
13 Wendell Phillips Dodge, Jr., Thomas Aquinas: Advocate of Natural
Law and Limited Sovereignty, 33 A.B.A.J. 1013 (October 1947).
14 34 A.B.A.J. 554, 584 et seq. (1948).
15 FRANCIS P. LEBuPFE and JAMES V. HAYES, TE A, MICAN PHI-
LOSOPHY op LAW (1947).
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The Natural Law, by Heinrich A. Rommen.1 6
Liberty Against Government (Chapter II - Roman
and English Origins), by Edward S. Corwin."
And last, but not least, The Natural Law Institutes of
the University of Notre Dame. These Institutes and the
addresses which they sponsored and published have had
a direct, stimulating, and constructive force which can
hardly be over-estimated.
This renewal of interest in Natural Law philosophy is
now being evidenced by citations and references in opin-
ions of the courts and juristic writings. Moreover, the
efforts of the United Nations and other agencies to pro-
mulgate a Bill of Rights for the world have necessarily
called forth appeals to Natural Law philosophy and
citations to juristic authorities on Natural Law. The ar-
guments in the Nuremberg trials and the writings in de-
fense of such proceedings also contain references to Nat-
ural Law concepts and the juristic writings that support a
universal law.
Public Opinion
This revival of Natural Law is supported, moreover, by
a change in the climate of public opinion. The intense
materialism, scientism, and secularism which favored the
positivist philosophy has lost much of its assurance 'and
arrogance since the last war. The bigotry of scientists
has abated. From observations in the laboratory and ob-
servatory the universe had been growing increasingly
mysterious. The great physicists, like Jeans, Millikan and
Eddington, recognized a plan and order which did not
16 ROMMEN, op. cit. supra note 1.
17 EDnWAuw S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948).
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exclude God. And the great geologist, Dr. Alfred Church
Lane, said shortly before his death that "There are defi-
nite signs of God's plan in the story of the earth as re-
corded in Geology .... Belief in God is necessary to the
progress of humanity." 18
When Dr. Einstein and the nuclear scientists them-
selves began to cry out for the assertion of moral force to
save the world from the destructive agencies which
science had released, leaders of thought in all fields of
endeavor began again to consider the source of man's
moral power. The confession of science, made at the time
of its own greatest achievement, that it was unable to save
mankind from disaster, revived a general concern for
those ideals and beliefs which had sustained man's faith
and hope in times past.
This shift in public opinion from material to moral
considerations was evidenced also in education. Sir
Richard Livingston of the University of Oxford voiced
the dissatisfaction of many teachers when he said:
If you want a description of our age, here is one.
The civilization of means without ends; rich in means
beyond any other epoch, and almost beyond human
needs; squandering and misusing them, because it
has no overruling ideal: an ample body with a
meagre soul.
The same feeling was voiced by a schoolman of this
country, 1 9 who said that when we consider the crisis of
Western civilization, the possibilities of doom and dis-
aster, we cannot escape the feeling of Arnold that the
world
18 Alfred Church Lane, My Faith, American Weekly, July 18, 1948.
19 J. Fred Waring, The Alumni Record. Hudson, Ohio, Spring 1948.
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Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
Such feelings by schoolmen could not be ignored. Educa-
tional surveys were instituted by various agencies, includ-
ing the President of the United States, and the aims and
methods of teaching were re-examined. As a result we
now hear schoolmen declare that
Citizenship should be grounded in morality that
flows from religion, alert to the problems of the day
and ready to translate the ethical ideals of religion
and democracy into the realities of common life.
And we hear the dean of a state university law school
proclaim "the democratic ideal, of which the Christian
ethic of sympathy is a religious expression."
In the field of general literature there has been a no-
ticeable trend away from the cynics and skeptics, who
derided and scoffed so popularly during the nineteen-
twenties, toward an increasing interest in mysticism and
religion.2 0 Philosophy and religion have gained respec-
tability with the sophisticates, and such works as Toyn-
bee's Christian Philosophy of History, Lecomte des
Nouey's Human Destiny, and The Road to Reason, and
Liebman's Peace of Mind have become best sellers.
Well-informed observers now testify to a general reli-
gious awakening. It does not evidence itself in the form
of the old-time emotional revival, but appears in such
movements as the effort of merchants and manufacturers
20 Editorial, 34 A.B.A.J. 1119 (December 1948).
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for Christian Ethics in Business. As stated by C. A.
Arlington:
"The brotherhood of mankind" is now an article of
faith with many who reject the doctrine on which
alone it securely rests, the Christian ideal is accepted
by many who deny its creed, and what are called the
Christian virtues are honored by many who do not
know them to be divine.21
Such activity can hardly be called religious in the true
sense of the word. But it does emphasize the moral sig-
nificance of life and give practical effect to the teaching
of religion. We realize this when we read in an influen-
tial magazine the statement of a great teacher of econom-
ics that "the basis of all 'sensible and feasible' economic
policies is moral rather than economic." 22 The best ex-
emplification of the practical application of a religious
principle is found in the doctrine of trusteeship which is
now accepted and implemented by the United Nations.
Such concern for backward and unfortunate people is but
Christian charity applied to international affairs. Char-
ity and service are substituted for imperialism and ex-
ploitation in international relations.
When we read the recent address of Mr. John Foster
Dulles, advisor on our bi-partisan foreign policy, we
recognize how nearly complete is our return to Natural
Law. Speaking on the possibilities of peace in the world,
he said:
Two great principles are here involved. One is rec-
21 C. A ARLINGTON, EUROPE, A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL SURVEY
(1948).
22 William A. Orton, Business and Ethics, Fortune, October 1948, p.
118.
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ognition that there is a moral law and that it pro-
vides the only proper sanction for man-made laws.
The other principle is that every human individual,
as such, has dignity and worth that no man-made
law, no human power, can rightly desecrate ...
Experience shows that when men organize a society
in accordance with these two basic beliefs, they can,
within such society, have peace with each other.23
Those two principles are the very pith and marrow of
Natural Law.
Cycle of Natural Law
Thus it comes to pass that we witness the repetition
again of a cycle of history of Natural Law. Our genera-
tion has seen what Dr. Rommen refers to as the Age of
Individualism and Rationalism, the Victory of Positivism,
and now the Reappearance of Natural Law. The very
force of circumstances, the tragic and fateful crisis that
confronts us, compel us, if we are to save humanity from
violence and degradation, to turn again to those principles
of life which differentiate men from the brutes. And as
Macneile Dixon has said, "If there is anything at all to
distinguish man from the brutes, it is his very singular
faith in absolute and eternal values."
Twenty-five hundred years ago Plato in his discussion
of the Laws introduced the doctrine of an ideal law which
resulted from the divine ordering of the cosmos. The
Stoics developed this idea into the doctrine of a universal
law binding all rational beings into a world community.
A cosmic law should have cosmic validity, and as a result
23 John Foster Dulles, Which Way to World Peace . . . Revolution or
Reform 3 FREE O AND UNION 8 (October 1948).
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all mankind should participate in a sphere of rights and
duties that transcend political boundaries.2 4 To the Ro-
man jurisconsults this became the Law of Nature; i.e.,
the natural law of man's moral nature, or Natural Moral
Law. It was accepted by the Church Fathers because it
was consonant with Christian teaching. And through
them it came to the Scholastic philosophers of the Middle
Ages, who welded it and implemented it into constitu-
tionalism, the theory of government limited by law. That
is the source and essence of Western civilization and the
very foundation of our own national life.2 5
But the history of Natural Law has not been so direct
and smooth as that brief summary would indicate. It has
suffered the slings and arrows of misfortune. It has beern
misused and abused. Like all doctrines that exercise re-
straint and make for righteousness, it has been opposed
by the perversity and evil tendency which is inherent in
human nature. Moreover it has been misrepresented by
its over-zealous adherents, and then scoffed at by skeptics
and cynics. It has been erroneously referred to as support
for many false doctrines. Autocracy, vested interests, and
reaction have been especially prone to use it as a shield
for imperialism. As a result, many have opposed it who
should have opposed only its abuse.
But in spite of all opposition, and the numerous periods
of neglect and decline, Natural Law comes again into
ascendancy, because it is based on man's rational and so-
cial nature and the moral order of life. As Emerson said:
24 Glenn R. Morrow, Plato and the Law of Nature, in ESSAYS IN PO-
LITICAL THEORY 43 (1948).
25 ROBERT N. WILKIN, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION AND INDUSTRIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 28-33, 36 (1948); Manion, op. cit supra note 7.
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The intuition of the moral sentiment is an insight of
the perfection of the laws of the soul. These laws
execute themselves.25a
And so in our day, at the very time when the positivists
were proclaiming their exact science of law, and the mod-
em skeptics, like the sophists of old, were denying all pos-
sibility of truth or justice, and the teachers of the intelli-
gentsia were proclaiming the death of Natural Law, an
inexorable destiny impels us to recognize it as the con-
trolling factor in our political life and our only hope for
peace and security. Our present experience brings back
to us the conclusions of the Stoic philosophers, the Roman
jurisconsults, and the Church Fathers. And so again the
Natural Law returns to bury its undertakers.
Before I conclude I should like to make two general
observations: (1) On constitutionalism, and (2) on the
practice of courts.
(1) Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is the true implementation of Nat-
ural Law, but it is threatened today by a too far swing
toward absolute or unrestrained democracy.
Every normal man is subject to two conflicting im-
pulses. One prompts him to do as he pleases. The other
prompts him to do as he ought. One produces conduct
that is willful, capricious, arbitrary. The other produces
conduct that is reasonable, conscionable, just.
These conflicting impulses are present not only in every
individual but in every aggregation of individuals, includ-
25a R. W. Emerson, Address, Divinity College, MISCELLANIES 118
(Houghton, Miflin & Co. 1882).
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ing nations and states. But the impulse to willful and ar-
bitrary conduct becomes stronger in those who exercise
the power of government. And, as already stated, the
development of extreme nationalism has tended to en-
courage and defend the exercise of autocratic power, be-
cause the selfish tribal instinct is stronger in men than
their ethical judgment. Human history is largely the
story of conflict between arbitrary wills. And the history
of political evolution is the story of what von Jhering re-
ferred to as "The struggle for law"; that is, the effort to
bring the arbitrary will under the control of reason and
ethical judgment.
The culture or civilization of a man or a nation may
be measured by the degree to which arbitrary conduct
has been brought into rational control. "The wise man
does what ought to be done." The supreme accomplish-
ment for control of government is constitutionalism. That
is the great achievement of Western civilization. It pro-
vides a government not of men but of law, as distin-
guished from the absolutism or despotism of Eastern civ-
ilization. Just as man has found it necessary to have some
fixed standards and principles to control his arbitrary
will, so the state has need of some permanent principles,
embodied in a constitution, which set bounds to its ar-
bitrary impulses as expressed in government or the popu-
lar will at a particular moment.
The theory of government-subject-to-law was known
to Greek philosophers and Roman jurisconsults. Cicero
dealt with the idea in the Commonwealth. But it was
never implemented and made effective until the Middle
Ages. Prior to that time there was no independent
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agency, no permanent judiciary, to give effect to the law
and restrain the arbitrary power of governmental agents.
When men of the Church brought humanity up out of
the Dark Ages they became ministers of state and for
hundreds of years served as justiciars of the law.2 6 They
were educated in the canon law of the Church and the
civil law of Rome. Their training therefore embraced
both Christian ethic and Natural Law. They examined
the theory of the state and the function of government in
the light of the teaching of a universal church. It was
therefore natural for them to hold that "the King is under
no man but under God and the law." That statement by
Bracton, a priest and judge, and quoted so effectively by
Coke, Chief Justice, became the cornerstone of consti-
tutionalism.
The clerical judges were able to make their theories
effective because of their independent and secure posi-
tions as officers of the church and because of their conse-
cration to the service. When church and state became
separated and men of the church ceased to fill the judicial
offices, the legal profession had been so impressed by their
standards that it carried on the same traditions, just as
the judges assumed the priestly robes.
Thus we see that constitutionalism, the essence of West-
ern civilization, is dependent on two things:
1. The Natural Law theory of a higher law to which
government itself is subject, and
2. Independent courts, presided over by men of learn-
ing who are consecrated to judicial service, with
26 WILKIN, Op. cit. supra note 25, at 12 et. seq.
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authority to restrain abuse of power and arbitrary
conduct.
But history teaches that it is the tendency of those who
oppose autocracy to arrogate to themselves the same
arbitrary power when they become entrusted with the
authority of government. Thus when Parliament won
its struggle against the Crown, it substituted a form of
Parliamentary absolutism to replace the absolute sov-
ereignty of the king. That was the cause of the revolt of
the American colonies. The founders of the American
republic then based their government squarely on Nat-
ural Law and provided independent courts for the pro-
tection of the inalienable rights which such law recog-
nizes.
But the people were given the power to choose their
representatives in government, and now we see a tendency
to enlarge that power into a form of popular absolutism,
"the dictatorship of the proletariat." The populace is
impatient of any legal restraint, and "is everywhere ex-
tending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power
into its impetuous vortex." Flattered by demagogic ref-
erences to "the sovereign people," the voters are led to
believe that they are absolute sovereigns and that their
arbitrary will must prevail. But insofar as that takes
place, constitutionalism disintegrates, 27 and, as Madison
said:
In a democracy, where a multitude of people exer-
cise in person the legislative function, and are con-
tinually exposed, by their incapacity for regular de-
liberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious
27 CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 181, 182.
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intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny may
well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency,
to start up in the same quarter. (p. 309)
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, exec-
utive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny. (p. 300)28
It is apparent that our peace and security are endan-
gered today by an erroneous conception of sovereignty. It
affects both our domestic and foreign affairs. It is wrong
because the claim of absolute sovereignty contravenes the
fundamental principles of Natural Law, i.e., the concept
of a higher law binding on all men and on government
itself. As Professors McIlwain and Corwin have said,
sovereignty is historically a legal concept and implies
legal limitation in its very statement.29 It can not absolve
men or nations from the obligation to be guided by rea-
son rather than arbitrary will.
We can not maintain our free institutions at home or
extend them to the world by the assertion of absolute sov-
ereignty and arbitrary will. If freedom and human dig-
nity are to be preserved, we must preserve constitution-
alism and the Natural Law, upon which it was founded.
As Mark Ethridge says, "We are the trustees of both the
ideological and physical forces of Western civiliza-
tion . . . "
(2) Practice in Courts
Now in closing, if I may be indulged, I should like to
take advantage of this opportunity to give some personal
28 THE FEDERALIST 300, 309 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1889).
29 CoawiN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 188.
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testimony in support of Natural Law. Ever since I be-
came interested in the philosophy of law I have been
hearing the opponents of Natural Law say:
It is impractical. It is idealistic. Its aims and prin-
ciples are very well for such reflective studies as
Ethics and Moral Philosophy, but they have no place
in the actual administration of positive law.
As a result of ten years of experience as a trial judge in a
United States District Court I am convinced that such
assertions are not true. In fact they are mere nonsense.
The principles, standards, and precepts of Natural Law
are continually employed by courts as the constitutions,
statutes, and precedents are interpreted and applied to
the ever-varying circumstances of life. They are em-
ployed also in the interpretation of wills, contracts, con-
duct and relationships of life. They are part of man's
nature and cannot be separated from his life.
Courts continually use such tests as, What is reason-
able? What is true? What is fair? What is just? They
do not stop to ask Pilate's question. They are not dis-
turbed by the intricate ratiocinations of the skeptics who
think that all such concepts are merely subjective and
actually unattainable. Courts are not deterred l y such
conceits. They believe that "Thinking is very far from
knowing." They act upon the admonition of Ruskin that
if we "would only just look at a thing instead of thinking
what it must be like, or do a thing instead of thinking it
cannot be done, we should all get on far better."
In order to illustrate the attitude of courts toward the
assertions of the skeptics, Dean Pound has developed the
analogy to the attitude of civil engineers toward the the-
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ories of the higher mathematicians. In spite of the dis-
crediting effect of relativity upon the axioms of geometry,
he points out that surveyors continue to use those axioms
to meet the needs of men for highways, railroads, and
bridges. So courts rely on the thoughts and beliefs of
common men and give to words their generally accepted
meaning, in confidence that in such matters "the children
of this world are in their generation wiser than the chil-
dren of light."
Not only do courts actually employ the ideals and stan-
dards of Natural Law; I shall say further, that a judge of
sentient mind and heart would hardly be able to endure
the responsibilities of office if he were denied the guiding
influence and sustaining strength of Natural Law pre-
cepts and philosophy.
And so the summation of all my study and experience
brings me to agreement with the statement of Professor
McIlwain that Cicero's words defining Natural Law are
"among the most memorable in political literature":
There is in fact a true law -namely, right reason
- which is in accordance with nature, applies to all
men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its com-
mands this law summons men to the performance of
their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them
from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions
always influence good men, but are without effect
upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human
legislation is never morally right, nor is it permis-
sible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it
wholly is impossible. Neither the Senate nor the
people can absolve us from our obligation to obey
this law, and it requires no Sextus Aelius to expound
and interpret it. It will not lay down one rule at
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Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one rule
today and another tomorrow. But there will be one
law, eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times
upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one
common master and ruler of men, namely God, who
is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its spon-
sor. The man who will not obey it will abandon his
better self, and, in denying the true nature of a man,
will thereby suffer the severest of penalties, though
he has escaped all the other consequences which men
call punishment.30
30 WILKIN, ETERNAL LAWYER: A LEGAL BIOGRAPHY OF CICERO 225
(1947).

